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INTRODUCTION

Setting the Stage

N the first years of this new century a succession of massive corporate
frauds dominated the business sections and front pages of major newspapers, shaking public confidence in the integrity of corporate America. 1
Those scandals raise serious questions about the integrity, acuity and prudence of the accountants and lawyers who structure and document business transactions, approve required financial disclosures and, in the case
of accountants, certify the accuracy of required reports. 2
Congress responded by enacting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
("Sarbanes-Oxley"), which became effective on July 30, 2002. 3 Sarbanes-

1. See Charles P. Kindleberger, Corruption, Crime, Chicanery: Business Through
the Ages, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2002, at C3 (stating that scandals surrounding highly
regarded companies have caused confidence crisis in America).
2. See generallyJohn C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the
SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1293, 1300-07 (2003) (commenting on gatekeeper role of
lawyers and accountants both before and after corporate scandals of 1990s); Susan
P. Koniak, CorporateFraud: See, Lawyers, 26 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 195, 198-210
(2003) [hereinafter Koniak I] (describing role of lawyers in perpetuating recent
fraudulent transactions by large corporate clients; Susan P. Koniak, When the Hurlyburly's Done: The Bar's Struggle with the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1236, 1239-43
(2003) [hereinafter Koniak II] (discussing lawyers' role in wave of corporate
fraud).
3. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 784 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.). Section 307 of
the Act deals specifically with the rule of professional responsibility governing lawyers practicing or appearing before the SEC. Several other provisions of the Act
apply to lawyers but are not considered in this Article. Section 602 codifies part of
Rule 102(e) of the Commission's Rules of Practice, which establishes standards for
disciplining professionals, including prohibiting those professionals from practic-
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Oxley makes many changes in the securities regulation process to improve
corporate governance and reporting. 4 It imposes harsh penalties on violators, creates an elaborate system for governing and regulating auditors for
public companies and requires the securities industry's self-regulatory organizations to adopt rules to prevent conflicts of interest and enhance the
independence of securities analysts. 5 Even casual observers of the political
reaction to the stunning disclosures about Enron's, WorldCom's and
Tyco's deceitful financial practices might have predicted some such legislative response. But little public attention had focused on what the lawyers
for fraud-ridden corporations had been doing while shareholders and the
investing public were being duped. Thus, even careful observers were surprised by Section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley. Section 307 directed the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or the "Commission") to promulgate
"minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing in
practice before the commission." 6

Moreover, Section 307 did more than require the SEC to issue standards for lawyers; it specified that one of those rules require lawyers to
"report evidence of a material violation of the securities law or breach of
fiduciary duty or similar violation by the company or any agent thereof, to
the chief legal or the chief executive officer of the company (or the
equivalent thereof)." 7 If the chief legal officer (CLO) or chief executive

officer (CEO) fails to provide an "appropriate response" to the evidence,
the rule required the lawyer to "report the evidence to the audit committee.., or to another committee of the board of directors comprised solely
of [independent] directors ... , or to the full board."8 This requirement
is typically referred to as "up-the-ladder" reporting, or simply "reporting
up," a phrase we will use here.
On January 29, 2003, the SEC adopted the statutorily mandated rule,
which became effective on August 5, 2003. 9 But that's getting ahead of
the story. We will come back to that. First, some attention is due another
player in this drama, the organized bar.
ing before the SEC. Section 806 provides whistle-blower protection for employees
of public companies in fraud-related matters. Section 3(b) provides sanctions for
violations of the Act or related rules.
4. See id. (stating that this is "[an act to] protect investors by improving the
accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures to the securities laws, and for
other purposes").
5. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7241-7266 (2003) (listing rules on corporate responsibility
and enhanced financial disclosures).
6. Id. § 7245.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Release No. 33-8185, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296 (Feb. 6, 2003) (codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 205) [hereinafter SEC Final Rule] (providing disclosure and withdrawal
standards for securities attorneys practicing before SEC).
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The organized bar was against the enactment of Section 307. It lobbied Congress, arguing that the federal government should stay out of
lawyer regulation because state regulatory authorities could be counted on
to enact and implement appropriate reforms to address the question of
lawyer acquiescence or involvement in corporate fraud.1 0
Congress, however, had good reason to be skeptical of such claims.
Since 1974, when the American Bar Association (ABA) changed Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B) (1) of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility,
abandoning language that required lawyers to disclose client fraud in
which the lawyers' services had been used when the client refused to rectify the fraud in favor of language that required lawyers to keep quiet
about client fraud, the organized bar had steadfastly refused to rethink its
attitude toward client wrongdoing.'" Periodically, the ABA's House of
Delegates had considered proposals to amend Model Rule 1.6, the rule on
lawyer-client confidentiality, to allow lawyers to disclose substantial frauds,
at least those in which the lawyer's services had been used, but time after
2
time the House of Delegates refused, albeit by relatively slim majorities.'
Most damning, the ABA House of Delegates rejected just such a reform
proposal in August 2001, a few months before the disclosure of Enron's
13
massive frauds.
After the Enron disclosures, in February 2002, while Congress was
considering what type of reform legislation to enact, the ABA House of
Delegates effectively refused to reconsider its stance on client fraud. The
ABA voted to accept the package of changes to the Model Rules it had
approved six months earlier, 14 which included no exception to disclose
15
client fraud, unless that fraud was committed against a tribunal.
Instead, the ABA created a Task Force on Corporate Responsibility to
consider whether to recommend changes to the law of corporate governance and to the ABA's Model Rules, particularly the rule on confidentiality, Model Rule 1.6, and the rule on representing organizations, Model

10. See Koniak I, supra note 2, at 220 (discussing ABA's efforts to eliminate
Section 307).

11. See MODEL

RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT

R. 1.6 (1983) [hereinafter

MODEL

1983]. In 1983, when the Model Rules were adopted, Rule 1.6 provided no
exception for disclosures to prevent or rectify client crime or fraud. The ABA
rejected proposals from the Kutak Commission, which drafted the Model Rules,
that would have permitted such disclosure. A majority of states, however, declined
to adopt the ABA's version of Rule 1.6. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
12. See Irma S. Russell, Client Confidences and Public Confidence in the Legal Profession: Observations on the ABA House of DelegatesDeliberationson the Duty of ConfidentialRULES

ity, 13 A.B.A. PROF. LAw. 19 (2002).

13. See id.
14. See id. at 21.
15. See id.
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Rule 1.13.16 While that Task Force was studying those questions, Congress
7
enacted Sarbanes-Oxley and that law went into effect.'
The bar argued to Congress that it could take care of any problem by
changing its model ethics rules and insisted that state regulatory authorities could handle misconduct by securities lawyers. The bar's position was
that federal regulation was unnecessary as well as inappropriate, given that
lawyer-regulation was a matter entrusted to the states (generally state
18
courts) in our federalist system.
What about the states? The states had not passively accepted the
ABA's position of no disclosure of client fraud under any circumstances.
On the contrary, by 2002 most states had rules in force that allowed lawyers to disclose client fraud in certain circumstances, particularly when the
lawyer's services had been used by the client to perpetrate the fraud. 19 On
the other hand, the states had, and continue to have, a dismal record of
enforcing ethics rules against big firm lawyers. Indeed, despite a multitude of cases involving big firm securities lawyers that demonstrate, in our
opinion, clear violations of numerous ethics rules, most notably the rule
against assisting a client in unlawful conduct (Model Rule 1.2(d)), the authors of this Article know of only a few instances of bar disciplinary action
against a big firm securities lawyer who had not first been convicted of a
criminal offense. State regulatory authorities simply lack the resources

and expertise to take on a major securities law firm. Thus, to argue for
exclusive state jurisdiction over securities lawyer misdeeds is, as a practical
matter, to argue that securities lawyers remain beyond the reach of discipline. Congress sensibly rejected the bar's states' rights argument. The
bar, however, continued that theme in its comments to the SEC with assistance, as we shall see, from the Conference of Chief Justices.
After Congress passed Sarbanes-Oxley, the scene of action shifted to
the SEC. The SEC had 180 days under Sarbanes-Oxley in which to pro-

16. See Christina R. Salem, The New Mandate of the CorporateLawyer After the Fall
of Enron and the Enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
765, 780-83 (2003).
17. See id. at 779 (noting that Task Force issued report just days before President Bush signed Sarbanes-Oxley bill); see also ABA Task Force on Corp. Responsibility, Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on CorporateResponsibility, 59

Bus. LAw. 145, 148-49 (2003) [hereinafter Final Report]. A preliminary report of
the Task Force had startled the corporate bar by recommending that lawyers be
required to disclose corporate fraud in some circumstances. See ABA Task Force on
Corp. Responsibility, PreliminaryReport of the American Bar Association Task Force on
Corporate Responsibility, 58 Bus. LAw. 189, 205-06 (2002) [hereinafter PreliminaryReport]. The ABA Task Force dropped the "required" recommendation and substituted permissive disclosure standards before the final report was issued. See Final
Report, supra, at 172-73.
18. See Koniak 1, supra note 2, at 220.
19. See id. at 214. The state rules are discussed in some detail in infra Part
III.A.2.

2004]

LEGAL AND ETHICAL DUTIES OF LAWYERS

mulgate an up-the-ladder reporting requirement. 20 On November 21,
2002, the Commission published proposed rules for comment.2 1 Bar associations and prominent corporate lawyers and law firms were aghast.
The rules were drafted quite broadly, seeming to apply to virtually any
lawyer in any way associated with the representation of an issuer, including
foreign lawyers. Even more troubling to the bar was that, instead of a
mere up-the-ladder reporting requirement, the rules went further, proposing to require "noisy withdrawal" in certain situations, that is, withdrawal
from representation of the issuer and notice to the Commission of that
withdrawal. 22 Letters from lawyers, law firms and bar associations came
pouring into the Commission-letters strenuously objecting to any form
of "reporting out" to the Commission (including any form of required
noisy withdrawal) and arguing against the breadth of the proposed
rules. 23 The battle was on and the bar was now fully engaged.
At this point the assist from the Conference of Chief Justices came
into play. On August 1, 2002, the Conference of Chief Justices, apparently
influenced, at least in part, by a desire to derail any larger federal involvement in lawyer regulation, unanimously recommended that all state high
courts adopt a confidentiality rule allowing disclosure of client fraud in
cases in which the client had used the lawyer's services to commit the
fraud. This was the proposal made by the ABA's Ethics 2000 Commission
that the ABA's House of Delegates rejected just a year before.2 4 As discussed earlier, by the time the Conference adopted this resolution, most
states already allowed lawyer disclosure of some client frauds, which is one
of the reasons we see the Conference's move as part of a strategy to encourage minimal regulation of the bar by the SEC. But more telling are
the comments the Conference submitted to the SEC. The Conference
explicitly referred to the states' traditional roles as exclusive regulators of
the bars and opposed the SEC's proposed "permissive disclosure" and
"noisy withdrawal" rules. 25 The Conference took this position, despite the
20. See 15 U.S.C. § 7202(a) (2001) (instructing SEC to promulgate regulations consistent with Sarbanes-Oxley); see also 148 CONG. REc. S6552 (daily ed. July
10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Edwards) ("This amendment is about making sure
those lawyers, in addition to the accountants and executives in the company, don't
violate the law and, in fact, more importantly, ensure that the law is being
followed.").
21. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys,
Securities Act Release No. 33-8150, 67 Fed. Reg. 71,670 (Dec. 2, 2002) (providing
SEC proposed rule regarding attorney conduct).
22. See id.
23. See Koniak II, supra note 2, at 1270-74 (discussing general tenor of comments submitted by associations and law firms regarding SEC proposed rules).
24. See Conference of Chief Justices, Resolution 35: In Support of Rule
1.6(b) (2) and 1.6(b) (3) of Ethics 2000 (Aug. 1, 2002), at http://ccj.ncsc.dni.us/
reso135RuleOneptSixEthics2000.html.
25. See Letter from Judith S. Kaye, President, Conference of ChiefJustices, to
Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (Dec. 13, 2002), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
proposed/s74502/jskayel.htm (commenting on SEC proposed rule).
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resolution calling for all states to permit disclosure of client fraud in certain circumstances and the fact that the comments to the ethics rules in
many states already authorize noisy withdrawal without explicit limitation
26
on the circumstances in which the "noise" may be made.
On January 29, 2003, the SEC adopted a rule implementing Section
307 to take effect on August 5, 2003.27 As Section 307 mandates, the rule

requires up-the-ladder reporting in certain circumstances. 28 The rule also
follows the ethics rules of most states by permitting a lawyer in some circumstances to disclose client fraud to the SEC without the issuer's consent
(an action often referred to as permissive "reporting out" in contrast to
the required "reporting up" the corporate ladder) .29 On the other hand,
the SEC took no action on its proposal to require noisy withdrawal in
some circumstances. Instead, the SEC proposed an alternative to its initial
noisy-withdrawal proposal, albeit saying at the same time that it would con30
tinue to consider that first proposal too.
The SEC's alternative would, like its first proposal, require lawyers to
withdraw from representing an issuer when the issuer's board did not "respond appropriately" to a lawyer's prior report of a material violation of
law, but instead of the lawyer having to tell the SEC of that withdrawal, the
31
alternative put that responsibility on the issuer itself.
In August 2003, the ABA House of Delegates amended model Rules
1.6 and 1.13 substantially as recommended in the Task Force on Corporate Responsibility's final report.3 2 Rule 1.6 was changed to allow disclosure of client fraud in certain situations.3 3 Rule 1.13 was amended to
make it clear that a lawyer is required: first, to inform the highest authority
of an organization when lower-level officers fail to take action to address a
law violation (Rule 1.13(b)); and second, to inform the organization's
26. See Koniak I, supra note 2, at 229 (noting that at time of proposed SEC
rule, "noisy withdrawal was allowed by the ethics rules of almost every state and
already required in certain instances by the newest Comments to the ABA's Model
Rules").
27. See SEC Final Rule, supra note 9, at 6296.
28. See id. For a further discussion of the reporting up requirement of Part
205, see infra Part II.
29. See id. For a further discussion of the reporting out aspect of Part 205, see
infra Part III.B.
30. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys,
Securities Act Release No. 33-8186, 68 Fed. Reg. 6324, 6328 (Feb. 6, 2003) (soliciting comments on both proposals).
31. See id.
32. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6, 1.13 (2003) [hereinafter
MODEL RULES 2003] (providing ABA Model Rules as amended); FinalReport, supra
note 17, at 172, 175 (recommending adoption of revised Rule 1.6 and Rule 1.13).
33. See MODEL RULES 2003, supra note 32, R. 1.6. The vote in the ABA House
of Delegates permitting disclosure in the case of client fraud was a close one (218201). See Jason Hoppin, Put Aside Privilege in Post-Enron World, ABA Urges, NAT'L
L.J., Aug. 18, 2003, at 5 (noting that vote to amend reporting up requirement of
Rule 1.13 was also close).
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highest authority of a lawyer's discharge or withdrawal for fulfilling the upthe-ladder reporting duties of the rule (Rule 1.13(e)). 34 A third change
added a new provision permitting disclosure of confidential information
outside the organization when the highest authority of the organization
fails to address a law violation that was reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the organization (Rule 1.13(c)) even if the lawyer's ser35
vices were not used to commit the violation.
The ABA's change of position was influenced by a growing feeling
within the organization that its leadership in the legal ethics field was
threatened by the degree to which its confidentiality provisions departed
from the actions taken by the high courts of most of the states. Also important was the ABA's desire to keep the SEC and the rest of the federal
government at bay.
This Article examines the legal and ethical duties of lawyers after
Sarbanes-Oxley, focusing on the application, interpretation and ambiguities of the SEC rule implementing Section 307. Although our primary
frame of reference will be on the SEC's new rules as an aspect of lawyer
regulation, those rules are part of federal securities laws and should be
considered in that aspect, i.e., whether they advance the purposes of the
federal securities laws. The rules affecting lawyers should not be assessed
in a vacuum as a mere turf war between federal regulators on the one
hand and the organized bar and its state regulators on the other, although
that is one relevant aspect.
Federal securities laws exist to protect investors, largely through compulsory issuer disclosure. The SEC exists for this purpose. Its rules, including the rules governing lawyers, must be evaluated in light of this
overarching purpose. In our view, this purpose, and the SEC's rules, are
largely consistent with what a prudent lawyer, representing an entity client, would do both for the good of the client and for the lawyer's own risk
management. The bar's discomfort with the rules measures in large part
the degree to which everyday corporate practice deviates from what one
would expect from a prudent and faithful entity agent.
B.

36
A Situation to Ponder: The Spiegel Case

In March 2003, several months before the SEC's rules implementing
Section 307 became effective, the SEC filed a partially settled securities
fraud complaint that brought into sharp focus the concerns that animated
34. See MODEL

RULES 2003, supra note 32, R. 1.13.
35. See id. R. 1.13(c) (stating that when highest organizational authority fails

to address action that is clearly violation of law, lawyer may "reveal information
relating to the representation whether or not Rule 1.6 permits such disclosure, but
only if and to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial injury to the organization").
36. The discussion that follows contains a number of quotations from
Jonathan Weil & Cassell Bryan-Low, Report Bolsters SEC's Proposalfor Attorneys, WALL
ST.J., Sept. 15, 2003, at Cl.
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the legislation requiring those rules. 37 The defendant was Spiegel, Inc.
("Spiegel"), a retailer that operates a mail order business and the Eddie
Bauer clothing chain, and had just filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.3 8 The SEC civil complaint charged Spiegel with fraudulently withholding public disclosure of the company's 2001 annual report, as well as
subsequent quarterly reports, to conceal the fact that its auditor, KPMG,
had rendered an opinion in early 2002 expressing the accounting firm's
substantial doubt about Spiegel's ability to remain in business. 39 Although
Spiegel neither admitted nor denied wrongdoing, the settlement terms
included the court's appointment of Stephen J. Crimmins, a partner in
the Washington office of Pepper Hamilton LLP, as an examiner to review
40
Spiegel's accounting regularities and financial condition.
Six months later, in September 2003, Mr. Crimmins filed his examiner's report (the "Crimmins Report") with the district court. 41 The report details "numerous accounting violations at Spiegel, which hit the
skids after it began issuing easy credit to unqualified customers as a way to
boost revenues." 4 2 Among other topics, the report addresses the conduct
of Spiegel's lawyers. The report concludes that the lawyers initially behaved appropriately. The report states that the law firm responsible for
approving Spiegel's securities disclosure, Kirkland & Ellis LLP ("Kirkland") "had plainly advised Spiegel that it was violating the law by not filing" its 2001 annual report with the SEC. 43 Kirkland also warned the
company's management and top directors that "this illegal act could have
44
serious consequences, including action by the SEC."
37. See Litigation Release, United States Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Charges Spiegel, Inc. with Fraud for Failing to Disclose Auditor's "Going
Concern" and Related Reporting Violations (Mar. 7, 2003), at http://www.sec.
gov/litigation/litreleases/lrl8020.htm [hereinafter Spiegel Litigation Release]
(announcing SEC's suit against Spiegel for violation of federal securities laws).
38. See In re Spiegel, 292 B.R. 748, 749 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003).
39. See Spiegel Litigation Release, supra note 37.
40. See id.
41. See Indep. Exam'r Report, SEC v. Spiegel, Inc., No. 03C-1685, 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 17933 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 5, 2003), at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/276641/000094787103002136/0000947871-03-002136.txt
[hereinafter
Crimmins Report]. Mr. Crimmins based his reports on documents provided by
Spiegel, its law firm (Kirkland) and its auditor (KPMG) relating to Spiegel's disclosures to the SEC and interviews with Spiegel's officers, directors, lawyers and accountants. Spiegel waived its attorney-client privilege with respect to a number of
matters, including those related to Spiegel's disclosures to the SEC.
42. Weil & Bryan-Low, supra note 36, at Cl.
43. Crimmins Report, supra note 41, at 80.
44. Id. Kirkland spokesman and partner, Jack Levin, echoing the examiner's
comment, told the Wall StreetJournalthat the law firm "repeatedly advised the company to file its SEC reports, and we repeatedly told the company that the failure to
file was a serious matter," adding, "[tihe examiner's report confirms that we gave
our advice loudly and clearly." Weil & Bryan-Low, supra note 36, at Cl.
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When Spiegel refused to file the report, 45 however, the lawyers faced
a critical choice. They chose to continue the representation. A Kirkland
spokesman and partner, Jack Levin, later told the Wall Street Journal
"There are no rules that say you must resign if the client doesn't take your
advice." 46 He also noted that "[t] he SEC, of course, is debating whether it
47
should adopt such rules, and the debate is ongoing."
The Crimmins Report states that Kirkland continued to prepare and
file forms to the SEC, notifying it of the reasons for Spiegel's filing deficiencies for months after the March 2002 deadline for Spiegel's 2001 annual report. Spiegel's late-filing notices all recited that the company was
"not in a position to issue financial statements" on the grounds that Spiegel was in default on its loan covenants and "currently working with its
bank group" to amend its credit agreements. 48 According to the Crimmins Report, these representations were materially misleading, and Kirkland knew it. 49 The report states: "As Kirkland & Ellis knew, the real
reason why Spiegel was not filing its periodic reports was that it did not
want to disclose KPMG's going-concern qualification and other material
bad facts and circumstances threatening Spiegel's survival." Kirkland's response to the Report's allegations, through Mr. Levin, was: "All the underlying facts-that the company had defaulted on its debt and other
' 50
financial problems-were disclosed.
The Crimmins Report offers an excellent opportunity to evaluate lawyers' responsibilities in the post-Enron world. If the facts recited in the
Crimmins Report are taken as true, what did the applicable state ethics
rules permit or require the lawyers to do? If the SEC rule implementing
45. Jonathan Weil and Cassell Bryan-Low explain the reasons for Spiegel's
refusal:
According to the report, Spiegel's executive committee rejected the views
of Kirkland, KPMG and Spiegel's management during the May [31,] 2003
meeting in Hamburg, Germany and directed the company not to file its
overdue SEC reports. The executive committee at that meeting consisted
of Michael Otto of Hamburg, who along with his family controlled all of
Spiegel's voting shares and an executive of Mr. Otto's closely held Otto
Versand GmbH, the world's largest mail-order company. The report says
the law firm White and Case LLP interpreted Kirkland's advice for Spiegel's auditing committee, though Spiegel technically wasn't a White &
Case client. White & Case's Hamburg partner [Urs Aschenbrenner]
strongly challenged Kirkland's recommendations, the report says. Phillip
Schaeffer, White & Case's general counsel, said any communications the
firm may have had on the matter were with its client, Otto Versand, not
Spiegel. "We can't talk about the advice we did or didn't give a client."
Weil & Bryan-Low, supra note 36, at Cl.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See Crimmins Report, supra note 41. "The report notes that the SEC forms
themselves contain this warning just below the signature line: 'ATTENTION: Intentional misstatements or omissions of fact constitute Federal Crime Violation."'
Weil & Bryan-Low, supra note 36.
50. Weil & Bryan-Low, supra note 36, at Cl.
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Section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley had been in effect at the time Kirkland
acted, what would the rules have required or permitted Kirkland to do?
The possibilities include:
1. Take the matter to Spiegel's highest authority (the appropriate committee of the board or the full board).
2. Resign from any representation of Spiegel related to its securities filings if Spiegel failed to meet its obligations under the
federal securities laws.
3. Correct the prior material false statements its client had made
to the SEC and which Kirkland had prepared.
4. Disclose confidential information to the SEC or defrauded
persons to rectify the prior fraud or prevent the continuing
fraud.
5. Withdraw from its representation of Spiegel, disaffirm the filings it had helped to prepare and notify the Commission of its
51
withdrawal "for professional considerations."
In additional to analyzing the SEC rules in detail, this Article considers the Spiegel case and the Crimmins Report as a concrete scenario in
which to evaluate those rules. A brief conclusion summarizes the three
propositions advanced in this Article.
II.

"REPORTING

Up":

REPORTING MATERIAL VIOLATIONS OF LAw UP THE
CORPORATE LADDER

A.

Reporting Duties of a Corporation'sLawyer Under State Law

The Canons of Professional Ethics and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility did not contain disciplinary rules that dealt explicitly
with the responsibilities of a lawyer for an organization. Nevertheless, case
law in the United States gradually developed propositions that are now
52
well settled.
First, a lawyer employed to represent an organization owes professional duties of competence and loyalty to the organization (the so-called
"entity theory" of organizational representation) .5
51. The title of the Wall StreetJournal article, cited supra note 36, was "Report
Bolsters SEC's Proposal for Attorneys." The article states that "Mr. Crimmins's
findings will likely add pressure on the SEC to adopt its proposed 'noisy withdrawal' rules for corporate lawyers."
52. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAw GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96 cmts. b, d, f
(2000) (hereinafter RESTATEMENT] (prescribing generally accepted duties owed
corporation by corporate counsel); Roger C. Cramton, Enron and the CorporateLawyer: A Primer on Legal and Ethical Issues, 58 Bus. LAw. 143, 145-58 (2002) (providing
review of legal and ethical duties that organization's lawyer owes to organizational
entity). The following summary is largely drawn from comments b, d and f of
Section 96 of the Restatement.
53. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 52, § 96 cmt. b ("The so-called 'entity' theory
of organizational representation. . . is now universally recognized in American law,

2004]

LEGAL AND ETHICAL DUTIES OF LAWYERS

Second, the persons authorized by law to act for the organization
make decisions to retain or discharge a lawyer for the organization, deter54
mine the scope of representation and provide direction to the lawyer.
Third, although an organization's lawyer inevitably works closely with
the constituents of the organization who provide direction, the lawyer
does not thereby form a client-lawyer relationship with the officers or employees who direct its operations or those who own it. Moreover, the organization's lawyer does not owe duties of care, diligence or
confidentiality to the organization's constituents unless joint representation of the organization and a constituent is agreed upon and does not
55
involve an impermissible conflict of interest.
Fourth, as part of the duties of care, competence and diligence that
an organization's lawyer owes to the organization, the lawyer is required to
exercise reasonable care to prevent an organization's constituent from violating a legal obligation to the organization or causing harm to the organization by performing acts on behalf of the organization that will cause
injury to it, such as by exposing the organization to criminal or civil liability. 56 When the lawyer knows that such a situation has arisen, the lawyer
must proceed in the best interests of the organization.
Finally, a lawyer is not prevented by rules of confidentiality from acting to protect the interests of the client organization by disclosing within
for purposes of determining the identity of the direct beneficiary of legal representation of corporations and other forms of organizations.").
54. See id. § 96 cmt. d ("Persons authorized to act for the organization make
decisions about retaining or discharging a lawyer for the organization, determine
the scope of the representation, and create an obligation for the organization to
compensate the lawyer."). Lawyers are obligated to comply with the lawful requests of those authorized to act for the organization. See id. ("Unless the lawyer
withdraws, the lawyer must follow instructions and implement decisions of those
persons, as the lawyer would follow instructions of an individual client [unless unlawful client acts are involved].").
55. See id. § 96 cmt. b ("By representing the organization, a lawyer does not
thereby also form a client-lawyer relationship with all or any individuals employed
by it or who direct its operations or who have an ownership or other beneficial
interest in it, such as its shareholders.").
56. See id. § 96 cmt. e (stating that lawyer "must not knowingly or negligently
assist any constituent to breach a legal duty to the organization," and is required to
"act diligently and to exercise care to prevent reasonably foreseeable harm to a
client [and must] take action ... with respect to certain breaches of legal duty to
the organization by a constituent"); Cramton, supra note 52, at 154-58 (stating that
lawyer has duty to first report up corporate ladder and then, if corrective action is
not taken, to withdraw and perhaps report out to third parties in order to prevent
harm to organization caused by fraudulent or criminal enterprises of organization's constituents); George C. Harris, Taking the Entity Theory Seriously: Lawyer Liability for Failure to Prevent Harm to Organizational Clients Through Disclosure of
Constituent Wrongdoing, 11 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHIcs 597, 653 (1998) (" [T] he individual
constituents of the organization . . .should know ...that the lawyer's duty of
loyalty is not to them individually and that the lawyer will not be bound to keep
their confidences if they are engaged or intend to engage in activities that are not
in the interest of the organization.").
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the organization communications gained from constituents who are not
themselves clients. 5 7 Also, the organization, acting through duly authorized constituents, may assert or waive the duty of confidentiality or the
58
attorney-client privilege to such information.
Today, most of these propositions are stated or are implicit in ABA
Rule 1.13, which has been adopted by virtually every state. 59 Nevertheless,
the lawyer's duty of "loyal disclosure" within the organization has not been
generally understood although it is plainly stated in Rule 1.13(b): When a
lawyer for an organization knows that a constituent of the organization is
engaged in wrongful conduct that is likely to harm the organization or
embark the organization on an unlawful course, Rule 1.13(b) provides
that the lawyer "shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest
60
of the organization."
Two circumstances explain the widespread failure of lawyers to understand that Rule 1.13, even prior to its amendment in August 2003, requires
lawyers for an organization to go up the organizational ladder to prevent
law violations that will harm the organization. One emerges from the language and structure of the former rule itself. Former Rule 1.13(b), which
is still the governing rule in most jurisdictions, is a lengthy provision that
lists four factors to be considered by the lawyer in determining what to do,
and then presents three possible remedial measures that the lawyer "may"
take, with "referring the matter to higher authority in the organization"
coming last. As a consequence, many lawyers have viewed the provision as
only giving the lawyer discretion to choose among a number of options,
including doing nothing at all.
This uncertainty is compounded by the lack of interpretation of Rule
1.13 and its application to the situations in which an organization's lawyer
does nothing to prevent organizational wrongdoing resulting in harm to
57. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 52, § 96 cmt. e (noting that disclosure within
organization of information gained from constituents may be made "even if disclosure is against the interests of the communicating person, [or] of another constituent whose breach of duty is in issue").
58. See id. § 73 cmt. j (discussing authority of those in control of organization,
not individual constituents, to waive organization's attorney-client privilege). A
successor in interest, such as a bankruptcy trustee, can waive the organization's
privilege over the objections of the organization's former directors. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 358 (1985) (holding that
corporation's bankruptcy trustee had power to waive attorney-client privilege with
respect to pre-bankruptcy communications).
59. See MODEL RULES 2003, supra note 32, R. 1.13 (establishing duties by organization's lawyer to lawyer's organizational client). Even states such as California and New York, that have not adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
as the framework for the state's ethics rules, have adopted provisions concerning
the duties of an organizational lawyer that parallel and are largely drawn from the
1983 version of Model Rule 1.13. See THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
2003 SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 445-47, 509-10 (2003)
(reproducing California and New York equivalent of ABA Model Rule 1.13).
60. MODEL RULES 1983, supranote 11, R. 1.13 (emphasis added). The quoted
language was retained in the 2002 revision.
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third persons and ultimately to the organization. Judicial decisions and
ethics opinions interpreting and applying Rule 1.13 are virtually
61
nonexistent.
As indicated earlier, in August 2003 the ABA amended Rule 1.13 to
remedy these flaws. Rule 1.13 now requires a lawyer to inform a higher
authority in an organization (and the highest authority "if warranted by
the circumstances") when lower levels have failed to take action to address
a law violation "[u]nless the lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of the organization to do so (1.13(b))." Despite
this desirable change in Model Rule 1.13, it remains doubtful whether upthe-ladder reporting by an organization's lawyer will become routine and
whether departures from the report obligation will be punished. It remains uncertain whether or when state high courts will adopt the
amended version of the rule. Even if state high courts adopt the amended
Rule 1.13, the rule, despite its mandatory language, contains a number of
important limitations and qualifications (or should we say loopholes) that
give lawyers wide discretion, making enforcement difficult. These include:
(1) the actual knowledge standard as the trigger for the lawyer's duty; (2)
a definitive "violation" rather than evidence of a violation or a potential
violation; (3) the requirement that the violation be "related to the representation;" (4) the requirement that the violation "is likely to result in substantial injury" rather than simply being "material;" (5) the requirement
that the substantial injury be "to the organization," ignoring the situations
in which only third persons are harmed by the illegality; (6) the exception
to the reporting up duty if the lawyer "reasonably believes that it is not
necessary in the best interests of the organization to do so;" and (7) the
limitation that lawyers need to report to the "highest authority" only "if
62
warranted by the seriousness of the matter."
In the past, state disciplinary authorities have not brought disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers who failed to take constituent wrongdoing to
the highest authority of an organization when doing so was required. Experience under the pre-2003 version of Rule 1.13 suggests that enforcement of "loyal disclosure," within the corporation and to protect its
interests, will come only through civil liability actions or SEC enforcement
proceedings against securities lawyers for public companies. Somejudicial
decisions hold that the organization's former lawyer may be liable to the
organization for failing to prevent a constituent's breach of a legal obliga61. The fifth edition of the ABA Annotated Model Rules cites no cases that discuss Rule 1.13(b) or 1.13(c). For a rare case discussing Rule 1.13 and suggesting a
weak commitment to enforcing the rule, see FloridaBar v. Brown, 790 So. 2d 1081,
1086 (Fla. 2001), in which the Florida Supreme Court stated that the defendant
could have taken more steps to alert persons in the corporation of illegal conduct,
but there was no evidence that he did not act as reasonably necessary in the best
interest of the corporation.
62. See MODEL RULEs 2003, supra note 32, R. 1.13.
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tion to the organization. 63 Others hold the organization's lawyer liable for
failing to protect the organization against wrongful acts by constituents
harming third persons (third-party liability for assisting or participating in
the organization's wrongful conduct). 64 And, even prior to the enactment
of Section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley, a line of SEC enforcement proceedings
against lawyers had established that securities lawyers have obligations,
flowing primarily from state ethics rules, to take reasonable steps to prevent an organizational client or one of its constituents from violating fed65
eral securities laws.
B.

Required Reporting Under Section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley

The final rules implementing Section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley are set
forth in new Part 205 of the Commission's rules. 66 The rules require attorneys "appearing and practicing" before the SEC in the representation
of issuers to report evidence of a material violation of law or breach of
fiduciary duty by the issuer or its agent up the corporate ladder to the
CLO or to both the CLO and the CEO. 6 7 If the CLO or CEO fails to
provide an "appropriate response" to the evidence, the attorney must re63. See, e.g., In re Am. Cont'l Corp., 794 F. Supp. 1424, 1453 (D. Ariz. 1992)
(finding complaint alleging law firm failed to take corrective action to prevent
serious regulatory violations by those then in control of organization stated claim
for relief; lawyer must go to board, urge cessation and withdraw when continued
representation will assist ongoing illegality). See generally Fin. Gen. Bankshares,
Inc. v. Metzger, 523 F. Supp. 744 (D.D.C. 1981) (finding lawyer violated fiduciary
duty to organization by assisting a hostile takeover), vacated, 680 F.2d 768 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) (vacating for lack of jurisdiction).
64. See, e.g., FDIC v. O'Melveny & Myers, 969 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding breach of lawyer's duty to protect corporate client against wrongful acts of
constituents giving rise to corporation's liability to third person), rev'd on other
grounds, 512 U.S. 79 (1994), affd on remand, 61 F.3d 17 (9th Cir. 1995); see also
FDIC v. Clark, 978 F.2d 1541 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding substantial evidence supported jury verdict that corporation's lawyers breached duty to make reasonable
independent investigation into third-party allegations of fraud on part of corporate officers).
65. See In re Carter &Johnson, 47 S.E.C. 471 (1981) (stating prospective rule
that "[w] hen a lawyer with significant responsibilities in the effectuation of a company's compliance with the disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws
becomes aware that his client is engaged in a substantial and continuing failure to
satisfy those disclosure requirements, his continued participation violates professional standards unless he takes prompt steps to end the client's compliance"); see
also In re Gutfreund, Exchange Act Release No. 31,553 (1992) (lawyer who had
legal compliance duties as chief legal counsel of investment banking firm, and who
knows or has reason to know misconduct by company trader has not been addressed, must take appropriate steps to ensure that misconduct is adequately addressed, which "may include disclosure of the matter to the entity's board of
directors, resignation from the [representation], or disclosure to regulatory
authorities").
66. See 17 C.F.R. § 205 (2004) (setting forth new minimum standards for professional conduct for attorneys).
67. See id. § 205.3(b) (1).
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port the evidence to the audit committee, another independent commit68
tee or the full board of directors.
The SEC rules supplement state ethics rules and are not intended to
limit states from imposing additional obligations consistent with their purposes. 69 Section 307 required the SEC to promulgate "minimum" rules of
professional conduct, not "maximum" ones. 70 Where state rules conflict
with the SEC rules, however, the federal rules govern.7 1 Preemption of
state standards is most likely to arise with respect to disclosure of confiden'7 2
tial information outside the organization also known as "reporting out.
1.

Which Lawyers Are "Appearingand Practicing"Before the SEC Under Part
205?

The first interpretive question lawyers face under the SEC rules is
whether the rules apply to them. Congress cast a potentially wide net in
Section 307 by requiring the SEC rules to apply to all "attorneys appearing
and practicing before the Commission in any way in the representation of
issuers."73 In accordance with this directive, the SEC promulgated Section
205.2(a) (1), which defines "appearing and practicing before the Commission" to include:
* transacting any business with the SEC, including communications in any form;
" representing an issuer in SEC administrative proceedings or in
connection with any SEC investigation, inquiry, information request or subpoena;
" providing advice with respect to the federal securities laws or
SEC rules thereunder regarding any document that the attorney has notice will be filed with the SEC; and
68. See id. § 205.3(b) (3). The rule does not give complete discretion to the
lawyer to choose among the higher authorities. As Section 205.3(b) (3) is written,
the lawyer must report to the audit committee if one exists. If no audit committee
exists, the lawyer must report to a committee of independent directors. Only if
there is no such committee is the lawyer required to report to the full board of
directors.
69. See id. § 205.1. Section 205.1 states:
These standards supplement applicable standards of any jurisdiction
where an attorney is admitted or practices and are not intended to limit
the ability of anyjurisdiction to impose additional obligations on an attorney not inconsistent with the application of this part. Where the standards of a state or other United States jurisdiction where an attorney is
admitted or practices conflict with this part, this part shall govern.
Id.
70. See 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2004).
71. See infra notes 282-91 and accompanying text.
72. For further discussion of "reporting out," see infra Part III.
73. 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (emphasis added).

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49: p. 725

* advising an issuer as to whether information or a statement,
opinion or other writing is required to be filed with or submit74
ted to the SEC.
The definition of "appearing and practicing" expressly excludes two
types of lawyers. 75 First, the rules do not apply to lawyers who engage in
the above listed activities outside of the "context of providing legal services
76
to an issuer with whom the attorney has an attorney-client relationship."
specifically
Second, the rules exclude some, but not all, foreign lawyers,
77
those who qualify as "non-appearing foreign attorneys."
Five aspects of this definition have given rise to the most concern and
discussion among lawyers: the application of the SEC rules to non-securities lawyers; the application of the SEC rules to securities lawyers who advise on, but do not sign, documents submitted to the SEC; the exclusion of
lawyers not in a lawyer-client relationship with the corporation; the exclusion of some foreign lawyers; and the failure to cover law firms.
a.

Application of the SEC Rules to Lawyers Who Do Not Specialize in
Securities Law

The potential application of the SEC rules to lawyers who do not specialize in securities law comes from Section 205.2(a)(1)(iii), which includes as a lawyer "appearing and practicing" before the SEC, one who:
Provid[es] advice in respect of the United States securities laws or
the Commission's rules or regulations thereunder regarding any
document that the attorney has notice will be filed with or submitted to, or incorporatedinto any document that will be filed with or
submitted to, the Commission, including the provision of such advice in the context of preparing, or participating in the prepara78
tion of, any such document.
Practicing lawyers have expressed concern about the possibility that
this provision inappropriately sweeps lawyers within the SEC rules' grasp
in two general situations. 79 First, transactional lawyers who are specialists
in some area other than securities law-such as tax, labor or environmental law-may prepare a document that will be incorporated by the client's
securities counsel (who may be in the same firm) into an SEC filing. Second, litigators may be asked by a corporation's auditors to provide infor74. 17 C.F.R.

§ 205.2(a) (1).

75. See id. § 205.2(a) (2).
76. See id. § 205.2(a) (2) (i).
77. See id. § 205.2(a) (2) (ii). For the definition of "Non-appearing foreign attorneys," see id. § 205.2(j).
78. Id. § 205.2(a)(1)(iii) (emphasis added).
79. See, e.g., ABA Comments on Initial Proposed Rules, at www.sec.gov/rules/
proposed/s74502.html (urging that non-securities specialists who do not in fact
practice securities law should not be subject to Section 205).
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mation relevant to the question whether the litigation affects the issuer's
financial position. The SEC responded to the bar's concerns by adding a
requirement that lawyers have "notice" that their documents will be made
part of an SEC filing.80
In fact, however, Section 205.2(a)(1)(iii) is ambiguous as to whether
these non-securities lawyers are covered by the SEC rules. The textual argument that these lawyers are not covered is that even if they have given
advice with respect to a document that they have notice will be included in
an SEC filing, the "advice" covered by the provision is expressly limited to
"advice in respect of the United States securities laws or the Commission's
rules and regulations thereunder."8 1 If "in respect of" means "about,"
then lawyers who are not securities lawyers would not be giving the required advice.8 2 On the other hand, if "in respect of' means "relevant to"
(such as when the inclusion of materially misleading information in the
filed document may constitute a violation of securities laws even if the
information itself is not about securities), then these lawyers would be
83
covered.
Regardless of how a court would interpret the language of Section
205.2(a) (1) (iii), the SEC rules should cover non-securities lawyers in the
situations described, and the SEC should either change the language of
the rule or clarify its meaning in a formal ruling at the earliest opportunity. Lawyers for a corporation need not be "securities lawyers" providing
"securities law advice" either to participate in activity that may be or become a securities law violation, or to become aware of evidence of such
activity. The evidence they are most likely to become aware of is evidence
related to their own area of practice. If, for example, an environmental
lawyer has evidence that the corporation is engaged in material violations
of environmental law, yet provides information for an SEC filing suggesting that there is no violation, the lawyer may be assisting, or at least
facilitating, a securities law violation. The investing public would certainly
take such information into account in making investment decisions. Why
should such a lawyer be exempt from a duty to report this evidence?
Some lawyers are concerned that the coverage sweeps more broadly
than the above scenarios suggest. For example, it could be argued that
once a lawyer is deemed to be "appearing and practicing" before the SEC,
then the lawyer's duty to report applies to everything that lawyer does, not
just the advice concerning the document submitted to the SEC, including
all material violations of securities law or breaches of fiduciary duty the
lawyer becomes aware of, not just evidence within the lawyer's area of expertise. It is true that, unlike Model Rule 1.13, which limits the obligations
imposed on a corporation's lawyers to "matter[s] related to the represen80.
81.
82.
83.

See SEC Final Rule, supra note 9, cmt. to 17 C.F.R. § 205.2.
See SEC Final Rule, supra note 9.
See id.
See id.
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tation," the duty to report under Section 205.2(b) contains no similar limitation. 84 The most sensible reading of the duty to report under Section
205.2(b), however, is that it applies only to the extent that the lawyer's
activities count as "appearing and practicing."
Even if the SEC rules are interpreted to contain no limitation based
on the relationship between the lawyer and the subject matter of the representation, the rules include two other important protections for lawyers
who do not generally practice securities law. First, the rules contain an
important limitation on the duty to report for "subordinate" lawyers in
Section 205.5.85 Paragraph (a) of that section defines "subordinate attorney" broadly, as a lawyer who appears and practices before the SEC "under
the supervision or direction of another attorney." 8 6 Subordinate attorneys
do have a duty to report, but satisfy that duty by reporting evidence of a
material violation to the supervising attorney without regard to whether
the supervising attorney satisfies his or her duties under the rules.8 7 Lawyers who are not securities lawyers have a good argument that, at least with
respect to evidence outside their area of expertise, reporting evidence of a
material violation to the securities lawyer who is handling the SEC filing
would be sufficient because the securities lawyer would be acting in a supervisory capacity.8 8 Second, as a practical matter, the sanctions the SEC
can impose on non-securities lawyers are limited.8 9 The SEC can, for example, preclude the lawyer from appearing and practicing before the SEC
for a period of time, but if that simply means the lawyer cannot give an
opinion about material to be included in an SEC filing, that may not put a
large dent in the non-securities lawyer's practice or that of the lawyer's
firm.

b.

90

Application of the SEC Rules to Lawyers Who Do Not Sign
Documents Filed with the SEC

With respect to lawyers who specialize in securities law, the main coverage question resolved by the SEC rules is whether lawyers who do not
sign documents filed with the SEC are covered. One scenario involves
84. Contra MODEL RULES 2003, supra note 32, R. 1.13(b) (amending Model
Rule 1.13(b) to eliminate limitation on reporting duty). For a critique of the SEC
rules' failure to limit the reporting duty to matters related to the representation,
see Thomas D. Morgan, Sarbanes-Oxley: A Complication, Not a Contributionin the Effort
to Improve a CorporateLawyer's ProfessionalConduct, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 29-30

(2003).
85. See
86. Id.
87. See
88. See
subordinate

17 C.F.R. § 205.5 (2004).
id.
id. § 205.5(c) ("A subordinate attorney complies with § 205.3 if the
attorney reports to his or her supervising attorney under § 205.3(b)

evidence of a material violation of which the subordinate attorney has become
aware in appearing and practicing before the Commission.").
89. See id, § 205.6.
90. See id.
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securities lawyers who advise that documents need not be filed at all or
that certain information need not be included in filed documents. Section 205.2(a) (1) (iv) expressly includes lawyers who:
[Advise] an issuer as to whether information or a statement,
opinion, or other writing is required under the United States securities laws or the Commission's rules and regulations thereunder to be filed with or submitted to, or incorporated into any
document that will be filed with or submitted to, the
Commission. 9 1
The securities laws are as concerned with failures to make required
disclosures as they are with affirmative misstatements in required disclosures. Thus, lawyers who advise against disclosure should not be excluded
from the duty to report evidence of a material violation.
Lawyers who advise or draft, but do not sign, documents filed with the
SEC are covered by Section 205.2(a)(1)(iii). 92 The SEC's decision to in-

clude these lawyers should be applauded. Any other rule would facilitate
circumvention of Part 205 by encouraging corporate managers and corporate counsel to confine lawyer signatures on Commission documents or
filings to a bare minimum to ensure no up-the-ladder reporting of wrongdoing by non-signing lawyers. That would risk gutting the SEC rules and
Section 307. Lawyers and corporate managers already have an incentive
to employ this strategy in an attempt to avoid primary liability for violating
the securities laws in civil suits, now that secondary liability for aiding and
abetting a securities violation-the assistance that lawyers most commonly
provide to risk-taking clients-is no longer available to third parties in private suits for damages because of the decision in Central Bank of Denver v.
93

First Interstate Bank of Denver.

The argument that lawyers should have no responsibility for client
illegality, short of signing documents, is an embarrassment to the legal
profession. The law rejects this hamstrung vision of lawyer ethics. At a
minimum, it is malpractice for a lawyer whether negligently, recklessly or
intentionally, to sit by silently or passively and advise a client that legally
required documents need not be filed or that certain required information need not be disclosed when a reasonable lawyer in the same circumstances would advise otherwise. 94 In SEC v. National Student Marketing
Corp.,95 the court found that in some circumstances, such conduct is more

91. Id. § 205.2(a)(1)(iv).
92. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text (discussing Section
205.2 (a) (1) (iii)).
93. 511 U.S. 164, 192 (1994).
94. In FDIC v. O'Melveny & Myers, 969 F.2d 744, 746-47 (9th Cir. 1992), the
law firm, knowing that the client's auditing and law firms had recently resigned,
went ahead with a client's securities offering without making any inquiry as to the
circumstances of resignation.
95. 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
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than malpractice; it amounts to aiding and abetting securities fraud. 9 6
97
Most recently, In re Enron Corp. Securities, Derivative & ERISA Litigation
held that lawyers can be primary violators of the securities laws even if they
98
do not sign the relevant documents.
Civil liability, however, insufficiently deters those kinds of lawyer misconduct. First, under Central Bank, private parties can no longer bring
civil suits for aiding and abetting. 99 Second, investors cannot rely on malpractice actions by corporations to deter such behavior. Until and unless a
corporation is forced into bankruptcy and a trustee has been appointed,
experience teaches that corporations are unlikely to bring malpractice actions against their lawyers. Absent a hostile change of control, corporate
managers usually prefer to keep such matters private. With the law already
labeling such conduct as malpractice or sometimes more and civil actions
unlikely to be brought due to either the limits of law or what economists
call an "agency" problem, Congress was right to require the Commission
to regulate behind-the-scenes assistance, which is precisely what the SEC
rules do.
In introducing and debating Section 307, the amendment's sponsors
were absolutely clear that the conduct at which Section 307 was directed
had nothing to do with who signed what documents and everything to do
with lawyers failing to advise and insist that the law's requirements be met,
including disclosure of all required information to the Commission and
filing all necessary paperwork.10 0 The argument that advising as described
in Section 205.2(a) (1) (iii) and (iv) should not be covered by these rules is
implausible and unsound.
c.

The Exclusion of Lawyers Not in a Lawyer-Client Relationship with
the Issuer

After the SEC circulated its initial proposed rules, many lawyers expressed concern that the rules could be read to cover corporate employees
who are trained and licensed lawyers but who do not practice law within
the company. In response, the SEC adopted Section 205.2(a) (2) (i), which
excludes from coverage lawyers who engage in the activities described in
Section 205.2 (a) (1), "other than in the context of providing legal services
to an issuer with whom the attorney has an attorney-client
relationship."' 0 1
96. See id. at 712-15.
97. 235 F. Supp. 2d 549 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
98. See id. at 582 (concluding that lawyers are responsible for violations even
without signing questionable documents).
99. See Cent. Bank of Denver v. First InterstateBankof Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 190-91
(1994).
100. See 148 CONC. Rac. S6555 (July 10, 2002) (insisting attorneys meet disclosure requirements).
101. 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(a)(2)(i) (2004).
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It is not clear that the exemption in Section 205.2(a) (2) (i) was necessary at all. First, the duty to report under Section 205.3(b) is limited to an
attorney "appearing and practicing before the Commission in the representation of an issuer."' 0 2 The phrase "in the representation of an issuer" is
defined in Section 205.2(g) to mean "providing legal services as an attorney for the issuer, regardless of whether the attorney is employed or retained by the issuer."' 0 3 That definition seems to resolve the problem of
lawyers who are employed by issuers but do not practice law. Even without
that limiting definition, most of the conduct listed in "appearing and practicing" involves the practice of law, rather than "mere business" activity.
Mere redundancy in regulation, however, is not a large problem. The
bigger problem with Section 205.2(a) (2) (i) is that it extends the exemption beyond the stated concern. The source of the problem is the last
phrase in the subsection, "with whom the attorney has an attorney-client
relationship."10 4 This phrase was not necessary to exempt licensed lawyers
who perform only business functions for their corporate employer. The
provision of legal services to an issuer is implicit in the SEC's requirement
of an "attorney-client relationship" with an issuer. The requirement of an
attorney-client relationship with an "issuer" raises the question whether
lawyers for a related corporate entity, such as a subsidiary or a "special
purpose entity" (SPE), or for an agent of the issuer, such as the CFO, are
excepted. For an example of these lawyers, one need look no further than
the Enron case, in which the Kirkland firm is alleged to have provided
substantial legal advice to Enron while representing only Fastow and the
SPEs. 10 5 There is no reason for the SEC to exempt any lawyer who provides legal advice to an issuer from any of these rules simply because that
lawyer may be able to claim that he or she had no "attorney-client relationship" with the issuer.
The rules may address this problem in the definition of "issuer" in
Section 205.2(h). 10 6 "For purposes of [defining 'appearing and practicing
in the representation of an issuer'], the term 'issuer' includes any person
controlled by an issuer, where an attorney provides legal services to such
person on behalf of, or at the behest, or for the benefit of the issuer,
102. Id. § 205.3(b) (emphasis added).
103. Id. § 205.2(g).
104. See id. § 205.2(a) (2) (i).
105. See Koniak II, supra note 2, at 1240-42 (providing example of lawyers for
related entity).
106. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(h). An argument could also be made that Section

205(g) solves the problem by defining "representation by an issuer" to mean "pro-

viding legal services as an attorney for an issuer, regardless of whether the attorney
is employed or retained by the issuer." The problem with this argument is that the
duty to report under Section 205.2(b) (1) applies only to a lawyer "appearing and
practicing before the Commission in the representation of an issuer." Thus, if an
attorney is not "appearing and practicing" under Section 205.2(a), it is not sufficient that the attorney is acting "in the representation of an issuer" under Section
205(g).
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regardless of whether the attorney is employed or retained by the issuer."10 7 This definition could take care of problems like Kirkland's representation of Enron SPEs, depending on how the SEC and the courts
interpret the key phrase "controlled by an issuer." It is not clear to us why
the SEC added the "control" requirement, which is likely to end up being
heavily litigated. Why is it not enough for the lawyer to provide legal services "on behalf of, or at the behest, or for the benefit of the issuer"? Of
course, that may be the way the SEC and the courts wind up defining
"attorney-client relationship" in Section 205.2(a) (2) (i).10 8 The cleaner solution, however, is to drop the "attorney-client relationship" limitation,
and substitute the "on behalf of, or at the behest, or for the benefit of the
issuer" phrase in Section 205.2(a) (2) (i).
d.

The Partial Inclusion of Foreign Lawyers

The SEC's decision to include the regulation of foreign lawyers within
its rules resulted in more comments than any other provision, except for
the noisy withdrawal proposal.1 0 9 Despite the universal outcry from foreign lawyers, the SEC did not completely back down in its final rules,
though it did retreat somewhat, in two separate rules. 110 First, Section
205.6(d) provides that any lawyer "practicing outside the United States
shall not be required to comply with the requirements of this part to the
extent that such compliance is prohibited by applicable foreign law."','
Second, Section 205.2 (a) (2) (ii) excludes all "non-appearing foreign attorneys," a term defined in Section 205.2(j).112 Section 205.6(d) seems sensi-

ble and straightforward, if not sufficient, to address the legitimate
concerns of foreign lawyers, as well as American lawyers practicing in foreign countries. Consequently, the comments below focus on Section
205.2(j).
To qualify as a "non-appearing foreign attorney" under Section
205.2(j), a lawyer must meet three criteria. First, the lawyer must be "admitted to practice in ajurisdiction outside the United States." 113 Second,
the lawyer must neither "hold himself or herself out as practicing," nor
"give legal advice regarding, United States federal or state securities or
107. Id.
108. The SEC, in the comment to Section 205.2(a) expresses the view that
"whether an attorney-client relationship exists for purposes of this part will be a
federal question and, in general, will turn on the expectations and understandings
between the attorney and the issuer."
109. According to the comment to Section 205.2(j), the SEC received more
than forty comment letters addressing the international aspects of the initial proposed rule.
110. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(c) (defining "attorney" to include "any person who
is admitted, licensed, or otherwise qualified to practice law in any jurisdiction, domestic or foreign").
111. Id.§ 205.6(d).
112. See id. § 205.2(a)(2)(ii).
113. Id. § 205.20) (1).
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other laws," unless done "in consultation with" a lawyer admitted in the
United States (a "U.S. lawyer").' 1 4 Third, the lawyer's "appearing and
practicing" activity within the meaning of the SEC rules is done in either
one of two contexts.1 15 The first context involves "activities that would
constitute appearing and practicing before the Commission only incidentally to, and in the ordinary course of, the practice of law in a jurisdiction
outside the United States."" 6 The alternative context involves activities
done "in consultation with counsel, other than a non-appearing foreign
attorney, admitted or licensed to practice in a state or other United States
1
jurisdiction." 7
Section 205.20) essentially gives foreign lawyers the ability to opt out
of the SEC rules by associating with a U.S. lawyer. The key question is how
"in consultation with" will be interpreted. The requirement is not a problem if it means that the U.S. lawyer is responsible for the representation
and for the conduct of the foreign lawyer. This would be an extension of
the rules for supervisory and subordinate lawyers outlined in Sections
205.4 and 205.5, except that the foreign "subordinate" would not even
have reporting responsibilities to the U.S. "superior."' 1 8 If the U.S. lawyer
would be held vicariously liable for the foreign lawyer's conduct, the U.S.
lawyer would have an incentive to ensure compliance by the foreign lawyer. More likely, however, the phrase "in consultation with" is intended to
denote a looser association between the foreign and U.S. lawyer. If so, the
exemption would be more troubling. The looser the association, the
more foreign lawyers will be able to take advantage of the exemption, and
the greater the potential for corporations to use foreign lawyers to circumvent the reporting requirements of the SEC rules. The danger is that foreign-licensed lawyers who practice U.S. securities law in the United States,
and who apparently also may be U.S.-licensed lawyers, could take advantage of this opt-out provision. This makes little sense.
If a foreign lawyer does not "appear and practice" before the SEC "in
consultation with" a U.S. lawyer, then the foreign lawyer can be exempt
only if the lawyer practices or gives advice with respect to foreign law, practices law outside the U.S. and provides advice constituting "appearing and
practicing" before the SEC only "incidentally to, and in the ordinary
course of' this foreign practice. An example of how a foreign lawyer could
be within the "appearing and practicing" definition and yet exempt would
be a French environmental lawyer who provides information to a U.S.listed corporation about that corporation's compliance with French environmental law. The main question here is how "incidentally to, and in the
ordinary course of' will be interpreted. Perhaps the idea is that the closer
114. Id. § 205.2(j) (2), (3).
115. See id. § 205.2(j) (3).
116. Id. § 205.20) (3) (i).

117. Id. § 205.2(j) (3) (ii).
118. See id. §§ 205.4, 205.5.
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the relationship the foreign lawyer has with the U.S. issuer and the more
often the foreign lawyer, as part of his or her regular practice, provides
information on foreign law for the purpose of inclusion in a U.S. securities
filing, the greater the justification for regulation of the lawyer under the
SEC rules.
e.

Law Firms as Legal Persons Who "Appear and Practice"

Section 307 refers to "standards of professional conduct for attorneys"
without addressing the question whether firms in which attorneys practice
are intended to be regulated.' 19 The SEC rules appear directed at individual attorneys. 120 The rules should be revised to state explicitly that law
firms, not just individual lawyers, "appear and practice" before the SEC.
Similarly, the SEC should add a rule permitting the censure or reprimand
of a law firm and the assessment of monetary fines when the firm has
failed to conform to responsibilities required by the Commission.
The rationale for including law firms within the SEC rules is straightforward. 12 1 Corporate clients who hire outside counsel usually understand that they are represented by the law firm, not any one individual
lawyer within the firm. In matters of any size or complexity, multiple law119. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2003).
120. The rules mention only the obligations of "an attorney." Section
205.2(c) defines "attorney" as "any person who is admitted, licensed, or otherwise
qualified to practice law in any jurisdiction, domestic or foreign, or who holds
himself or herself out as admitted, licensed, or otherwise qualified to practice law."
See 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(c) (emphasis added) (defining attorney without defining
whether firms are covered). The comment accompanying Section 205.2 (c) makes
no mention of whether firms are covered. One could, perhaps, argue that "person" includes an entity, as it often does in legal definitions. The rules mention law
firms, as distinct from attorneys, in only one place. See id. § 205.7(a) ("Nothing in
this part is intended to, or does, create a private right of action against any attorney, law firm, or issuer, based upon compliance or noncompliance with its provisions."). The comment accompanying Section 205.7(a) states that "the protection
of this provision should extend to any entity that might be compelled to take action under this part." Although the comment could be read to support the coverage of law firms, Section 205.7(a) is directed at liability rather than the duty to
report under the Part 205 rules themselves. Even if only individual lawyers have
responsibilities under the SEC rules, law firms could be exposed to vicarious liability for the acts of their lawyers.
121. For a persuasive argument in favor of extending discipline to law firms,
see Ted Schneyer, ProfessionalDisciplinefor Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 4546

(1992) (arguing "that recent developments in legal ethics and disciplinary enforcement have brought us to the point where firm discipline would only be an incremental, not a radical, step forward"). Cf Elizabeth Chambers & David B. Wilkins,
A New Frameworkfor Discipline, 11 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICS 335 (2003). For a critique,
of Schneyer's proposal, see Julie Rose O'Sullivan, Professional Discipline for Law
Firms? A Response to Professor Schneyer's Proposal, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 (2002).
New York and New Jersey now allow discipline of law firms. See N.Y. CODE OF
PROF'L RESPONSImILIT DR 1-104, 5-105(e) (2003) (requiring law firm to make rea-

sonable efforts to ensure that all lawyers in firm conform to disciplinary rules); see
also N.J. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1 (a) (2003) (requiring firms to establish

procedures to maximize attorneys' compliance with Rules).
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yers in the firm, not just one partner and a few subordinates, are likely to
be involved. Specialized corporate and securities practice involves the participation of a team of lawyers who bring differing skills and knowledge.
Responsibility for decisions is often divided or shared in ways that are uncertain or shifting. The diffusion of responsibility and knowledge leads to
the argument that no one lawyer or identified group of lawyers can be
held responsible for the work done. The law of agency addresses these
realities through rules of vicarious liability and imputed knowledge, which
are discussed in more detail in the next section. Furthermore, the SEC
itself has disciplined law firms in the past in exercising its authority under
Rule 102(e) (formerly Rule 2(e)).
2.

122

What Triggers the Lawyer's Initial Duty to Report?

The heart of Section 307, and of the SEC rules, is the lawyer's duty to
report. The key question under the duty to report is what circumstances
trigger that duty. Section 307 obligated the SEC to adopt a rule requiring
a lawyer "to report evidence of a material violation of securities law or
breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the company or any agent
thereof, to the chief legal counsel or the chief executive officer of the
company (or the equivalent thereof)."' 23 The rule implementing this requirement, Section 205.3(b) (1), states:
If an attorney, appearing and practicing before the Commission
in the representation of an issuer, becomes aware of evidence of
a material violation by the issuer or by any officer, director, employee, or agent of the issuer, the attorney shall report such evidence to the issuer's chief legal officer (or the equivalent
thereof) or to both the issuer's chief legal officer and its chief
1 24
executive officer (or the equivalents thereof) forthwith.
122. See In re Keating, Muething & Klekamp, Exchange Act Release No. 3415982 July 2, 1979) (finding that "law firm has a duty to make sure that disclosure
documents filed with the Commission include all material facts about a client of
which it has knowledge as a result of its legal representation of that client," and
imposing sanctions on law firm for "fail[ing] to carry out its professional
responsibilities").
123. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307, 15 U.S.C.

§ 7245(1).
124. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b) (1) (2004) (stating rule requiring lawyer to report).
The SEC rules provide two alternative first steps to reporting to the chief legal
officer (CLO): (1) reporting to a qualified legal compliance committee and (2)
reporting directly to the board or relevant board committee. The alternative of
reporting to a previously formed "qualified legal compliance committee," is subject
to a trigger similar to the general trigger for reporting to the CLO. See id.
§ 205.3(c) (stating trigger for duty to report is when "an attorney, appearing and
practicing before the Commission, becomes aware of evidence of a material viola-

tion"). The requirements for a qualified legal compliance committee are given in
the definition section. See id. § 205.2(k). The alternative of bypassing the CLO
and going directly to the board requires that the lawyer "reasonably believe[ I that
it would be futile to report evidence of a material violation to the issuer's chief
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The SEC rules define "evidence of a material violation" in Section
205.2(e) as "credible evidence, based upon which it would be unreasonable, under the circumstances, for a prudent and competent attorney not
to conclude that it is reasonably likely that a material violation has oc125
curred, is occurring, or is about to occur."
In assessing how faithfully and well the SEC rules implement the congressional mandate, it is important to keep in mind the goals of Section
307. In the wake of Enron and other corporate scandals, Congress was
concerned that too many corporate lawyers were taking a "see no evil, report no evil" approach to their representations. Any lawyer worth his salt

knows that assessing whether the law is actually being violated is no simple
task. One extra fact, one nuance, one affirmative defense, one creative
ambiguity, and a judgment of "illegality" morphs into something more benign. Unfortunately, as lawyer behavior in the S & L scandal and countless
other financial debacles demonstrate, the inevitable "grayness" or uncertainty of all law-a characteristic of all just legal regimes and not a flawhas become an excuse for ignoring evidence of illegality, no matter how
substantial the evidence or harm being wrought has been.
The purpose of Section 307 was to change this corporate legal culture
and practice and encourage more reporting of dubious corporate activities. Thus, Congress abandoned the "subjective" approach of Model Rule
1.13(b), which imposes no obligations on a lawyer unless she "knows" that
illegal activity is occurring or will occur. Instead, Congress mandated an
objective trigger, while at the same time lowering the triggering standard
from one of definitive violation to "evidence" of a violation. The hope was
that an objective, probabilistic "evidence" trigger would be less subject to
manipulation by lawyers inclined not to notice evidence of wrongdoing or
to explain such evidence away. The question, then, is whether the SEC
rules further this objective. The answer, unfortunately, is no.
There are four deficiencies in the SEC's triggering standard: the
double-negative formulation in the definition of "evidence of a material
violation;" the ambiguity of the "reasonably likely" standard in the same
definition; the undefined and uncertain meaning of the "becomes aware"
trigger; and the failure to address the problem of imputed knowledge.
a.

The Troublesome Double-Negative Standard

In deciding whether to act-whether to report what Congress wanted
to encourage lawyers to report up the corporate ladder-the lawyer confronting the definition of "evidence of a material violation" in Section
205.2(e) must ask herself whether it would be unreasonablenot to conclude
legal officer and chief executive officer." Id. § 205.3(b) (4). Reasonable belief is
defined as actual belief plus circumstances suggesting that the belief is "not unreasonable." Id. § 205.2(m).
125. Id. § 205.2(e). Other relevant definitions are "material violation" in Section 205.2(i) and "breach of fiduciary duty" in Section 205.2(d).
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that the evidence before her demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of a
material violation of law. This definition, which triggers the up-the-ladder
reporting duty, is troublesome because its use of a double-negative formulation makes the standard difficult to understand, interpret or apply.
Law is intended to guide action in the world. Yet it is barely possible
to read the SEC's definition out loud without tripping (or, as we have
discovered when presenting this definition in various fora, chuckling) over
the words, let alone trying to remember the definition without reading it
or trying to work out its "logic." Indeed, the provision is a gross violation
of the SEC's own "plain English" rules applicable to SEC filings intended
for investors. Similar language in a prospectus would not fare well.
Moreover, the SEC's standard fails another critical test of sound
rulemaking. It will be a nightmare to enforce. 126 The Commission has
asked its staff to assume the burden of proving not just one negative, but
two. To enforce this rule, the Commission would have to show that it was
unreasonable for a lawyer not to conclude that a violation was reasonably
likely. We do not believe that this burden is a realistic one to ask the staff
to meet.
The SEC's defense of this definition in the Adopting Release is that it
"recognizes that there is a range of conduct in which an attorney may
engage without being unreasonable." 127 The idea is that if any "prudent
and competent" lawyer might conclude that the evidence did not support
the conclusion that a material violation has occurred, up-the-ladder reporting is not required. But this standard renders the reporting requirement of Section 307 nearly an empty shell. Any good lawyer will almost
always be able to conclude that it is not "unreasonable" to conclude that
the evidence before her demonstrates legal conduct. Lawyers are trained
to re-imagine evidence of illegality as evidence of legality. Not only will
lawyers be able to reach this conclusion, they have strong motives to do so.
The ethos of lawyers is not to report up the corporate ladder; instead it is
to find any possible way to avoid doing so.
The SEC could easily have adopted a rule plainly stating that a lawyer
must report when confronted with information that a prudent and competent lawyer, acting reasonably under the circumstances, would conclude
was credible evidence of a material violation. In fact, that is precisely the
126. See Floyd Norris, No Positives in This Legal Double Negative, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan.

24, 2003, at C1 (stating that change from "straightforward" and "reasonably simple
definition" to one that is "confusing" makes required reporting up ladder "a lot
harder to enforce").
127. SEC Final Rule, supra note 9 (discussing Section 205.2(l) and (m)). The

SEC used a similar double negative to define "reasonable" in Section 205.2(l) and
"reasonably believes" in Section 205.2(m). Both definitions define "reasonable"
behavior as behavior that is "not unreasonable," again to emphasize a "range" of
reasonable behavior or belief, a range we believe is already inherent in the concept
of "reasonable." In fact, the word "unreasonable" appears in the definition of "evidence of a material violation" in Section 205.2(e), making that definition even
more confusing and solicitous of lawyer discretion.
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triggering standard we proposed in our comments to the SEC, and which

we still support. l2 8 This clearer and more straightforward definition, incorporating a standard conception of reasonableness, would provide ample recognition of a "range of conduct" and the need for lawyer
discretion. 12 9 It would also be consistent with Congress's intent by providing an objective standard (a "prudent and competent lawyer, acting reasonably under the circumstances") with respect to both the factual
question ("credible evidence") and the legal question ("material violation"). 13 0 The fact that the SEC opted for a more convoluted double-negative standard, rather than the more straightforward standard, will be read
by many lawyers as an invitation to inaction. The bar needs no such invitation and Congress surely did not intend the Commission to offer one.
b.

The Ambiguity of "Reasonably Likely"

As we noted above, Congress, in adopting a duty to report triggered
by "evidence" of a material violation, intended to encourage more reporting by corporate lawyers, even when those lawyers could imagine some
alternative interpretation of the facts or law that would render innocuous
the conduct about which they had information. Yet, the SEC's trigger,
contained in its definition of "evidence of a material violation," includes
the troubling qualification that the evidence must show that a material
violation is "reasonably likely."
The SEC's intent was apparently to add a substantiality requirement
to the evidence trigger. The Adopting Release states: "To be 'reasonably
likely' a material violation must be more than a mere possibility, but it
need not be 'more likely than not."' SEC staff members, while disclaiming
authority to speak for the Commission, have stated publicly that "reasonably likely" means less than "more probably than not" and that conduct in
"the 20%-40% range of likelihood" should trigger a report.1 3 1 If the lan128. See Letter from Professors Susan P. Koniak, Roger C. Cramton & George
M. Cohen, to Securities and Exchange Commission (Apr. 7, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/lawprofsO40703.htm
[hereinafter
Koniak, Cramton & Cohen Comments] (commenting on SEC's proposed rule implementing Section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley).
129. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 52, § 52 cmt. b (interpreting lawyer's
duty of competence as one of "reasonableness in the circumstances," which "does
not require a lawyer, in a situation involving the exercise of professional judgment,
to employ the same means or select the same options as would other competent
lawyers in the many situations in which competent lawyers reasonably exercise professional judgment in different ways"). Moreover, our proposed reasonableness
standard, by using the word "would" to modify "conclude" rather than "could,"
would ensure the recognition of sufficient lawyer discretion without undermining
the rule. See generally Koniak, Cramton & Cohen Comments, supra note 128 (advocating different reasonableness standard).
130. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.2(e), 205.3(b) (1).
131. Simon N. Lome, An Issue-Annotated Version of the SOX 307 Rules, in ALAS
Loss PREVENTION PROGRAMS,A-117, 125 (June 12, 2003); see also Symposium Transcript, After Sarbanes-Oxley: A PanelDiscussion on Law and Ethics in the Era of Corporate
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guage is interpreted that way, it would be consistent with congressional
intent by requiring lawyers to report evidence of possible violations, but
not requiring the report of evidence that is so vague and insubstantial as
32
not to warrant additional investigation by the corporation. 1
Unfortunately, the language used by the Commission is susceptible of
other readings. As one comment on this language stated:
The ordinary, commonly understood meaning of the word
"likely" is probable or having a high probability of occurring.
Most attorneys would understand the phrase "reasonably likely"
as used in Section 205.2(e) to mean probably or more likely than
not. Nothing in Part 205 itself seems inconsistent with the com133
monly accepted understanding of "reasonably likely."'
The comment goes on to state that the sentence in the Adopting Release,
quoted above, "muddies the meaning of 'reasonably likely' by attempting
to assign to that phrase the meaning 'possible,' which is counter-intuitive
for most attorneys, confusing and contrary to the commonly accepted
34
meaning."1
When the SEC attempts to enforce Part 205, the SEC will face a "plain
meaning" attack on its interpretation of "reasonably likely." The lawyer
accused of failing to report will argue that the language used in the text of
the rule is a misleading trap on which the SEC cannot base enforcement,
because the SEC's interpretation of "reasonably likely" departs from the
common understanding of those words on which the lawyer reasonably
relied. The Commission should amend the rule to make "reasonably
likely" a defined term and add a definition stating that "'reasonably likely'
means something less than 'more probable than not' but more than a
remote possibility."
c.

"Becomes Aware" and the Duty of Inquiry

One of the problems with the subjective "actual knowledge" trigger in
Model Rule 1.13(b),' 135 which Congress sought to replace in Section 307,
Scandal, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 67, 83-84 (2003) (statement of Richard Hershey,
Associate General Counsel, SEC).
132. In our first set of comments to the SEC, we recommended a "probable
cause" standard for handling this concern. See Koniak, Cramton & Cohen Comments, supra note 128, at 6-10, 15-16.
133. Comment of Attorneys' Liability Assurance Society, Inc., on the SEC Proposed Rule (Mar. 28, 2003), available at http//www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74
502.html.
134. Id.
135. Under Rule 1.13(b) of the 2003 Model Rules, a lawyer for a corporation
has no duty to act unless he "knows" that a violation is occurring or about to occur.
See MODEL RULES 2003, supra note 32. "Knows" is defined in Model Rule 1.0(f) as
"actual knowledge," which "may be inferred from circumstances." The actual
knowledge trigger remains in Model Rule 1.13, even after the changes adopted by
the ABA's House of Delegates based on the ABA Task Force's recommendations.
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is that it creates an incentive for lawyers not to "know" that wrongdoing is
occurring or may occur. An examination of corporate failures and frauds
often shows that information that should have led lawyers to inquire was
ignored, handled by taking the word of the agents accused of wrongdoing
without more or given only a perfunctory review. Many of these cases involved a number of suspicious circumstances over time, some eye-opening
enough to be characterized as red flags. 136 In situations of this type, law
firms have frequently ended up settling malpractice or third-party liability
claims for large amounts of money.
Prevailing state and federal law on aiding and abetting fraud addresses the problem of "willful blindness" by adopting a standard-usually
labeled a scienter of "recklessness"-under which a lawyer's knowledge of
client fraud can be inferred from a failure to report or act on suspicious
circumstances. 137 The law of malpractice goes even further and recognizes a duty to investigate in some cases. A growing number of decisions
impose liability when the lawyer relied on the word of the alleged wrongdoer without further inquiry;13 8 failed to inquire when a number of suspicious circumstances would have stimulated action by a prudent and
competent lawyer; 139 failed to report illegal activities by the client's man136. See, e.g., Report of the Trustee, In re OPM (S.D.N.Y. 1983). In the OPM
fraud, the largest in American history at the time it occurred, the law firm that
documented and closed all of OPM's lease transactions continued to represent
OPM after learning that the two managers of OPM were guilty of check-kiting
involving a bank they owned, engaged in numerous and unusual transactions with
a particular vendor and received a letter from OPM's former chief financial officer, just resigned, stating that many of the transactions with that vendor were
fraudulent.
137. The Model Rules appear to adopt the "willful blindness" standard and
the comments to the newly revised version of Model Rule 1.13 interprets the

knowledge standard to include willful blindness. See

MODEL RULES

2003, supra

note 32, R. 1.13 cmt. 3 ("As defined in Rule 1.0(f), knowledge can be inferred
from circumstances, and a lawyer cannot ignore the obvious."); see also MODEL
RULES

2003, supra note 32, R. 4.2 cmt. 8;

RESTATEMENT,

supra note 52, § 94, re-

porter's note to cmt. g ("In the Reporter's view, the preferable rule is that proof of
a lawyer's conscious disregard of facts is relevant evidence, which, together with
other evidence bearing on the question, may warrant a finding of actual
knowledge.").
138. See, e.g.,
FDIC v. Clark, 978 F.2d 1541 (10th Cir. 1992) (affirming jury's
verdict against law firm when firm's lawyers, after receiving plausible allegations
that bank's president had defrauded bank, accepted president's explanation without making further inquiry or informing bank's board of allegations).
139. See, e.g., FDIC v. O'Melveny & Myers, 969 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1992) (reversing summary judgment when law firm, knowing of recent resignation of its
client's prior auditors and outside law firm, made no further inquiry before giving
legal opinions and doing other work that assisted client in selling securities that
turned out to be fraudulent). In Loyd v. Paine Webber, Inc., 208 F.3d 755, 760 (9th
Cir. 2000), O'Melveny was distinguished as limited to "the 'high specialty field' of
securities offerings [where] counsel has an automatic duty to make a 'reasonable,
independent investigation to detect and correct false or misleading materials."'
The court dismissed the legal malpractice suit for failure to allege that the law firm
knew or should have known of the fraud. Cf Tush v. Pharr, 68 P.3d 1239, 1246 &
n.14 (Alaska 2003) (interpreting Loyd as finding no duty to independently investi-
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agers to its board of directors; 140 turned a blind eye to facts that were
plain to see;14 1 or failed to take steps to prevent a continuing violation of
law. 142 Moreover, in situations in which the outside law firm has provided
legal opinions as part of representation involving compliance with federal
securities laws, a number of decisions hold that lawyers have a duty to investigate when they have reason to know that the factual assumptions of
143
the legal opinion may be unreliable.
It is unclear how the SEC rules handle the willful blindness problem.
Section 205.3(b) imposes a duty to report on a lawyer who "becomes aware
of evidence of a material violation." 144 By lowering the trigger from "violation" to "evidence," Section 307 and the SEC rules in effect shift much of
the burden of a duty of inquiry to the CLO to whom initial reports are
made.' 45 There could still remain some level of evidence that is not
strong enough to trigger a duty to report but could trigger some kind of
gate whether clients were engaged in fraudulent conduct where situation was "unambiguous" in failing to present facts suggesting fraud); see also Chem-Age, Inc. v.
Glover, 652 N.W.2d 756 (S.D. 2002) (following O'Melveny).
140. See, e.g., In reAm. Cont'l Corp., 794 F. Supp. 1424, 1452 (D. Ariz. 1992)
(finding failure to report illegal activity of client's managers to its board of directors could not be excused because thought to be futile).
141. See, e.g., United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir. 1964)
(finding that lawyer who "deliberately closed his eyes to facts he had a duty to see"
or "recklessly stated as facts things of which he was ignorant" satisfies scienter requirement of mail fraud conviction for securities fraud); see also SEC v. Frank, 388
F.2d 486, 488-89 (2d Cir. 1968) ("[A] lawyer, no more than others, can escape
liability for fraud by closing his eyes to what he saw and could readily understand,"
though whether securities laws "require a lawyer... to run down possible infirmities in his client's story of which he has been put on notice, and if so what efforts
are required of him, is a closer question").
142. See, e.g., SEC v. Nat'l Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 714 (D.D.C.
1978) (holding that lawyers who closed merger transaction knowing that proxy
solicitation contained materially false information were required "to speak out at
the closing" and "to take steps to ensure that the information would be disclosed
to the . . . shareholders"); In re Gutfreund, 51 S.E.C. 93, 112-14 (1992) (establishing that CLO of public company must take affirmative steps to ensure that misconduct by company trader is adequately addressed); In re Carter &Johnson, 47 S.E.C.
471, 511-12 (1981) (indicating lawyer's continued representation knowing of client's ongoing securities fraud "violates professional standards unless he takes
prompt steps to end the client's noncompliance").
143. See, e.g., Kline v. First W. Gov't Secs., Inc., 24 F.3d 480, 488 (3d Cir. 1994)
(concluding that facts relied on in legal opinion must be investigated when firm
had notice they might not be accurate); Ackerman v. Schwartz, 947 F.2d 841, 84344 (7th Cir. 1991) (noting that knowledge of suspicious circumstances makes further inquiry necessary); Breard v. Sachnoff & Weaver, Ltd., 941 F.2d 142, 144 (2d
Cir. 1991) (stating that firm's knowledge that client's principal had been convicted
of mail fraud required it to conduct independent investigation).
144. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b) (2004).
145. The duty of inquiry for the CLO as a result of a "report" of evidence of a
material violation is made explicit in Section 205.3(b)(2) (requiring CLO to
"cause such inquiry into the evidence of a material violation as he or she reasonably believes is appropriate to determine whether the material violation described
in the report has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur").
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duty to inquire. And, the higher the threshold of "evidence" needed to
trigger the duty to report, for example, due to a strict reading of "reasonably likely" as discussed in the previous section, the more important the
meaning of "becomes aware" becomes.
"Becomes aware," which is not defined in the rules, sounds like a subjective standard. It could, however, be interpreted to incorporate at least
the "recklessness" standard from the case law. We think it should be so
interpreted, or better yet, the phrase should be changed or specifically
defined to incorporate the recklessness standard. 146 One reason is that
lawyers are likely to view compliance with the SEC rules as a kind of "safe
harbor" against liability, although the rules themselves do not directly
speak to this issue. 147 We do not think the rules should be interpreted to
146. One possibility would be to use a "reason to know" standard. The law of
agency distinguishes "reason to know" from "should know." The latter standard
contemplates a duty of inquiry; the former generally does not. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) AGENCY § 9 cmts. d, e (current through June 2003); see also Deborah A.
DeMott, When Is a PrincipalCharged with an Agent's Knowledge?, 13 DuIK J. COMp. &
INT'L L. 291, 300-02 (2003). According to the Restatement comment d:
A person has reason to know of a fact if he has information from which a
person of ordinary intelligence, or of the superior intelligence which
such person may have, would infer that the fact in question exists or that
there is such a substantial chance of its existence that, if exercising reasonable care with reference to the matter in question, his action would be
predicated upon the assumption of its possible existence. The inference
drawn need not be that the fact exists; it is sufficient that the likelihood of
its existence is so great that a person of ordinary intelligence, or of the
superior intelligence which the person in question has, would, if exercising ordinary prudence under the circumstances, govern his conduct as if
the fact existed, until he could ascertain its existence or non-existence.
The words "reason to know" do not necessarily import the existence of a
duty to others to ascertain facts; the words are used both where the actor
has a duty to another and where he would not be acting adequately in the
protection of his own interests were he not to act with reference to the
facts which he has reason to know. One may have reason to know a fact
although he does not make the inference of its existence which would be
made by a reasonable person in his position and with his knowledge,
whether his failure to make such inference is due to inferior intelligence
or to a failure properly to exercise such intelligence as he has. A person
of superior intelligence or training has reason to know a fact if a person
with his mental capacity and attainments would draw such an inference
from the facts known to him. On the other hand, "reason to know" imports no duty to ascertain facts not to be deduced as inferences from facts
already known; one has reason to know a fact only if a reasonable person
in his position would infer such fact from other facts already known to
him.
147. The SEC in its comments refers to Section 205.7(a) as creating a "safe
harbor," but that rule merely says that the SEC rules do not create any causes of
action; it does not address the relationship between the rules and existing causes of
action. With respect to existing liability, the rules speak only to the relationship
between the rules and "standards" of other state or federal jurisdictions,which presumably refers to specific standards of lawyer conduct such as ethics rules, rather
than the relationship between the rules and substantive law of general applicability. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.1 ("These standards supplement applicable standardsof any
jurisdictionwhere an attorney is admitted or practices and are not intended to limit
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provide such a safe harbor, because the SEC should not be adopting minimum standards for lawyers that are lower than the prohibitions against
securities fraud that are part of the larger regulatory scheme. If they are
interpreted to create a safe harbor, however, at least the rules should not
provide weaker protection for investors than the general rules of liability
under the securities laws and related law. On the other hand, if the rules
do not provide a safe harbor, then lawyers who mistakenly believe that
they do risk falling into a trap for the unwary.
Of course, prudent lawyers will investigate suspicious, credible information in any event. 148 The likelihood of an adverse outcome in a subsequent proceeding in which the trier of fact knows that a large fraud was
involved and the lawyer ignored suspicious circumstances should lead a
prudent lawyer to the view that "it depends on the circumstances" and err
on the side of caution in examining those circumstances. The CLO can
go a long way toward creating an atmosphere of candor and openness, at
least for inside counsel, and to some extent even for outside counsel. In
addition, for outside counsel, the partner in charge of the relationship
with the issuer can set a similar tone within her firm to ensure that she
may be fully informed and serve a function analogous to that of the client's CLO in determining what inquiry is necessary or prudent and how it
should be carried out.
In our view, however, the thrust of Section 307 is that reliance on the
prudence of most lawyers as well as the threat of liability is not a sufficient
deterrent to corporate wrongdoing. The SEC rules should implement
that vision.
d.

Imputed knowledge

A question related to the duty of inquiry and willful blindness, but not
addressed in the rules, is the extent to which knowledge within firms will
be "imputed" from one lawyer to another. Lawyers often cite the desire to
avoid imputation as a key reason for supporting the "actual knowledge"
the ability of any jurisdiction to impose additional obligations on an attorney not

inconsistent with the application of this part. Where the standards of a state or
other United States jurisdiction where an attorney is admitted or practices conflict
with this part, this part shall govern.") (emphasis added); id. § 205.6(c) ("An attorney who complies in good faith with the provisions of this part shall not be subject
to discipline or otherwise liable under inconsistent standards imposed by any state
or other United States jurisdiction where the attorney is admitted or practices.")
(emphasis added). In our comments to the SEC, we argued that these rules

should be revised to make clear that compliance with them does not ensure that
the lawyer has complied with all requirements of the securities laws.
148. Simon Lorne, a former SEC general counsel, opposes regulatory language that would impose a broad duty of investigation. Nevertheless, he recommends that prudent corporate counsel encourage reporting of possible problems:
"Nothing, of course, prevents corporate counsel from establishing their own,
lower, standards for reporting; it may well be that a fairly low standard is the right
approach when the power of the SEC enforcement division stands behind a failure
to meet that standard." Lorne, supra note 131, at A-117, 126.
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standard in Model Rule 1.13. If the SEC rules are revised to make explicit
the coverage of law firms, as we recommended above, some form of imputation is necessary, because there must be some way to determine the
"knowledge" and "intent" of the firm, which can act only through its
agents.
The concept of imputed knowledge comes from the law of agency
and partnership. In general, an agent's knowledge is imputed to the
agent's principal in two situations: (1) if the knowledge concerns a matter
in which the agent's own actions bind the principal; or (2) if the agent has
a duty to give the principal information. 14 9 Similarly, under partnership
law, "the knowledge of the partner acting in the particular matter, acquired while a partner or then present to his mind, and the knowledge of
any other partner who reasonably could and should have communicated it
150
to the acting partner, operate as . . . knowledge of the partnership."
The first situation involves cases in which the agent (or partner) makes
contracts on behalf of the principal (or partnership) or commits a tort,
including misrepresentation, in the course of representing the principal
(or partnership). Although lawyers can certainly be involved in such activity, the situation more relevant to the SEC rules is the second one, in
which the lawyer has a duty to disclose to the lawyer's firm. In particular,
the question is whether a law firm might have "evidence of a material violation" as a result of information possessed by lawyers in the firm, even if
15 1
that information is not disclosed to the firm.
When the agent has a duty to disclose information to the principal,
the imputation of knowledge depends on the standards of conduct applicable to the principal. If the principal is subject to an "actual knowledge"
standard, then an agent's knowledge is not imputed to the principal unless the agent is acting for the principal in the transaction. On the other
hand, if the standard applicable to the principal is "reason to know," the
agent's knowledge is imputed even if the agent is not acting for the princi-

149. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 272 (current through June 2003).
150. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACt § 12 (2001). The Uniform Partnership Act
defines "knowledge" as actual knowledge, as well as "knowledge of such other facts
as in the circumstances shows bad faith." Id. § 3(1). This definition incorporates
the "willful blindness" standard or the agency law "reason to know" standard discussed at supra note 136 and accompanying text. The Revised Uniform Partnership Act, now adopted by a majority of U.S. jurisdictions, broadens the concept of
partnership imputation to any "fact relating to the partnership" of which a partner
has "knowledge," REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 102(f) (1997), but narrows
the definition of knowledge to actual knowledge, id. § 102(a). Limited liability
companies, a form used by many law firms, are also subject to imputation rules, but
the statutes governing these entities do not take a uniform position on the question. See generally UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 303 (2001).
151. A lawyer's knowledge could also be imputed to the lawyer's other principal, the client. But for our purposes in interpreting the SEC rules' duty to report,
this potential imputation is not relevant.
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pal in the transaction. 152 Moreover, if the principal has a duty to a third
party, such as a duty to disclose, and the principal entrusts the matter to
an agent, the knowledge that the agent would have acquired had the
agent exercised due care is also imputed to the principal. 153 These principles have led courts to adopt a doctrine of "composite knowledge," which
attributes to an entity the collective knowledge of its individual agents
even if no one agent had all the knowledge. 154 The SEC has previously
endorsed the composite knowledge idea in exercising its disciplinary au1 55
thority against law firms under Rule 102(e) (formerly Rule 2(e)).
In our view, not only should the SEC rules apply to law firms, but the
application to law firms should include the concept of composite knowledge. Absent such an imputation rule, law firms would have an incentive
to decentralize legal work to minimize the number of lawyers with access
to sufficient client information to bring them within the purview of these
rules. As a result, the quality of legal work done in securities matters as
well as compliance with the securities laws would decline, perhaps in dramatic ways. 156 Moreover, we would not expect a composite knowledge
rule to add significantly to legal costs. Firms often have good economic
152. See Restatement (Second) Agency § 275 cmt. b (current through June
2003).
153. See id. § 277 cmt. b.
154. See, e.g., United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C. Inc., 381 F. Supp. 730, 738 (W.D.
Va. 1974).
[K]nowledge acquired by employees within the scope of their employment is imputed to the corporation. In consequence, a corporation cannot plead innocence by asserting that the information obtained by several
employees was not acquired by any one individual employee who then
would have comprehended its full import. Rather, the corporation is
considered to have acquired the collective knowledge of its employees
and is held responsible for their failure to act accordingly.
Id. But cf. Woodmont v. Daniels, 274 F.2d 132, 137 (10th Cir. 1959) ("[Wlhile in
some cases, a corporation may be held constructively responsible for the composite knowledge of all its agents, whether acting in unison or not, .... we are unwilling to apply the rule to fix liability where, as here, intent is an essential ingredient
of tort liability as for deceit.").
155. See In re Keating, Muething & Klekamp, Release No. 34-15982, 1979 WL

186370 (July 2, 1979). In that case, the Commission found that the firm "collectively had knowledge" of questionable transactions, but had imposed "a division of
authority among the partners within the firm concerning client matters which significantly impaired communications within the firm .. due in part to the lack of
comprehensive internal procedures within the firm to gather and evaluate such
information in connection with the preparation of [the client's] filings with the
Commission." The Commission faulted the firm for failure to have in place "a
system which assured that the knowledge of the members of the firm was communicated to the persons responsible for preparing disclosure documents so that adequate disclosure of material information-which was within the firm's
knowledge-was made."
156. One of the purposes of the disclosure regime of the federal securities
laws is to force issuers to aggregate material information and disclose it, which
avoids needlessly redundant investigation by analysts and investors. A composite
knowledge standard for law firms furthers this regulatory objective.
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reasons for dividing up legal work (in particular, benefits from specialization), and so they already have a need to coordinate and monitor the work
and information of various lawyers. A failure to coordinate is itself likely
to result in duplication of legal work that alone would unnecessarily escalate fees, as well as increase the risk of malpractice. Finally, the increased
risk on law firms as a result of the composite knowledge rule could be
mitigated by adopting a system of reduced penalties for firms with effective compliance programs and procedures reasonably designed to prevent
violations of the SEC rules.
The question of imputation may be important even if law firms as
entities are not covered by the rules. In theory, multiple lawyers or multiple law firms could be in an agency relationship with each other, in which
case, the agency rules of imputation would apply to the lawyer in the position of principal. In most cases, however, the multiple lawyers involved in
representing the corporation will be co-agents of the lawyer's two principals, the law firm and the client. For example, an individual partner is not
the principal of an associate whom the partner supervises. If the firm is
not subject to sanctions, there is no principal to which information can be
imputed. But even if the rules do not adopt "imputation" of knowledge in
the sense of a conclusive presumption based solely on an agency relationship, the actual relationship between lawyers may give rise to an inference
157
or presumption of knowledge depending on the circumstances.
There is, of course, one area in which the law does impute knowledge
to sanction individual lawyers within a firm: conflicts of interest. Conflicts
of interest are different from client fraud problems in that conflicts of
interest involve situations in which the concern is that lawyers will disclose
information that they should not; the rules presume that a conflicting interest will lead them to do so. In the case of client wrongdoing, the concern is that lawyers will fail to disclose information that they should
disclose. But it is not clear why that difference should matter. The more
important difference is that the result of imputation in the conflict of interest case is disqualification of the firm, whereas the result of imputation
in the client fraud situation in the absence of firm sanctions is discipline of
an individual lawyer.
An alternative way to handle the problem that imputed knowledge is
meant to solve would be through the rule concerning the responsibilities
of supervisory attorneys. Under Section 205.4(b), "a supervisory attorney
shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that a subordinate attorney...
157. See

RESTATEMENT,

supra note 52, § 94 cmt. g ("If the facts warrant, a

finder of fact may infer that the lawyer gained information possessed by other
associated lawyers, such as other lawyers in the same law firm, where such an inference would be warranted due to the particular circumstances of the persons working together. Thus, for example, in particular circumstances it may be reasonable
to infer that a lawyer who regularly consulted about a matter with another lawyer
in the same firm became aware of the other lawyer's information about a fact.").
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that he or she supervises or directs conforms to this part." 58 The rule as
adopted does not quite solve the problem because the "evidence of a material violation" may become apparent only after the supervisory attorney
gathers information from multiple subordinates. Thus, a supervisory attorney who sought to discourage or diffuse the transmission of bits of information that in themselves did not amount to evidence of a material
violation would not run afoul of Section 205.4(b).
Section 205.4(b), however, should be modified to include a responsibility on supervisory attorneys who supervise multiple subordinates to
adopt reasonable measures for collecting and coordinating information
from those subordinates to facilitate compliance with the rules. In addition, we recommend clarifying that the CLO of the corporation, who is
defined as a supervisory attorney under Section 205.4(a), is a supervisor
not only of inside counsel, but of all outside counsel, or must appoint one
outside counsel to serve as such a supervisory attorney for purposes of the
duty of collection and coordination of information from multiple firms,
which responsible issuers already do. Just as law firms should not have an
incentive to balkanize work among their various lawyers, neither should
the issuer have an incentive to balkanize work among its various firms, so
that no one firm has sufficient information to trigger the duty to report.
e.

Conclusion: The Importance of the Initial Trigger

The triggering standard is the gateway to the entire set of obligations
created by the SEC's rules. If that standard is so weak that lawyers inclined
to do so can easily circumvent it, if it is so ambiguous and convoluted that
the SEC cannot effectively enforce it, the rules will not have effectuated
the statutory objective. We find it disappointing, then, that so little attention has been paid to the triggering standard compared to other issues,
most notably noisy withdrawal.
We find it even more disappointing that many lawyers who did pay
attention to the trigger, and the SEC, which sympathized with their objections, so strongly resisted a simple, objective standard, stated in affirmative
terms and incorporating the willful blindness concept. This simple, objective standard would fully implement congressional intent that lawyers report evidence of a material violation, while at the same time preserving an
appropriate degree of lawyer discretion. The resistance is all the more
troubling when one considers how little is really being demanded of the
lawyer at the initial stage. The lawyer must simply report "evidence of a
material violation" to the corporation's CLO. 159 The "report" is not a formal, detailed document, but can be a simple phone call, e-mail or even a
casual water cooler comment.1 60 More important, the lawyer is not re158. 17 C.F.R. § 205.4(b) (2004).
159. Id. § 205.3(b)(1).
160. "Report" is defined in Section 205.2(n) as simply "mak[ing] known to

directly, either in person, by telephone, by e-mail, electronically, or in writing." In
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quired to take any further steps without an additional, more demanding
trigger being satisfied. The next section considers those further steps and
their accompanying triggers.
3.

Obligations of the Reporting Lawyer After the Initial Report

Aside from the initial duty to report evidence of a material violation
to the CLO or CEO, the other key component of Section 307 is the obligation of the reporting lawyer to report the evidence up the corporate ladder to the board or relevant board committee if the CLO or CEO does not
"appropriately respond" to the reporting lawyer. The SEC implemented
this directive in Section 205.3(b) (3), which states that the reporting lawyer
"shall report the evidence of a material violation" to the board or relevant
board committee, unless the lawyer "reasonably believes that the chief legal officer or the chief executive officer ...

has provided an appropriate

response within a reasonable time." 16 1 The lawyer who reports up to the
board must also "explain his or her reasons" for believing that the issuer
has not made an appropriate response to the CLO, CEO and the "directors to whom the attorney reported the evidence of a material violation. '162 On the other hand, if the lawyer "reasonably believes" that he or
she has received "an appropriate and timely response," he or she "need do
1
nothing more . . .with respect to his or her report.

63

The effectiveness of the SEC's rule implementing the reporting up
obligation thus depends crucially on the definition and meaning of "appropriate response." Section 205.2(b) defines "appropriate response" as
"a response to an attorney regarding reported evidence of a material violation as a result of which the attorney reasonably believes" any one of three
its initial proposed set of rules, the SEC had required written reports, but even
those could have been very informal.
161. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(3). "Reasonably believes" is defined in Section
205.2(m) to mean "that an attorney believes the matter in question and that the
circumstances are such that the belief is not unreasonable." It is important to
understand the role of a lawyer's subjective belief under this standard. If a lawyer
subjectively believes that he or she has not received an appropriate response, Section 205.3(b) (3) appears to require the lawyer to report up, even if the lawyer's
belief is unreasonable. This may not be a bad result (though it may not be a result
the SEC intended) because the harm from extra reporting in this situation is likely
to be minimal and the likelihood of SEC discipline if the lawyer fails to report in
this situation is slim. Still, as we argued in our initial comments to the SEC, we
think the lawyer's obligations to report up should not turn on the lawyer's subjective belief, and so support a completely objective standard, such as "if a prudent
and competent lawyer would conclude."
162. Id. § 205.3(b) (9). The requirement that the lawyer explain his or her
reasons to the CLO and CEO, as well as the board, seems unnecessary and, especially in the case of bypassing the CLO and CEO under Section 205.3(b) (4), overly
discouraging of the duty to report in situations in which the CLO and/or the CEO
are implicated in the material violation.
163. Id. § 205.3(b) (8).

2004]

LEGAL AND ETHICAL DUTIES OF LAWYERS

things. 164 First, there is no problem; that is, "no material violation ... has
occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur." 165 Second, the issuer is fixing
166
whatever problem exists by adopting "appropriate remedial measures."
Third, "the issuer, with the consent of the issuer's board of directors" or
relevant board committee "has retained or directed an attorney to review
the reported evidence of a material violation," as a result of which one of
68
two further things must happen. 16 7 Either this "investigatory lawyer"'
must conduct "a reasonable investigation and evaluation of the reported
evidence," make "remedial recommendations" and have those recommendations "substantially implemented" by the issuer, 169 or the "investigatory
lawyer" must advise the issuer that he or she "may, consistent with his or
her professional obligations, assert a colorable defense on behalf of the
issuer (or the issuer's officer, director, employee, or agent, as the case may
be) in any investigation or judicial or administrative proceeding relating
170
to the reported evidence of a material violation."
To the extent that the bar has expressed concern about this definition, it has focused on the second option and the difficulties in determining what counts as "appropriate measures." Although this phrase creates
significant interpretive questions, we think the far more important aspect
of the definition concerns what we will call the "third option," involving
164. Id. § 205.2(b). Note that by including the "reasonable belief' of the reporting lawyer in both the definition of "appropriate response" as well as in the
reporting lawyer's follow-up duty in Section 205.3(b) (3), the rules create an unfortunate redundancy that, if read literally, leads to an absurd result. Namely, the
lawyer has a duty to report up if the lawyer reasonably believes that he has received
a response as a result of which he reasonably believes. In our view, "reasonably
believes" should be removed from the definition of "appropriate response."
165. Id. § 205.2(b) (1).
166. Id. § 205.2(b) (2).
167. Id. § 205.2(b)(3). Note that the CLO is obligated to "cause such inquiry
into the evidence of a material violation as he or she reasonably believes is appropriate." Id. § 205.3(b) (2). Whether such an inquiry by the CLO qualifies as a "review" by an "attorney" under Section 205.2(b) (3), or whether Section 205.2(b) (3)
applies only to reviews by an attorney other than the CLO, is not clear. Under a
literal reading, the answer is that a review by the CLO will satisfy Section
205.2(b) (3), though the structure of Section 205.3(b) (2) suggests that an "inquiry"
by the CLO is separate from an "appropriate response." Under Section
205.3(b) (2), the CLO must "cause the issuer to adopt an appropriate response,"
unless the CLO "reasonably believes" that there is no material violation. This obligation is mentioned after the CLO's duty of "inquiry," which suggests the rule
intends that the CLO's inquiry precedes, and so is distinct from, an "appropriate
response." On the other hand, Section 205.3(b) (2) is somewhat inconsistent with
the definition of "appropriate response" because it suggests that there is no need
for the CLO to "cause the issuer to adopt an appropriate response" if the CLO
determines there is no material violation, whereas Section 205.2 (b)(1) includes a
determination of "no material violation" as one "appropriate response."
168. The SEC rules do not use the term "investigatory lawyer." We use it simply to provide a label for a lawyer serving the investigatory function in this
subsection.
169. 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(b)(3)(i).
170. Id. § 205.2(b) (3) (ii).
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the investigatory lawyer, and in particular the investigatory lawyer's assertion of a "colorable defense." The reason is that Section 205.2(b) (3) (ii)
creates a very strong incentive for issuers faced'with a "report" to take
advantage of this third option. And much like the confusing initial trigger, the third option threatens to undermine Congress's intent in enacting Section 307. In short, the assertion of a colorable defense is not an
appropriate response to a report of evidence of a material violation.
To set up our critique of the third option, we explain two legitimate,
and related, drafting concerns the SEC faced in implementing Section
307: the problem of lawyers acting as advocates, and the problem of factual and/or legal uncertainty remaining after an investigation of the initial
report. We suggest relatively simple ways the SEC could have addressed
these concerns. We then analyze how the SEC in fact tried to handle these
concerns through the third option and we argue that these provisions do a
poor job of handling the SEC's concerns.
a.

The SEC's Legitimate Concerns and Their Proper Resolution

In drafting its rules, the SEC faced two concerns that it treated as
related, but which in fact are importantly distinct. First, the SEC did not
want to interfere with the ability of a corporation charged with a material
violation to defend itself in litigation or a similar proceeding. Second, the
SEC had to decide what an "appropriate response" to a report of evidence
of a material violation would be in situations in which the existence of a
material violation, after an investigation of the evidence, remained uncertain. The reason these concerns have a superficial relationship is that litigation often occurs in cases in which the existence of a material violation
is uncertain, or at least is contested. But as we shall see, the differences far
outweigh the similarities.
The SEC rules, as initially proposed, did not make clear how, if at all,
they applied to lawyers acting as advocates in litigation defending their
corporate clients against civil or criminal charges alleging material violations of securities law or other related law. Many commentators, including
the authors of this Article, expressed the concern that the SEC rules
should not chill legitimate advocacy on behalf of issuers.' 7 1 The chilling
effect could be particularly strong in cases in which the SEC appears as a
party, especially in those cases in which the SEC acts as adjudicator and
decider as well as prosecutor.
The solution to this problem is straightforward. The SEC could have
adopted a simple rule stating that nothing in the rules is intended to interfere with the ability of a lawyer, acting as an advocate for an issuer in litigation or similar proceeding, from zealously presenting all available
nonfrivolous arguments on behalf of the issuer. 17 2 In our system, advo171. See Koniak, Cramton & Cohen Comments, supra note 128, at 33-34.
172. We argued for such a rule in our comments to the SEC. See id. Our
proposed rule stated: "Nothing in these rules prevents a lawyer who is acting as an
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cates are required to put the other side, particularly if that side is the government, to its proof. They are privileged to put forth all nonfrivolous
justifications of their clients' conduct and all nonfrivolous arguments that
the law should be read in novel, even unprecedented, ways. When they
represent clients charged with civil or criminal wrongs, they may offer "colorable defenses."
The "nonfrivolous" standards applied to advocates under Rule 11173
and state ethics rules, 174 and expressly incorporated into Section
205.2(b) (3) (ii), 175 are quite low. These standards suggest that virtually
any argument or assertion is permissible if it has the slightest chance of
prevailing. 176 At the extremes, these standards may be justifiable in the
litigation context, but as we shall argue in the next section, they are not
appropriate outside that context.
The SEC's second legitimate concern was what should happen in
cases in which the violation remains uncertain after the initial report and
subsequent investigation by the CLO. It is important to recall that Section
307 specifically requires that the reporting lawyer take "the evidence" to
the board or relevant board committee if the CLO or CEO does not "appropriately respond." Thus, the statute itself mandates reporting up in at
least some cases in which the violation is uncertain. This mandate makes
sense because a concerned and prudent board would want to know about
potential material violations of law. Of course, there is a separate question
of what happens if the board itself does not "appropriately respond," a
177
question we address in a subsequent section.
The SEC could have responded to the question of uncertain violations simply by including within the definition of "appropriate response" a
reporting of the evidence to the board by the CLO or CEO, rather than by
the initially reporting lawyer. But the SEC did not take this route, with two
exceptions: (1) allowing the CLO to refer the matter to a previously created qualified legal compliance committee (QLCC); 178 and (2) ending
the duty to report of a lawyer hired to investigate the evidence after the
advocate in any proceeding or formal or informal investigation by the government
from presenting any and all colorable defenses available to the issuer or its agents."
173. FED. R. Crv. P. 11.
174. E.g., Model Rule 3.1, prohibiting a lawyer from making an assertion "unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes
a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law."
175. Under Section 205.2(b) (3) (ii), the lawyer asserting a colorable defense
must do so "consistent with his or her professional obligations."
176. One experienced litigator has described his own test for "frivolous": "if
nobody in the office giggles, it passes muster." See David Margolick, Lauryerfor Striking Air Traffic Controllers Won Back 60Jobs but Suffered PersonalLoss, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
20, 1989, at B4 (quoting Harvey Silverglate, a well-known Boston lawyer).
177. The "colorable defense" standard may, in fact, have been drafted with
reporting out in mind rather than reporting up. We still believe the standard
would be inappropriate in the context of reporting out, but in any case the SEC
could have handled the standard for reporting out separately.
178. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.3(b) (2), 205.3(c) (2).
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initial report. 179 Perhaps the SEC thought that the CLO or CEO could
not be trusted to report the evidence to the board or that the statute precluded this possibility, though these explanations seem unlikely. 180 Alternatively, perhaps the SEC did not want the report to the board to end the
reporting lawyer's obligations, which is the key consequence of deeming
something an "appropriate response." But again this explanation is unsatisfactory because the result of the CLO's or CEO's reporting to the board
is exactly the same as if the reporting lawyer reports to the board. If the
SEC wanted to create further obligations after that point, it would presumably do so regardless of how the board acquired the information.
The more likely possibility is that the SEC wanted to adopt a graduated approach to reporting up, under which there would be a stricter standard for reporting evidence of a material violation to the board than for
the initial duty to report, when the violation remained uncertain after investigation. We supported such a graduated approach in our initial comments. 18 1 But if a graduated approach was the SEC's intent, there were
much more direct and less drastic ways to achieve that than the third option under the "appropriate response" definition the SEC drafted. For
example, the SEC could have increased the quantum of evidence necessary by adopting a "substantial evidence" standard as triggering a duty to
go to the board. Or the SEC could have demanded a higher likelihood of
violation than the "reasonably likely" standard it used to define "evidence
of a material violation." For example, the SEC could have defined appropriate response to include a determination by the CLO, after investigation, that the risk of a material violation was not significant, or that the
absence of a violation was more likely than not. The precise formulation
could be debated, as could the appropriate place in the rules to locate the
182
stricter standard.
179. See id. § 205.3(b) (6) (i) (B) (stating that lawyer retained or directed by
CLO to investigate reported evidence of material violation has no duty of his own
to report if CLO "reports the results of the investigation to the issuer's board of
directors" or relevant board committee). Actually, as we discuss in the next section, this is not exactly the same as having the CLO reporting "evidence" up to the
board.
180. The untrustworthy CLO/CEO case is in part addressed by the bypass
rule allowing the reporting lawyer to go directly to the board if the lawyer reasonably believes that reporting to the CLO and CEO would be "futile." Id.
§ 205.3(b) (4). Moreover, why would the SEC deem the CLO more trustworthy in
reporting an investigatory lawyer's report under Section 205.3(b) (6) (i) (B) than in
reporting an initial report?
181. See Koniak, Cramton & Cohen Comments, supra note 128, at 6-17.
182. There are at least three candidates for where the stricter standard could
be located: the definition of "evidence of a material violation," Section 205.2(e)
(which already includes a "reasonably likely" standard), the definition of "appropriate response," Section 205.2(b), or the triggering rule itself, Section
205.3(b) (3). We do not take a position here on the best place to locate the stricter
standard. In our initial comments to the SEC, we argued for using a "substantial
evidence" standard in the triggering rule. See Koniak, Cramton & Cohen Comments, supra note 128.
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The SEC could have adopted a graduated approach to the reporting
up trigger without weakening the statutory mandate that "evidence of a
material violation" be reported to the board. Nothing in the statute required or even suggested that the SEC use a litigation standard-"colorable defense"-to handle the problem of uncertain violations. Requiring
the reporting up of an uncertain violation in no way interferes with a subsequent decision by the board to litigate the issue, asserting all nonfrivolous defenses. Unfortunately, by conflating the SEC's two legitimate
183
concerns, the third option falls far short of the statutory mandate.
b.

The Mistaken Transplanting of Colorable Defense from the
Litigation Context to the Counseling Context

The discussion in the preceding section demonstrates the problem
with the SEC's third option in its definition of "appropriate response."
The SEC took a standard, "colorable defense," that is appropriate to litigation, and unjustifiably transferred it to the counseling context by recognizing the assertion of a colorable defense as an appropriate response to a
report of evidence of a material violation. The colorable defense standard
will result in too little reporting up of such evidence. Moreover, as a
means of addressing the uncertain violation problem, the colorable defense standard sweeps far too broadly.
Litigation standards should not apply to the duty to report. The SEC
rules are largely addressed to lawyers acting in a counseling rather than an
adversarial role. Their purpose is to enhance compliance with the law.
Reporting evidence of misconduct and litigating are two very different legal events, even though they may involve the same conduct. Of course,
the reporting of evidence of material violation may lead to litigation over
whether a violation has occurred, but it need not.
The bar sometimes speaks as if every lawyer's job is to behave as lawyers in adversary adjudicatory proceedings are privileged to behave. But
that is not so: lawyers who facilitate transactions or advise clients in private
on complying with the law perform distinct functions in our democracy
183. It could be argued that by making the reporting up trigger based on
"evidence of a materialviolation," the SEC rules intended to incorporate all aspects
of the general securities law standard of "materiality." The materiality standard in
securities law not only incorporates a risk assessment based on the likelihood and
magnitude of the potential harm, Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), but also
whether or not a good defense is available. The problem with this argument is that
the standard for reporting up is based on evidence of a material violation, which is
necessarily a lower standard than the securities requirement of reporting material
information. The fact that the SEC added a separate provision discussing the availability of a "colorable defense" as an "appropriate response" supports the conclusion that the SEC did not intend to incorporate into its notion of "materiality" the
availability of a good defense. If the SEC did intend to incorporate the availability
of a good defense into its "materiality" standard, that combined with the "colorable
defense" provision would make matters worse by essentially double-counting the
availability of a defense. Such an interpretation would surely contravene the intent
of Section 307.
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and operate in radically different environments from those inhabited by
advocates engaged in adversary proceedings.
Advocates operate in an environment designed to guard against
abuses of their broad license to manipulate fact and law. First, there is an
adversary party equipped (in almost every case) with a lawyer both armed
with information sufficient to challenge vigorously every theory, farfetched or standard, that the opposing lawyer can make. Second, there is
a judge, who is acting as legal umpire (and sometimes as a neutral fact
finder), and frequently a separate fact finder, the jury, in addition to the
judge-actors obligated to decide with objectivity and neutrality between
the contrasting visions of law and fact presented by the battling lawyers.
None of those checks is present when, in the privacy of the office and
under the protections of lawyer confidentiality, a legal advisor counsels a
client or corporate manager that it can act based on some unprecedented
vision of what the law requires or some barely plausible interpretation of
facts. In short, advocates have much more license to manipulate law and
facts than advisors do.
And that is how it should be. Lawyers as advisors are a private sector
solution to intrusive government alternatives to ensure that corporations,
other entities and individuals operate within and not without the law. It is
simply not true that the advisor's job is to stand by the client's position, no
matter how implausible as a matter of fact or law, and notjudge the client,
as lawyers often assert. This is especially true when the client is an entity
and the "client's position" may simply be the position of management,
which may be acting against the best interest of the entity. Advocates
should not judge because there are others charged with that role in the
environment in which they operate and they are present to guarantee the
clash of positions upon which our adversary system depends. But advisors
are relied upon to give advice made on prudent judgments. How else are
they to tell anyone what the law requires and what it does not? And that is
the role for which they are retained and paid to perform.
Lawyers always seek to fend off regulation by claiming the government is trying to turn them into whistle-blowers or government agents expected to infiltrate and influence private entities from within. They made
the same claims with respect to the SEC rules. This is nonsense. The SEC
rules on reporting up require no action by lawyers other than those actions they are now permitted or required to take in almost every state.
Moreover, the applicable law other than the ethics rules-such as tort law,
agency law, corporate law, securities law and criminal law-already provides that advisors who act as advocates in stretching the law and facts risk
running afoul of that law. The SEC rules do not change the traditional
responsibility and role of lawyer-advisors; they just insist that lawyers properly fulfill that role and not act as advocates in situations where such behavior is not permitted or appropriate.
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In light of these general principles, accepting as an "appropriate response" to a report of evidence of a material violation the retaining or
directing of a lawyer who may assert a colorable defense in any litigation
relating to the reported evidence is indefensible. The fact that a lawyer
can advance arguments that would meet the minimum level of plausibility
sufficient to avoid sanction in an adversary proceeding does not mean that
the conduct is probably legal or somewhere near that middle ground. A
public company subject to SEC regulation is guilty of a civil violation of
the securities laws when the preponderance of evidence supports a finding
of a violation. A lawyer acting as an adviser in transactions and filings
subject to SEC disclosure requirements must advise the company on the
basis of whether the available evidence indicates that a violation is more
likely than not. Indeed, for a lawyer to adopt a litigation stance in the
counseling context would, in our view, be a serious breach of the lawyer's
duty of care to the client. Yet the result of a lawyer following the SEC's
rule is that both the firm and the lawyer potentially remain exposed to a
significant risk of liability.
The application of the "colorable defense" standard must be limited
to the litigation context for which it is appropriate. The existence of a
colorable defense allows a lawyer-advocate once a client's conduct is challenged in a forum as unlawful, to argue that the conduct, even if very likely
illegal, is legal. It has no other relevance. The colorable defense standard
certainly should not be used to permit lawyers to advise clients, particularly corporate clients with fiduciary obligations to their owner-shareholders, to proceed with conduct that is very likely illegal.
But that is precisely what could happen. The rule as adopted suggests
that one alternative to stopping an ongoing fraud or abandoning plans to
commit a new fraud is to get an opinion from a lawyer that should the
issuer be investigated for the illegal conduct (there is no requirement in
the definition that the investigation be underway, pending or even likely
to occur), a colorable defense would be available. The SEC should not be
suggesting to anyone that the fact that a lawyer can (in good faith and/or
reasonably) state that a "colorable defense" would be available, if the action is ever challenged, licenses an issuer to engage in activity that may
more likely than not be illegal.
c.

Other Problems with the SEC's Third "Appropriate Response"
Option

The SEC's use of the "colorable defense" standard as an "appropriate
response" is bad enough by itself. But the third option contains numerous
other provisions that could weaken the reporting up duty even further.
Although the SEC or the courts could wind up interpreting some of these
provisions in ways that do not weaken the reporting up duty, our fear is
that lawyers inclined to avoid reporting up will exploit these ambiguities.
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The "colorable defense" prong of the third option in Section
205.2(b) (3) (ii) is written very broadly. First, the provision kicks in if the
investigatory lawyer advises the issuer that he or she "may" assert a colorable defense. Why "may," as opposed to "will"? The provision as drafted
appears not to require the investigating lawyer to commit to asserting a
colorable defense. 184 The SEC's intention may have been to avoid tying
the hands of the issuer in subsequent litigation. The issuer might, for strategic reasons, forgo a colorable defense that would otherwise be available.
If this was the SEC's concern, however, the SEC could have addressed it by
using "can" or "is able to" instead of "may." The problem with the "may"
formulation is that it is susceptible of other meanings. It could be interpreted to mean that an investigating lawyer who is not sure that a colorable defense is available but thinks that one "may" be available (based on
the facts and law then known to the lawyer) can, simply by advising that he
may be able to assert such a defense, provide the basis for an "appropriate
response," which ends the reporting lawyer's obligations. This problem is
exacerbated by the fact that, although we have referred to the lawyer who
"may" assert a colorable defense under Section 205.2(b) (3) (ii) as the "investigating lawyer," in fact that lawyer is not required to do anything more
than "review" the reported evidence before rendering an opinion that a
colorable defense may be available. 18 5 Moreover, there is no provision
that if the investigating lawyer subsequently discovers facts or law that
render the "colorable defense" unavailable, the "appropriate response" is
somehow undone.
Another problem created by the use of "may" is a temporal one.
"May" suggests not only that present uncertainty exists about the assertion
of a colorable defense, but that such assertion could come at any time in
the future. Section 205.2(b) (3) (ii) deems an appropriate response to occur when the lawyer "may... assert a colorable defense

. . .

in any investi-

gation or ... proceeding."' 18 6 Thus, the provision apparently applies even
if there is no investigation or proceeding underway, pending or even likely
to occur. If no proceeding is pending, issuers might be tempted to ask
lawyers to provide "colorable defense" opinions to a factual and legal situation at an early stage, opinions that would speculate about future proceedings that might occur. 187 The opinions would inevitably have a
184. Cf 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b) (6) (ii) (providing exemption to duty to report
for lawyers "retained or directed ... to assert... a colorable defense"). We discuss

this exemption in the next section.
185. Compare the other prong of the third option, Section 205.2(b) (3) (i),
which expressly refers to a lawyer making a "reasonable investigation and evaluation of the reported evidence." Cf also id. § 205.3(b) (6) (i) (providing exemption
to duty to report for lawyers retained or directed "to investigate such evidence of a
material violation"). We discuss this exemption in the next section.
186. Id. § 205.2(b) (3) (ii).
187. Further support for the possibility of "colorable defense opinions" given
in advance of any proceeding or investigation comes from the fact that Section
205.2(b) (3) (ii) contemplates that the lawyer retained or directed to "review" the
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hypothetical character as distinct from a report based on an existing, or at
least imminent, investigation or proceeding in which the issuer must develop a defensive stance. At the extreme, the provision might be used by
corporate risk-takers to shop around for a law firm willing to state that a
"colorable" defense would be available if a proposed action is ever challenged, giving an issuer an opportunity to engage in activity that may well
88
turn out to be illegal.'
"May" is not the only small word that creates problems in Section
205.2(b)(3)(ii). An even smaller word-"a"-precedes "colorable defense" and raises similarly troubling questions. The SEC's likely intent in
using "a"is to recognize that the issuer may have more than one colorable
defense available. By using the phrase "a colorable defense," the SEC rule
tells us that one of these multiple available colorable defenses is enough.
But again, that is not the only possible meaning of "a colorable defense."
In particular, "a colorable defense" could be interpreted to mean a colorable defense that is an incomplete defense. Suppose, for example, that a
colorable defense to a claim under the federal securities laws exists, but
not a defense to a state law claim based on the same evidence. Does an
issuer who informs the reporting lawyer that the investigating lawyer may
assert "a" colorable defense to the federal claim thereby provide an appropriate response? A similar question arises about procedural, as opposed to
substantive, defenses. Would the assertion that a statute of limitations or
laches defense "may" be available if litigation is filed be sufficient? It
seems crazy to contemplate these possibilities, but a literal reading of Section 205.2(b) (3) (ii) unfortunately supports them. There is no explicit requirement that the "colorable defense" be a complete and substantive

evidence of a material violation, rather than a separately retained or directed "advocate," is the one whose potential assertion of a colorable defense constitutes an
appropriate response. Section 205.2(b) (3) (ii) applies if "such attorney may ...
assert a colorable defense." "Such" refers to the attorney retained or directed to
"review the reported evidence of a material violation."
188. We note that a similar, and equally disturbing, problem of potential lawyer-shopping is created by Section 205.2(b) (3) (i), which deems the issuer to have
made an appropriate response when an investigatory lawyer conducts a "reasonable investigation and evaluation of the reported evidence" and the issuer "[h]as
substantially implemented any remedial recommendations made by such attorney." Note that although the investigating lawyer's investigation and evaluation
must be "reasonable," there is no similar requirement of reasonableness for the
remedial recommendations made by the investigatory lawyer. Compare also the
unqualified "remedial recommendations" under Section 205.2(b) (3) (i) with the
second "appropriate response" option in Section 205.2(b) (2), which refers to "appropriate remedial measures." An interpreter of Section 205.2 (b) (3) (i) might reasonably ask why that option is there if it merely replicates the remedial standards
of Section 205.2(b) (2). Given the apparent absence of constraints on the "remedial recommendations" made by investigating lawyers hired to "review" evidence of
a material violation under Section 205.2(b) (3) (i), issuers could be tempted to hire
investigatory lawyers known for making light or even no "remedial
recommendations."
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defense to all possible material violations in all possible proceedings based
on the evidence.
Other parts of Section 205.2(b) (3) (ii) create similar problems of incompleteness. For example, the "colorable defense" may be asserted on
behalf of the issuer "or the issuer's officer, director, employee, or agent, as
the case may be." Does this phrase mean that the issuer, simply by hiring a
lawyer to represent one of its agents, ends the initially reporting lawyer's
obligations if the hired lawyer asserts a colorable defense for that agent,
regardless of the liability exposure of the issuer, whether through vicarious
liability or otherwise? Similarly, the "colorable defense" may be asserted
"in any investigation or proceeding relating to the reported evidence of a
material violation" (emphasis added). Does this phrase mean, for exam-

ple, that if the issuer has a colorable defense to terminating a whistle-blowing employee in a wrongful discharge suit, the underlying material
violation that gave rise to the whistle-blower's actions need not be reported up? This problem could be avoided if "any" is interpreted to mean
"all possible" rather than "any one." Lawyers should not be left to speculate about such an important matter.
Finally, two further procedural defects contribute to the weakness of
the "colorable defense" rule. First, Section 205.2(b) (3) (ii) puts absolutely
no qualifications on the lawyer who is "retained or directed" to assert the
colorable defense. The rule refers simply to "an attorney." 18 9 The phrase
"retained or directed an attorney" makes clear that the issuer need not
even hire a new outside lawyer, let alone one with any particular expertise,
to conduct the "review" of the evidence. An in-house lawyer-even perhaps the CLO 19 0-could serve the purpose. Equally troubling, especially
given the history of Enron, is that an outside law firm whose conduct
might be at issue in the potential material violation, might qualify. 19 1
Second, the investigating lawyer must be retained or directed "with
the consent of the board." The SEC views board consent as providing sufficient protection to the issuer. 192 If "consent of the board" required that
the board be fully informed of the evidence of the material violation
before making a decision, then the SEC would be correct. Under that
interpretation, the board could not give "consent" unless it had already
189. "Attorney" is defined broadly in Section 205.2(c).
190. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(b) (3).
191. One possible limitation on this practice would be that the colorable defense must be offered "consistent with [the asserting lawyer's] professional obligations." These obligations include rules governing conflicts of interest, and a lawyer
whose own conduct might be implicated would arguably have a conflict of interest

in asserting a colorable defense. See generally MODEL

RULES

2003, supra note 32, R.

1.7(a) (2). However, apparently many practitioners do not see this as a problem.
See Cramton, supra note 52, at 163-66 (discussing conflict of interest issues raised by
law firm investigating situation in which its own prior legal work, including formal
opinions, was at issue).
192. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys,
Securities Act Release No. 33-8150, 67 Fed. Reg. 71,670 (Dec. 2, 2002).
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been informed, or otherwise already knew, about the evidence-the exact
result the reporting up duty is designed to accomplish. But once again,
that is not the only possible interpretation, and in this case, it is not even a
likely interpretation. For one thing, if the SEC's intent was really to use
"consent of the board" as a perfect substitute for reporting up, it could
have said so much more clearly than Section 205.2(b) (3) does (as we suggested in a previous subsection). More important, the SEC rules do not
define "consent." In particular, there is no express requirement that the
consent be informed, or what "informed consent" might mean. 19 3 Thus,
even if informed consent were required, that might not mean that the
board, before retaining or directing the reviewing attorney under Section
205.2(b) (3), must have full knowledge about the evidence of a material
violation. At the extreme, if no informed consent is required, the board
could hire the investigating lawyer without knowing anythingabout the evidence. One lawyer has even suggested that blanket advance consent
might do the trick.1 94 Whether or not that is acceptable under Section
205.2(b) (3), the point is that "consent of the board" is woefully inadequate to redress the deficiencies of the "colorable defense" provision.
4.

Obligations of Other Lawyers After the Initial Report: The Wrongheaded
Exemptions for Advocates and Investigatory Lawyers

Not only do the SEC rules unnecessarily weaken the reporting up obligations of the lawyers who make the initial report through the third option under the definition of "appropriate response" in Section
205.2(b) (3), the rules also provide unnecessarily broad exemptions from
the duty to report for lawyers who become involved after the initial report
is

made.

These

exemptions

appear

in Section

205.3(b) (6)

and

205.3(b) (7) and involve two types of lawyers: advocates and investigating
lawyers.' 9 5 We consider these in turn.

Section 205.3(b) (6) (ii) exempts a lawyer from the duty to report evidence of a material violation if the lawyer is "retained or directed by the
chief legal officer ... to assert ... a colorable defense ... in any investigation or... proceeding relating to such evidence of a material violation," so

193. Cf MODEL RULES 2003, supranote 32, R. 1.0(e) (defining "informed consent" to mean "the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after
the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the
material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of
conduct"); see also id. cmts. 6, 7.
194. See Lorne, supra note 131, at A-117, 125.
195. These lawyers roughly correspond to the lawyers mentioned in the "third
option" under the definition of "appropriate response," Section 205.2(b)(3), discussed in the previous section. The parallels are far from perfect, however, which
is likely to lead to interpretive difficulties. We have already pointed out some of
the differences in footnotes in the previous section. For example, advocate lawyers
covered by the exemptions in Section 205.3(b) (6)(ii) and 205.3(b)(7)(ii) need
not be the lawyers retained or directed to "review the reported evidence of a material violation," which is what Section 205.2(b) (3) (ii) requires for an "appropriate
response" based on the potential assertion of a colorable defense.
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long as the CLO "provides reasonable and timely reports on the progress
and outcome of such proceeding to the issuer's board of directors" or
relevant board committee. 196 Similarly, under Section 205.3(b) (7) (ii), a
lawyer "retained or directed by a qualified legal compliance committee to
assert... a colorable defense" in a proceeding relating to evidence of a
material violation has no reporting duties with respect to such evidence
either. 197 These sections exempt advocate lawyers from reporting duties
with respect to new evidence of ongoing or potential illegalities that the
lawyers might discover as part of their work. Why?
If the Commission meant only to relieve advocate lawyers from reporting evidence already reported to, or otherwise known by, the board, the
provisions are written too broadly. Section 205.3(b) (6) (ii) does not en-

sure that the board will get the new evidence. For one thing, unlike
Section 205.2(b) (3) (ii), the "colorable defense" option under the "appropriate response" definition, Section 205.3(b) (6) (ii) exempts the advocate
lawyer who in fact asserts a colorable defense from the duty to report even
if the advocate lawyer is not retained or directed with the consent of
the board; the CLO does the retaining or directing of the
advocate lawyer under Section 205.3(b)(6)(ii).1 98 In addition, all the
board need get to exempt the advocate from the duty to report is "reports
on the progress and outcome of such proceeding."' 99 These prog-

196. If the new evidence uncovered by the advocate has no relationship to the
proceeding, but involves an unrelated material violation, the advocate attorney
would not be exempt from the duty to report, because the advocate is exempt
from reporting evidence only when he or she is involved in a proceeding "relating
to such evidence." It is likely, however, that in most cases if the advocate discovers
new evidence, that evidence will be at least somewhat related to the proceeding or
investigation in which the advocate is involved.
197. Cf 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b) (7) (ii).
198. Cf id. § 205.3(b) (6) (ii) ("An attorney shall not have any obligation to
report evidence of a material violation ... if the attorney was retained or directed
by the chief legal officer ....
).
199. Id. This phrase concerning progress reports to the board does not expressly include "investigations" as distinguished from "proceedings." But Section
205.3(b) (6) (ii) expressly excepts lawyers "retained or directed ... to assert ... a
colorable defense . . . in any investigation or . . . proceeding." The omission of
"investigations" from the progress report phase could lead to an argument that no
progress reports to the board are required as a condition of the exemption for
advocates in cases of "investigations" as opposed to "proceedings." We assume the
SEC did not intend this result. Such a result would be particularly unfortunate in
that it would provide a broader exemption for advocates involved in investigations,
when the argument for any type of exemption for advocates is weaker in cases of
investigations. One of the many issues in the Kaye, Scholer incident during the
savings and loan crisis was when lawyers may treat an "investigation" as "advocacy."
See generally Quinn, Robert (Moderator), Panel Two: The Evolving Legal and Ethical
Role of the CorporateAttorney After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Panel 2: The Evolution
of Corporate Governance, 52 AM. U. L. REv. 613 (2003). We do not revisit that debate
here.
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ress reports need not contain information about any newly discovered
200
evidence.
On the other hand, if the Commission meant to exempt advocate lawyers from reporting new evidence of illegality, that is completely contrary
to the point of Section 307, and we can see no legitimate justification for
such an exemption. Even advocate lawyers are bound by obligations not
to facilitate client wrongdoing. There is no blanket exemption for "advocates" in the ethics rules for participating in, or reporting up, ongoing
illegality. 20 1 Nor should there be one here. Lawyers acting in an advocacy

role should be bound by the duty to report, except with respect to past
conduct that is the subject of the litigation and in which the advocate lawyers had no previous role.
It is true that the line between advocating and advising is often uncertain; but it is also true that every legal distinction of any import is subject
to the blurry-line critique. 20 2 The line between legal and illegal conduct-which Section 307 and the SEC's implementing rules employ and
with which all lawyers must struggle every day-is also blurry. Lawyers understand these realities and are better equipped to deal with them than
are ordinary Americans, who are held to account for crossing legal lines
that also are gray at the edges. Ordinary Americans are neither trained
nor paid to make these judgments. Securities lawyers, on the other hand,
are paid good money for negotiating those grays, including the gray between advocacy and advice. The Commission's rules do not demand
perfection of lawyers in any area, just reasonable conduct, reasonable
judgment and reasonable efforts to find the right side of blurry lines.
A similar problem of an excessively broad exemption exists for "investigating lawyers." Section 205.3(b) (6) (i) states that a lawyer has no duty to
report evidence of a material violation if the lawyer is retained or directed
by the CLO "to investigate such evidence," so long as the CLO "reports the
results of the investigation to the issuer's board of directors" or relevant
200. These problems do not exist in Section 205.3(b)(7)(ii), because the
QLCC, which stands in for the board, hires and directly monitors the advocate
lawyers.
201. See MODEL RULES 2003, supra note 32, R. 1.2(d), 1.13, 1.16(a), 4.1. The
ABA's newly adopted version of Model Rule 1.13 does, however, create an exception to the new permissive "reporting out" rule in 1.13(c) for "information relatingto
a lawyer's representation of an organization to investigate an alleged violation of
law, or to defend the organization or an officer, employee or other constituent associated with the organization against a claim arising out of an alleged violation of
law." Id. R. 1.13(d). It is possible (though we think undesirable) that "information
relating to" could be interpreted to include new information about ongoing violations discovered in the context of an investigation or litigation.
202. The distinction between the lawyer's litigating function ("advocate") and
the lawyer's advising function ("counselor") is helpfully discussed in CHARLES W.
WOLFRAM,

MODERN LEGAL ETHICS

ch. 13 (1986), Thomas D. Morgan, Thinking

About Lawyers as Counselors,42 FLA.L. REv. 439 (1990), and Murray L. Schwartz, The
Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REv. 669 (1978).
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board committee. 20 3 And Section 205.3(b) (7) (i) exempts from the duty
to report evidence of a material violation any lawyer retained or directed
by a QLCC " [t] o investigate such evidence of a material violation," without
any qualification. 20 4 At first blush, the SEC's interpretations of these exemptions seem reasonable because they seem to contemplate that the investigating lawyer's report, which presumably would include the evidence
of a material violation, would be reported to the board or QLCC.
On further inspection, however, the exemption rules for investigating
lawyers provide inadequate assurance that the reporting up demanded by
Section 307 will occur. First, the rules do not assure that the evidence of a
material violation will be communicated to the board or QLCC when the
investigating lawyer is "retained or directed." Under Section
205.3(b) (6) (i), the CLO, not the board, "retains or directs" the investigating lawyer. 20 5 And under both Section 205.3(b)(6)(i) and Section
205.3(b) (7) (i), an argument could be made that the investigating lawyer
could be "retained" in advance of the initial report of evidence of a material violation rather than retained in response to such report. Second,
there is no explicit requirement in either Section 205.3(b) (6) (i) or Section 205.3(b) (7) (i) that the investigation be reasonable.2 0 6 Indeed, Section 205.3(b)(7)(i) does not require that the investigating lawyer make
any investigation at all to be entitled to the exemption. Third, and most
important, neither Section 205.3(b) (6) (i) nor Section 205.3(b) (7) (i) explicitly requires that the initially reported "evidence" of a material violation, or any newly discovered evidence, be reported to the board or QLCC
as a condition of the exemption. Although one would hope and expect
that the report of the "results of the investigation" under Section
205.3(b) (6) (i) (B) would include both types of "evidence," that is not required. "Results" can include a brief summary with little or no detail.
Even worse, the investigating lawyer retained or directed by the QLCC
need not make any report at all to qualify for the exemption under Section 205.3(b) (7) (i), though presumably most such lawyers would in fact
make a report.
The problems with the exemptions for investigating lawyers are not
limited to the question of evidence uncovered during the course of the
investigation. The exemptions let the investigating lawyer off the hook if
the remedial steps recommended by the investigating lawyer are ignored,
thus leaving the material violation unremedied. By contrast, an initially
203. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(6)(i)(B). The rule does not require the reporting
of the results of the investigation to the board if both the CLO and the investigating lawyer reasonably believe that there is no material violation.
204. See id. § 205.3(b) (7) (i).
205. See id. § 205.3(b) (6) (i) (indicating no obligation to report where issuer's
CLO retains attorney to investigate evidence of material violation).
206. Cf id. § 205.2(b) (3) (i) (referring in third option under "appropriate response" definition to "reasonable investigation and evaluation of the reported

evidence").
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reporting lawyer is deemed not to have received an "appropriate response" under Section 205.2(b) (3) (i), and so must report to the board, if
a subsequently retained investigating lawyer makes recommendations that
the issuer does not "substantially implement."
As with advocates, there is no basis in Section 307, the securities laws
or the law of lawyering for creating a blanket reporting exemption, or
even increased solicitude, for "investigating lawyers." As with advocates,
the burden of imposing a duty to report on investigating lawyers seems
slight.20 7 And as with advocates, the SEC could have drafted a narrow

exemption for investigatory lawyers to relieve them of reporting duties
when the evidence was already known or reported to the board or QLCC,
without extending the exemption to the discovery by those lawyers of new
evidence or the failure to follow through on remedial recommendations.
Instead, the SEC's adoption of overly broad exemptions for advocates and
investigating lawyers threatens to weaken seriously the reporting up mandate of Section 307.
III.

"REPORTING OUT": PERMISSIVE DISCLOSURE OF CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMATION OUTSIDE THE CORPORATION

A.
1.

Permissive Disclosure Under State Ethics Rules

Some Relevant History

The central ethical tradition of the American legal profession includes four relevant propositions. First, a lawyer is prohibited from counseling or assisting a client in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or
fraudulent. 20 8 Second, when continued representation of a client would
constitute illegal assistance, the lawyer is required to withdraw from the
representation. 20 9 Third, a lawyer is permitted to disclose confidential information to prevent a client's prospective crime or fraud. 2 10 And fourth,
when the client in the course of the representation has perpetrated a
crime or fraud on a person or a tribunal, the lawyer is required to disclose

confidential information to the extent necessary to rectify the consequences of the crime or fraud. 211 The last of these propositions echoes
207. As we mentioned in our discussion of the initial trigger of the duty to
report, the SEC's exemptions may have been motivated by concern about the possibility of further duties imposed as a result of the duty to report, in particular,
mandatory noisy withdrawal. But since the SEC did not implement that proposal,
its concerns with excessive burdens on investigating and advocate lawyers seem
overblown.

208. See

MODEL RULES

2003, supra note 32, R. 1.2(d).

209. See id.R. 1.16(a).
210. Canon 37 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics permitted disclosure
to prevent "[t]he announced intention of a client to commit a crime." Disciplinary
Rule 4-101 (C) (3) of the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility permitted
a lawyer to reveal "the intention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime."
211. Canon 29 required disclosure by a trial lawyer of perjury committed in a
case handled by the lawyer. Canon 41 required a lawyer, when the client refused
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the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. Under evidence
law, client communications to a lawyer in furtherance of a client's criminal
or fraudulent conduct are not privileged. As Justice Cardozo said many
years ago, "The privilege takes flight if the relation is abused. A client who
consults an attorney for advice that will serve him in the commission of a
2 12
fraud will have no help from the law."
The policies and purposes that justify the attorney-client privilege and
its exceptions weigh heavily in favor of a permissive exception to the duty
of confidentiality corresponding to the crime-fraud exception of the attorney-client privilege. 213 If a lawyer is required to testify to a client communication, otherwise privileged, when the client uses the lawyer's services to
perpetrate a fraud on a third person or a tribunal, a parallel discretion to
disclose without testimonial compulsion should be recognized under the
professional duty of confidentiality. Neither the legal profession nor society as a whole should tolerate a regime in which clients may use lawyers as
a means of carrying out a crime or fraud. Permissive disclosure reinforces
the lawyer's duty to provide only lawful assistance and advice to clients. It
also provides the lawyer with a last-resort weapon and increased leverage
in dealing with a difficult client or one embarked on an unlawful or fraudulent course of conduct. Moreover, a lawyer's failure to take reasonable
steps to prevent or rectify client fraud is likely to lead to civil liability of the
lawyer. If insolvency and litigation occur as an aftermath of the fraud, a

to act, "to rectify... some [client] fraud or deception ... unjustly imposed on the
court or a party" by "promptly informing the injured person or his counsel, so that
they may take appropriate steps." Disciplinary Rule 7-102 (B) (1), until amended in
1974, provided:
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that: (1) His client
has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon the client to rectify the same,
and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to
the affected person or tribunal.
212. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933). See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An HistoricalPerspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege,66 CAL. L. REv. 1061
(1978).
213. The attorney-client privilege recognized in evidence law applies when a
governmental body with power to compel testimony attempts to exercise that
power to require a lawyer or the lawyer's client to reveal a communication made to
obtain legal advice. A small number of well-established exceptions limit the scope
of the privilege. The professional duty of confidentiality is a rule of professional
ethics that has a much broader sweep, protecting all information that the lawyer
obtains during the representation, subject to limited exceptions stated in state ethics rules. Commentators often confuse the two doctrines. See, e.g., Jason Hoppin,
Put Aside Privilege in Post-Enron World, ABA Urges, NAT'L LJ., Aug. 18, 2003, at 5, the
title of which suggests that the ABA action "puts aside privilege." An ABA action
recommending that state high courts adopt broadened exceptions to the professional duty of confidentiality would have no effect on the federal and state evidence law governing the attorney-client privilege.
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The ABA abandoned one of the four principles stated above in 1974
and another in 1983.215 In 1974, the fourth proposition was turned on its
head. 216 A rule that required a lawyer to reveal a crime or fraud that a
client had perpetrated on a person or tribunal was converted into a prohibition of doing so with the addition of an except clause and a subsequent
ABA formal opinion. 2 17 In 1983, when the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct replaced the Model Code of Professional Responsibility,
required disclosure was limited to the situation in which the lawyer, having
unknowingly "offered false evidence [in an adjudicative proceeding]
comes to know of its falsity."

2 18

The third proposition was largely annulled by the failure of the ABA
in 1983 to continue the Model Code provision that permitted a lawyer to
disclose confidential information to prevent any intended crime of a client
or the somewhat narrower client-fraud exception proposed by the Kutak
Commission, which had drafted the Model Rules. From 1983 until August
2003, Model Rule 1.6(b) restricted a lawyer's permission to reveal confidential information to prevent a crime or fraud to a client's criminal act
"that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm." Much more common consequences of client misconduct during the representation-those causing economic loss rather than
death or personal injury-were eliminated.
The source of the professional concerns that led to the ABA's retrenchment is relevant to today's concern that professional advisers have
failed to perform their functions of preventing corporate wrongdoing.
The ABA's actions in 1974 and 1983 were heavily influenced by the hostility of important segments of the legal community to the SEC's efforts during the 1970s to apply the third and fourth propositions to securities
lawyers who remained silent when they knew or should have known that
their client was engaged in a course of conduct that violated federal securi214. A public company often desires to cooperate with investigators, and waiving the privilege is often part of successful cooperation; a successor in interest,
such as a bankruptcy trustee, is likely to waive any privileges in an effort to recover
assets for the insolvent entity, and if these events do not take place, the crime-fraud
exception of the privilege may be successfully invoked by an adverse party. Finally,
if the lawyer is charged by defrauded persons, the lawyer ordinarily will invoke the

self-defense exception to confidentiality.
215. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1980) (abandoning
fourth proposition) [hereinafter MODEL CODE]; MODEL RULES 1983, supra note 11,
R. 1.6 (abandoning third proposition).
216. See the discussion of the ABA's tortured treatment of disclosure of client
fraud in GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., SUSAN P. KONIAK & ROGER C. CRAMTON, THE
LAw AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 282-88 (3d ed. 1999) [hereinafter HAZARD, KONIAK
& CRAMTON].

217. See Model Code, supra note 215, DR 7-102(B) (7) (1980).
218.

MODEL

RULES 1983, supra note 11, R. 3.3(a).
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ties laws. 2 19 Those propositions had not been viewed as problematic when
they were not enforced-state disciplinary authorities had neither the will
nor the resources to charge large firm lawyers with assisting a client
fraud. 220 But when SEC enforcement came into play with the National
Student Marketing case, 22 1 the two propositions were attacked and drastically narrowed by the ABA.
2.

Current State Law on Disclosure of ConfidentialInformation and Related
Issues

The ABA is not a lawmaking body but a private organization that recommends professional rules for the consideration of state authorities, usually the highest court of a state. Fortunately, most state courts have
rejected the ABA recommendations described above, taking a more public-spirited approach than did the ABA prior to 2002-2003. In 2002, fortyone U.S. jurisdictions permitted a lawyer to disclose confidential information to prevent a client's criminal fraud (four of them required disclosure); forty-four jurisdictions required disclosure of a client's ongoing
criminal or fraudulent act when the lawyer knows that the client, in the
course of the representation, has made criminal or fraudulent
22 2
representations.
The ABA's actions have had the greatest effect in emphasizing a distinction between, on the one hand, preventing future client crimes or
frauds and, on the other hand, rectifying past crimes or frauds of which the
victims are unaware and that have continuing consequences that are unrectified. In 2002, only eighteen states permitted (two of them required)
219. See Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model
Rules of ProfessionalConduct, 14 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 677, 700-20 (1989) (attributing
ABA's actions in 1974 and 1983 to opposition of powerful litigator groups (e.g.,
American College of Trial Lawyers) and concern among some business lawyers
about SEC's enforcement of profession's rules in NationalStudent Marketing case).
220. See 148 CONG. REc. S6555 (July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Enzi). Senator Enzi stated:
I am usually in the camp that believes that States should regulate professionals within their jurisdiction. However, in this case, the State bars as a
whole have failed. They have provided no specific ethical rule of conduct
to remedy this kind of situation. Even if they do have a general rule that
applies, it often goes un-enforced.
Id.
221. 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
222. Attorneys' Liability Assurance Society (ALAS), Ethics Rule on Client Confidences, reprinted in THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 2003 SELECTED
STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 161-72 (2003) [hereinafter ALAS
Memorandum]. The memorandum presents a chart indicating the position of the
ABA, the states and the District of Columbia on lawyer disclosure of confidential
information in eight situations. It is accompanied by footnotes that explain the
results in individual states or in groups of states that have similar confidentiality
provisions. Column C reports the position of the fifty-one jurisdictions when a
client intends to commit a criminal fraud likely to result in injury to the financial
interest or property of another; column G reports the disclosure position when a
client is engaged in an ongoing criminal or fraudulent act.
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an explicit disclosure by the lawyer to disclose confidential information to
rectify a client's prior commission of a crime or fraud, using the lawyer's
services, resulting in injury to the financial interest or property of another
party.22 3 Although communications about such past acts, if made by the
client to further a client crime or fraud, are not protected by the attorneyclient privilege, rule-makers have been more reluctant to include an explicit provision permitting or requiring a lawyer to disclose confidential
information concerning such past acts than to disclose prospective crimes
or frauds.
The situation is complicated by two additional considerations. First, a
fraudulent misrepresentation that continues to mislead third persons involves a continuing course of conduct that is constantly resulting in new
crimes or frauds. In states that permit a lawyer to disclose a prospective
crime or fraud, the lawyer may act to prevent harm to new victims (permissive disclosure of confidential information).
Second, the combined effect of Rules 1.2(d), 1.16(a), 4.1(b) and
1.6(b) often changes the analysis and requires the lawyer to withdraw and
to correct the prior material false statement (required disclosure). This result comes in three steps: (1) the lawyer's continued representation related to an ongoing crime or fraud would result in the lawyer assisting the
client's criminal or fraudulent act, prohibited by Rules 1.2(d) and 1.16(a),
which require the lawyer to withdraw unless the client corrects the prior
false statement; (2) because the client's criminal fraud is continuing to
deceive new victims, Rule 1.6 (in the form adopted by most states) permits
disclosure to prevent these new crimes or frauds, and Rule 4.1 (b) requires
the lawyer to correct the client's or the lawyer's prior false statement of
material fact when failure to disclose would assist the client's crime or
fraud and disclosure is permitted under Rule 1.6; and (3) as a result, the
224
permission under Rule 1.6(b) becomes a mandate under Rule 4.1(b).
In summary:
" Every state prohibits a lawyer from assisting a client's crime or
fraud.

22 5

" Every state requires a lawyer to withdraw from any related representation when continued representation would assist a cli226
ent's crime or fraud.
223. Id. col. D (noting disclosure to rectify consequences of client's prior
commission of crime or fraud, using lawyer's services, resulting in injury to financial interest or property of another party).
224. See id. nn.3, 4. These notes discuss this issue and include material on the
seven states that have retained at least part of the Model Code approach to confidentiality, including Illinois.
225. See Model Rules 2003, supra note 32, R. 1.2(d); MODEL CODE, supra note
215, DR 7-102(A) (7) & (8).
226. See MODEL RuLEs 2003, supra note 32, R. 1.16(a); MODEL CODE, supra
note 215, DR 7-102(B) (2).
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* Forty-one states permit (and four of them require) a lawyer to
disclose confidential information to prevent a client's criminal
22 7
fraud.
* Eighteen states permit a lawyer to disclose confidential information to rectify or mitigate a past client fraud in which the
28
2
lawyer's services were used.

• Forty-four states permit (and three require) a lawyer to disclose
confidential information relating to a client's ongoing criminal
229
or fraudulent act.

3.

Effect of Lawyer Disclosure of Confidential Information on the Client's
Attorney-Client Privilege

Articles in the press concerning lawyer disclosure of client confidences frequently contain statements by lawyers to the effect that a lawyer's permitted or required disclosure of client information pursuant to
one of the exceptions to confidentiality in a state's ethics rules has the
effect of waiving the client's attorney-client privilege as to that information. 230 These statements reflect the fact that a misunderstanding of the
privilege and its waiver and of the professional duty of confidentiality is
quite common. But repetition of an incorrect statement in the press or by
lawyers does not make it the law of the land.
As a leading case states, the ethical propriety of a lawyer disclosing
information without the client's consent "tells us nothing about the admissibility of the information disclosed." 23 1 The professional duty of confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege are separate doctrines although
they have overlapping objectives. Adverse disclosure by a lawyer in a situation permitted by the ethics rule, but without the client's consent or in
pursuit of the client's interest, does not waive the client's attorney-client
privilege in the information. 232 Although the information becomes
known to those to whom it is revealed and may result in harm to the client, the client retains the right to assert the privilege in any subsequent
proceeding whether or not the client is a party.
The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers contains an authoritative statement in a comment to Section 78:233
227. See
228.
229.
230.
231.

ALAS

Memorandum, supra note 222, at 161-66.

See id.
See id.
See supra note 213.
Purcell v. District Attorney, 676 N.E.2d 436, 438 (Mass. 1997). This case

is discussed infra.
232. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER B.
DENCE

MUELLER & LAIRD

C.

KIRKPATRICK, MODERN

EVI-

440-44 ("The client is the holder of the privilege, and the attorney cannot

waive it over the client's objection."). Actual or implied authority of the attorney
to waive the privilege "is determined by the customary rules of the law of agency."

Involuntary disclosures do not result in loss of the privilege.
233. RESTATEMENT, supra note 52, § 78 cmt. c.
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Unauthorized disclosure by a lawyer not in pursuit of a client's
interest does not constitute waiver under this Section. For example, disclosure of a client's confidential information . . . to prevent a crime or fraud 234 (§ 67) does not constitute waiver within
the meaning of this Section, although another basis for finding
the privilege inapplicable may apply [such as the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege].
In State v. Macumber, for example, a lawyer reported to public officials
that his client had committed a crime for which another person had been
convicted. 235 The disclosure was viewed as permissible under Arizona's
ethics rules (i.e., not in violation of the lawyer's duty of confidentiality) .236
Nevertheless, the lawyer's testimony concerning the client's communication was not admissible in a subsequent hearing challenging the allegedly
237
wrongful communication.
In Purcell v. DistrictAttorney, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
held that a lawyer's permissible disclosure of information that his client
planned to set fire to an apartment building did not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that the lawyer could be required to testify as to the client's
23 8
expression of criminal intent in a subsequent attempted arson trial.
The client, a maintenance man with an apartment in the building, had
consulted the lawyer about matters relating to the loss of the client's job
and apartment. 2 39 Those communications were privileged and the privilege was not waived by the lawyer's permitted disclosure under the ethics
code of the intended arson. The harder question was whether the communication concerning the threatened arson was admissible because of
the crime-fraud exception to the privilege, a determination that rested on
234. The reference clearly is to the Restatement's provisions permitting or
requiring a lawyer to disclose confidential information in certain situations (e.g.,
rules equivalent to Model Rules 1.6(b) and 3.3(a)(3)). The Reporter's Note on
this subject has an explicit statement: "On the rule that a lawyer's permissible disclosure to prevent a client crime does not waive the attorney-client privilege, see
Purcell v. District Attorney, 676 N.E.2d 436 (Mass. 1997)."
235. See State v. Macumber, 544 P.2d 1084, 1087 (Ariz. 1976) (disclosing information after obtaining informal opinion from Committee on Ethics of State
Bar, which advised that attorney-client privilege did not apply).
236. See id. at 1087-88.
237. See Macumber,544 P.2d at 1084 (holding that lawyer's permissible disclosure to authorities of client's information that he was responsible for crime for
which another person had been convicted did not waive client's attorney-client
privilege; reversing conviction and remanding for new trial); see also State v.
Macumber, 582 P.2d 162 (Ariz. 1978) (affirming conviction after second trial).
The case is thoroughly discussed in W. William Hodes, What Ought to Be DoneWhat Can Be Done-When the Wrong Person Is in Jail or About to Be Executed?, 29 Loy.
L.A. L. REv. 1547, 1560-81 (1996). See also State v. Valdez, 618 P.2d 1234, 1235
(N.M. 1980) (lawyer could not testify that his client had confessed to robbery for
which defendant had been convicted).
238. See Purcell v. District Attorney, 676 N.E.2d 436, 438 (Mass. 1997) (discussing facts of case).
239. See id.
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whether the client informed the lawyer of the intention to commit arson
"for the purpose of receiving legal advice" concerning the unlawful conduct. 24 0 On remand in Purcell, the defense lawyer was not required to
testify against his client. 2 4 1 The court held that the client's communication of the proposed arson, unlike those relating to the client's job and
housing, was not made for purposes of legal advice. 24 2 "A lawyer can act
to save lives [or property], and at the same time avoid being the instru24 3
ment of the client's conviction."
B.

Permissive Disclosure Under SEC Part 205

Section 205.3(d)(1) of the SEC rule implementing Section 307 of
Sarbanes-Oxley provides that an attorney who has reported evidence of a
material violation may use that report (and any response to the report) in
connection with any investigation, proceeding or litigation in which the
attorney's compliance with the rules is at issue. In addition, Section
205.3(d) (2) provides that:
An attorney ...

may reveal to the Commission, without the is-

suer's consent, confidential information related to the representation to the extent the attorney reasonably believes necessary:
(i) To prevent the issuer from committing a material violation
that is likely to cause substantial injury to the financial interest or property of the issuer or investors;
(ii) To prevent the issuer, in a Commission investigation or administrative proceeding from committing . . . [or] sub-

orning pejury... or committing any act.., that is likely to
perpetrate a fraud upon the Commission; or
(iii) To rectify the consequences of a material violation by the
issuer that caused, or may cause, substantial injury to the
financial interest or property of the issuer or investors in the
furtherance of which the attorney's services have been used.
Section 205.3(d) (1) permits something that is permitted under the
law of every state: a lawyer may disclose confidential information in a proceeding to defend against allegations or charges that the lawyer, in representing a client, engaged in wrongful conduct. 244 The SEC language
merely makes clear what is implicit under the language of ABA Rule
1.6(b) (5)-that an official investigation that precedes a formal proceed240. See id. at 439.
241. See id. at 441 (vacating order that denied motion to quash any subpoena

issued to Purcell to testify).

242. See id. at 441 (concluding that client's communication regarding intent
to commit arson was not for purpose of receiving legal advice).
243. Susan Martyn, The Restatement (3d) of the Law Governing Lawyers and the
Courts, PROF. LAw. 115, 124 (Symposium Issue 1997).
244. See MODEL RULES 2003, supra note 32, R. 1.6(b) (5) (permitting lawyer to
disclose confidential information to establish claim or defense).
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Section 205.3(d) (2) (ii) permits disclosure to protect the integrity of
SEC proceedings. 246 This section parallels Model Rule 3.3(a)(4), which
requires disclosure to the tribunal when the lawyer learns that the lawyer
has offered material evidence that the lawyer now knows is false or, more
broadly under Rule 3.3(b), when "[a] lawyer who represents a client in an
adjudicative proceeding and who knows that a person intends to engage,
is engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to
the proceeding." 24 7 This is a situation in which the vast majority of states
(forty-four, according to the Attorneys' Liability Assurance Society (ALAS)
Memorandum), require the lawyer to disclose confidential information to
the tribunal. 248 In this instance state ethics rules go substantially beyond
the SEC's provision vesting lawyers with permission to disclose.
Section 205.3(d) (2) (i) is substantially the same as current ABA Rules
1.6(b) (2) and 1.13(c), as amended in August 2003. To the extent differences exist, the SEC provision generally allows for somewhat more disclosure than the ABA rules. First, Rule 1.6(b) (2) requires that the client has
used or is using the lawyer's services to further the crime or fraud, whereas
the SEC rule and Rule 1.13(c) contain no such limitation. 249 Second,
Rule 1.13(c) requires that the matter be "related to the representation,"
whereas the SEC rule and Rule 1.16(b) (2) do not. Third, the SEC rule
allows disclosure whether the harm from the material violation affects the
issuer or third-party investors, while Rule 1.13(c) disclosure is limited to
preventing injury to the organization, and Rule 1.6(b) (3) disclosure is limited to preventing injury to "another," a term that would not include the
issuer client. A fourth difference with uncertain import is that the SEC
rule requires that substantial financial harm be "likely," while both ABA
rules require substantial injury to be "reasonably certain." As indicated
earlier, the ethics rules of about four-fifths of the states permit disclosure
to prevent a client's criminal fraud on a third person. Any substantial federal securities law violation would constitute a federal crime and could be
250
disclosed under the ethics rules of at least forty-one states.
Similarly, Section 205.3(d) (2) (iii) is substantially the same as ABA
Rule 1.6(b)(2), as amended in August 2003 (Rule 1.13(c) deals only with
prevention, not rectification). The only differences are that this SEC rule,
unlike the corresponding ABA rule, does not include prevention or mitigation of harm but only rectification of consequences and requires that
the harm be to the issuer or investors rather than "to another." Section
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
1.13(c).
250.

See id. (emphasis added).
See 17 C.F.R.. § 205.3(d) (2) (ii) (2004).
MODEL RuLEs 2003, supra note 32, R. 3.3(b).
See ALAS Memorandum, supra note 222, col. G.
Compare MODEL RULES 2003, supra note 32, R. 1.6(b)(2), with id. R.
See ALAS Memorandum, supra note 222, col. C.
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205.3(d) (2) (iii), unlike Section 205.3(d) (2) (i), follows the ABA provision
in limiting rectification of past frauds to situations in which the lawyer's
services have been used in furtherance of the fraud. As indicated earlier,
by providing for rectification of a past fraud by a client in which the lawyer's services were used, the SEC rule permits disclosure to the Commission in a situation in which a substantial minority of states (eighteen)
permit disclosure, but most states would prohibit it. Disclosure in this situation is now recommended by the ABA and by Section 67 of the ALI's
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers.
C.

The Validity and Preemptive Effect of Permissive Disclosure Under
Section 205.3(d)(2)

Reporting out, even if merely permissive, inevitably generates more
controversy than mandatory reporting up. Therefore, it should have been
no surprise that the first important public challenges to the SEC rules,
which occurred during the summer of 2003, involved the validity and preemptive effect of the SEC's permissive disclosure rules. The challenges
came from two state's bars: Washington and California. Our view is that
the challenges are unconvincing, and that the SEC had authority to, and
did in fact, draft rules that preempt state ethics rules that prohibit or restrict disclosure of material violations of law. 25 ' Indeed, the fact that state
bars are now arguing to the contrary supports our previously expressed
concern with "colorable defense" and other standards relating to reporting up, since it shows that some lawyers are willing to argue almost anything to protect their vision of lawyering.
An analysis of the validity and preemptive effect of the SEC's permissive disclosure rules involves several considerations. The first question is
whether Congress in Section 307 authorized the SEC to promulgate permissive disclosure rules. The next question is whether Congress intended
to allow the SEC to give its rules preemptive force. The Supreme Court
has recognized three types of preemption: express preemption, based on the
express language of a statute; field preemption, based on congressional intent to occupy an entire field and leave no room for state regulation; and
implied conflict preemption, under which federal statutes preempt state law
with which the federal statute "actually conflicts." 2 52 Because Section 307
contains no express preemption provision and does not intend to displace
all state regulation of lawyers, the type of preemption at issue here is implied conflict preemption.
Under the doctrine of implied conflict preemption, a conflict exists
between federal and state law either if it is "impossible for a private party
251. Another recent discussion by an ethics scholar reaches the same general
conclusion. See Roy D. Simon, The Washington State Bar Takes on the SEC (Sept.
11, 2003) (on file with Villanova Law Review).
252. See generally Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REv. 225, 225-231 (2000)
(citing cases setting forth preemption doctrine).
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to comply with both state and federal requirements" (sometimes known as
"physical impossibility") or if state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." 2 53 The SEC rules do not create situations in which compliance
with both the SEC rules and state law is a "physical impossibility." The
SEC rules generally do not require lawyers to do anything that state law
prohibits. They do two other things: require something (i.e., reporting
up) that some state rules may merely permit; and permit something (i.e.,
reporting out) that some state rules prohibit or restrict. And, unlike Section 307, the SEC rules contain express preemption provisions. The question is whether these rules involve the kind of "conflict" necessary to create
the "obstacle preemption" variant of conflict preemption. Finally, there is
the related question of what deference is owed to the SEC's own interpretations of its rules, in this case interpretations concerning preemption. As
a general proposition, courts are likely to give great deference to the SEC's
254
interpretations of its own rules.
1.

Validity of the SEC Permissive Disclosure Rule

We first consider whether Congress in Section 307 authorized the
SEC to promulgate a permissive disclosure rule and to give that rule preemptive effect. The language of Section 307 grants broad authority to the
SEC. 2 5 5 It requires the SEC to "issue rules, in the public interest and for
the protection of investors, setting forth minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the Commission in any way in the representation of issuers, including" two specific
rules, which we have discussed in previous sections. 25 6 Permissive disclosure rules fit comfortably within that legislative mandate. First, Section
307 refers to "minimum standards'of professional conduct," which means
that the SEC was required to adopt not simply the two rules referred to,
but a set of rules governing the conduct of lawyers who appear and practice before the SEC. Rules concerning disclosure are not unusual, either
for "standards of professional conduct" governing lawyers generally or for
253. E.g., Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 64 (2002) (quoting
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995)).
254. See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda, 529 U.S. 861, 883 (2000) (federal regulations preempt state product liability suits where "Congress has delegated to [the
agency] authority to implement the statute; the subject matter is technical; and the
relevant history and background are complex and extensive[; thus, t]he agency is
likely to have a thorough understanding of its own regulation and its objectives
and is 'uniquely qualified' to comprehend the likely impact of state requirements"); Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Counsel, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (noting that if statute is silent with respect to specific issue court must sustain agency's
interpretation if it is based on permissible construction of act); Bowles v. Seminole
Rock, 325 U.S. 410, 413-14 (1945) (agency's administrative interpretation of its
own regulations is controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with
regulation).
255. See 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2003).
256. Id.
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rules promulgated by the SEC under the securities laws, which of course
are all about disclosure of various types. The use of the word "including"
reinforces the idea that the two rules mentioned in Section 307 were not
the only ones Congress authorized the SEC to adopt. Moreover, there is
no language in Section 307 that purports to limit in any way the type of
"standards of professional conduct" the SEC is authorized to adopt.
That leaves legislative history. As many lawyers who criticized the
SEC's proposed rules in their public comments pointed out, there are
some statements in the legislative history to the effect that Section 307
does not require lawyers to report evidence of a material violation to the
SEC. Senator Enzi, one of the co-sponsors of the amendment that became
Section 307, stated that the "reporting up" required by the amendment:
[I]s still less onerous than that imposed on accountants under
section 10A of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, which requires
an auditor to report, both to the client's directors and simultaneously to the SEC, an illegal act if management fails to take remedial action.
The amendment I am supporting would not require the attorneys to
report violations to the SEC, only to corporate legal counsel or the CEO,
2 57
and ultimately, to the board of directors.
Shortly thereafter, the following colloquy occurred between Senator
Sarbanes and Senator Edwards, another of the co-sponsors of Section 307:
Mr. SARBANES. It is my understanding that this amendment,
which places responsibility upon the lawyer for the corporation
to report up the ladder, only involves going up within the corporate structure. He doesn't go outside of the corporate structure.
So the lawyer would first go to the chief legal officer, or the chief
executive officer, and if he didn't get an appropriate response,
he would go to the board of directors. Is that correct?
Mr. EDWARDS. Mr. President, my response to the question is
the only obligation that this amendment creates is the obligation
to report to the client, which begins with the chief legal officer,
and, if that is unsuccessful, then to the board of the corporation.
There is no obligation to report anything outside the client-the
corporation.
Mr. SARBANES. I think that is an important point. I simply
asked the question in order to stress the fact that that is the way
this amendment works. This has been a very carefully worked
out amendment ....

258

In our view, these statements do not support the proposition that Section 307 prohibits the SEC from adopting rules requiring disclosure,
257. 148 CONG. REC. S6555 (July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Enzi).
258. Id. S6557 (July 10, 2002) (statements of Sens. Edwards & Sarbanes).
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much less rules requiring noisy withdrawal, or rules merely permitting disclosure. First, the statements are directed to the lawyer's obligation to report up to the board if the lawyer does not receive an appropriate
response from management to the initial report of evidence of a material
violation. The statements do not address what is supposed to happen if
after reporting to the board, the board itself refuses to respond appropriately, perhaps because the senators were being optimistic that reporting
up would always work or perhaps because they wanted to duck a politically
sensitive issue. 2 59 At most, then, the statements seem to say that the lawyer
cannot immediately or simultaneously run to the SEC if management does
not appropriately respond to the lawyer's initial report. But permissive
disclosure would not be allowed in that situation under Section
205.3(d) (2), which requires that the lawyer "reasonably believe" the disclosure is "necessary." 260 It is hard to imagine that the SEC or the courts
would find disclosure to the SEC before (or at the same time as) reporting
up to the board "reasonably necessary." And the proposed mandatory
noisy withdrawal rule, discussed in the next section, does contain such a
limitation.
Second, the statements are directed to what the amendment requires,
not what the SEC is authorized to do in the exercise of its discretion pursuant
to the amendment. Neither of the statements say anythingaboutthe SEC's
rulemaking authority. Yet the amendment gives the SEC broad discretion
to create rules. It is common for legislators to leave technical details or
politically sensitive issues to agency rulemaking. That can be part of the
"careful working out" of a statute. So the fact that three senators did not
want to go on record as requiring outside disclosure in the amendment
says nothing about whether the SEC has authority to do so.
Third, to the extent the statements have relevance to the kinds of
rules the SEC is authorized to promulgate, they seem to be directed at
mandatory reporting to the SEC. Neither the permissive disclosure rule
adopted in Section 205.3(d) (2) nor the proposed noisy withdrawal rule
involves mandatory reporting to the SEC. Section 205.3(d) (2) does not
require the lawyer to do anything, but leaves disclosure to the lawyer's
discretion, subject to the "reasonably necessary" limitation. And the proposed noisy withdrawal rule, though mandatory, does not involve the lawyer making a full disclosure of his "report" to the SEC, but rather notifying
the SEC of his withdrawal "for professional reasons."
259. In another part of his statement, Senator Enzi expressed the view that a

lawyer, "[b]y reporting violations to the board of directors .... can avoid being

found guilty of aiding and abetting their client." Id. S6555 (July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Enzi). As we have already discussed, a lawyer would not avoid the risk
of aiding-and-abetting liability if the board refused to stop or rectify a material
violation. So Senator Enzi's stated concern could be read to support permissive
disclosure.
260. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2) (2004).
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Finally, of course, the weight that courts are likely to give to this legislative history is uncertain. The status of legislative history generally is controversial, especially in the face of statutory language directing the
promulgation of "minimum rules of professional conduct" for securities
lawyers. And in this case, all we have is the opinion of three senators,
albeit including two of the amendment's co-sponsors in the Senate. What,
if anything, the other senators or members of the House were thinking
when they voted for Section 307 is unknown.
2.

The SEC's Authority to Preempt State Law

As long as the federal government has authority under the Constitution to regulate in a particular area, the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution makes it clear that state law that conflicts or interferes with federal
regulation must yield. In general, an agency's authority to promulgate
substantive regulations in an area includes the authority to preempt state
law. In the case of Section 307, although the statute makes no explicit
reference to preemption, the structure of the statute, as well as the legislative history, both support the inference that Congress intended that the
26 1
SEC rules would preempt conflicting state rules.
The primary substantive goal of Section 307 was to replace what was
perceived to be the inadequate discretionary reporting up standard contained in old Model Rule 1.13 with a mandatory reporting up rule for
purposes of disciplining lawyers who appear and practice before the SEC.
As we have discussed, old Rule 1.13(b) did require that if a lawyer "knows"
of a violation "in a matter related to the representation" that is "likely to
result in substantial injury to the organization," the lawyer must "proceed
as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization," which
"may include" reporting up to the board. And as we have also discussed,
Section 307 not only made reporting up mandatory, it also replaced the
"actual knowledge" standard with an "evidence" standard, replaced the
"substantial injury" requirement with "material violation" and dropped the
requirement that the matter be related to the representation. Thus, Congress passed a statute that explicitly required the SEC to adopt rules that
clearly differed from state ethical standards because the state standards
261. In contrast, courts uniformly rejected arguments that the "Thornburgh
Memorandum," which purported to exempt Department of Justice lawyers from
the requirements of Model Rule 4.2, preempted state ethics rules. Rule 4.2 prohibits a lawyer from communicating directly with a represented person (with limited exceptions). Among other things, courts relied on the fact that the
Thornburgh Memorandum was not authorized by any federal statute. See, e.g.,
United States ex rel. O'Keefe v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 961 F. Supp. 1288, 1294
(E.D. Mo. 1997), afJ'd, 132 F.3d 1252, 1257 n.4 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Ferrara, 847 F. Supp. 964, 969 (D.D.C. 1993), affd on other grounds, 54 F.3d 825

(D.C. Cir. 1995); In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 484-487 (D.N.M. 1992); United States
v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433, 1445-50 (N.D. Cal. 1991), vacated, 989 F.3d 1032 (9th
Cir. 1993), amended and superseded, 4 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir. 1993); In re Howes, 940
P.2d 159, 169 (N.M. 1997).
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were not sufficiently encouraging of reporting up. If that is not preemptive intent, what is?
The legislative history here supports the view that the primary purpose of Section 307 was to displace the standard of former Model Rule
1.13. The amendment's sponsors repeatedly made reference to the letter
from the forty law professors (including us) to the SEC, which argued that
the Rule 1.13 standard was inadequate. 262 They also argued directly that
2 63
state standards were inadequate, as well as under-enforced.
Moreover, prior to the Senate vote on Section 307, the Senate considered the question of preemption because the opponents of the amend26 4
ment raised arguments against it. The Senate rejected the arguments.
While the bill was in conference, the ABA sent a letter to the conferees,
arguing, among other things, that federalism either mandated or counseled the legislators to declare that any Commission rules issued under
Section 307 would yield to state ethics codes. The conferees rejected the
ABA's pleas. 265 The same arguments are likely to be presented to courts

when they are asked to review an SEC enforcement proceeding under Section 307. The arguments are not meritorious.
262. See 148 CONG. REc. S6554 (July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Edwards);
id.S6555 (statement of Sen. Enzi); id. S6557 (statement of Sen. Sarbanes).
263. See id. S6555 (statement of Sen. Enzi). Senator Enzi stated:
When their counsel and advice is sought, attorneys should have an explicit, not just an implied, duty to advise the primary officer and then, if
necessary, the auditing committee or the board of directors of any serious
legal violation of the law by a corporate agent. Currently, there is no
explicit mandate requiring this standard of conduct....
I am usually in the camp that believes States should regulate professionals within their jurisdiction. However, in this case, the State bars as a
whole have failed. They have provided no specific ethical rule of conduct
to remedy this kind of situation. Even if they do have a general rule that
applies, it often goes unenforced. Most States also do not have the ability
to investigate attorney violations involved with the complex circumstances
of audit procedures within giant corporations.
Similarly, the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Responsibility do not have mandatory rules for professional conduct for corporate practitioners which require them to take specific
action. The ABA merely has a general rule that an attorney must represent the best interests of an organization and suggests a number of
ways an attorney could respond, including reporting illegal conduct to a
responsible constituent of the organization, such as the board of directors. But this does not mandate action.
Id.
264. Amendment Number S.Amdt.4187 to S.2643 was approved by a vote of
ninety-seven to zero, with three senators not voting. The amendment required the
SEC to set "forth minimum standards of professional conduct for attorney's appearing and practicing before the Commission." 148 CONG. REc. S6778 (July 15,
2002).
265. See H.R. CON. REP. No. 107-610 (2002) (recommending to both Houses
of Congress adoption of "Sarbanes-Oxley" Act of 2002, with Section 307 included).
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The arguments against preemptive authority made in comments to
the SEC emphasize the traditional role of the states in the regulation of
the bar. 26 6 It is true that lawyer regulation has traditionally been the province of the states, but so has the regulation of corporations and accountants. Yet, in furtherance of the regulation of securities that trade in
interstate commerce, the SEC regulates some aspects of corporate governance and the accounting profession. Moreover, courts have generally rejected claims that state law conflicting with those regulations should
somehow trump those regulatory efforts because "traditionally" states, not
the federal government, have been the primary regulators of those groups.
Anti-preemption arguments also emphasize the important role an independent bar plays in our constitutional system. We agree, but rhetoric
about lawyer independence is no substitute for reasoned argument. If the
federal government's power (and thus, the Commission's power) under
the Commerce Clause to regulate lawyers is more limited than its power to
regulate other groups that are involved in the issuance and trading of securities and that have been traditionally regulated by the states, the limitation can only be due to some other language in the Constitution that
provides that singular status for lawyers. Courts often invoke the Sixth
Amendment for that purpose, but the Supreme Court has long held that
the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel does not generally extend
beyond criminal prosecutions. 267 The Supreme Court has never held that
the Sixth Amendment extends to the provision of legal advice to companies relating to compliance with the securities laws or to regulating the
conduct of attorneys in administrative proceedings before the SEC. And
no court, of which we are aware, has suggested that any other clause of the
Constitution, including the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, performs the function that some commentators try
to attribute to the Sixth Amendment.
Assertions that the Commission is going where no arm of the federal
government has gone before, and that federal regulation of any lawyer is a
novel, alien and dangerous concept are false. 268 The IRS regulates tax
266. See, e.g., Comments of the ABA at 32; Comments of 77 Law Firms at 2;
Comments of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York at 38 ("There is
nothing in Section 307 to suggest that Congress authorized the Commission to
preempt state law and rules governing attorney conduct."); Comments of the Conference of Chief Justices at 1 ("[S]tate supreme courts are traditionally the ultimate authority for the promulgation and enforcement of the regulation of lawyers
on a day-by-day basis.") (citing McDade Act, 28 U.S.C. § 530B (1998), subjecting
attorneys for federal government to ethics rules of state in which federal attorney
acts).
267. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 26 (1981) (right to
appointed counsel applicable to criminal cases does not extend to indigent litigant
in civil proceeding involving parental rights); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
570 (1974) (holding there is no right to appointed counsel to inmate in prison
disciplinary proceeding).
268. See generally Michael P. Cox, Regulation of Attorneys PracticingBefore Federal
Agencies, 34 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 173 (1984) (finding that federal agencies have
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lawyers in some respects,

269

federal banking agencies have considered the

responsibilities of lawyers in bank examinations and filings, 270 the Patent
and Trademark Office regulates patent and trademark lawyers, 271 and federal bankruptcyjudges regulate bankruptcy lawyers (with rules, by the way,
that conflict with the conflict of interest rules in virtually every state), 2 7 2 to
provide five prominent examples. The federal government rightly exercises the right to regulate lawyers in those areas because all the areas involve matters on which the government's power to legislate and regulate
are beyond question, just as it is in securities law. There is no basis for
singling out the securities bar, among all lawyers engaged in federal practice areas, as being entitled to immunity from federal regulation. In the
past, even before the Commission had a specific legislative mandate to
regulate the conduct of lawyers appearing or practicing before it, similar
arguments against the Commission's discipline of lawyers were rejected by
273
federal courts.
3.

The Irrelevance of Federalism Concerns

Why do many lawyers argue for state regulation of the securities bar,
an approach that would involve differing standards and multiple regulatory bodies-an outcome that would be a nightmare for multi-state and
multi-national law firms? To speak plainly, bar organizations are not arguing for state or self-regulation in lieu of federal rules-because those are
not the choices. They are arguing for no effective regulation of corporate
lawyers handling complex securities-related matters versus effective regulation. Viewed in that light, the pleas of some segments of the bar are understandable. Everyone would prefer being free of the law's grasp,
although that argument is fraught with irony in the mouths of lawyers and
distressing in demonstrating how little faith in law those dedicated to it are
willing to display.
The choices are no regulation versus regulation for two reasons.
First, the ABA and other voluntary associations of lawyers have no power
authority to regulate attorneys and proposing grant of authority to regulate lawyers
to Office of Government Ethics).
269. See BERNARD WOLFMAN, JAMES P. HOLDEN & KENNETH L. HARRIS, STANDARDS OF TAx PRACTICE: PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ETHICS (CCH 1991).
270. See Lawrence G. Baxter, Reforming Legal Ethics in a Regulated Environment:
An Introductory Overview, 8 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICS 181 (1995) (examining how lawyer
conduct should be evaluated and controlled within regulatory sphere).
271. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 31-33 (1994) (governing practice before Patent Office);
see also 5 U.S.C. § 500e (1999) (excepting patent lawyer from general statute permitting lawyer admitted by any state to practice before U.S. administrative
agencies).
272. Practice before bankruptcy courts is governed by federal bankruptcy
court rules and the federal bankruptcy statute.
273. See, e.g., Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F.3d 452 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Davy v. SEC, 792
F.2d 1418, 1421 (9th Cir. 1986); Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570 (2d Cir.
1979). These decisions uphold the SEC's power to promulgate a rule, now Rule
102(e), providing for discipline of accountants and lawyers.
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to regulate anyone. Notwithstanding complaints about the bar's independence from the government, the states are empowered to regulate the bar
using rules, procedures and proceedings promulgated or supervised by
the highest court in each state (with some state legislative participation in
a few states). Second, the states have never made any effort to regulate the
274
This is not besecurities bar and are unlikely to do so in the future.
cause they are unconcerned with lawyer misconduct or the securities laws
but because bar counsel's offices lack (and will continue to lack) the expertise, resources and political clout to take on a major law firm for misconduct connected to that firm's securities practice. We are experts in
this field and none of us knows of a single instance in which bar counsel
has successfully prosecuted (or even brought charges against) a major law
firm relating to securities law practice.
This absence of state enforcement cannot be attributed to an absence
of evidence of serious misconduct by securities lawyers in major law firms.
Published cases relying on internal memoranda and testimony of lawyers
within a firm provide compelling evidence of misconduct connected to
securities work at a substantial number of successful and venerable law
firms. The bulk of lawyers in those firms and elsewhere are decent, dedicated and highly competent attorneys. Nevertheless, solid evidence exists
that lawyers within many firms at one time or another did things that in
any effective regulatory regime would, at a minimum, justify the filing of
charges. Yet there has been nothing in the way of formal state
proceedings.
We are not blaming the state courts, which do not control state funding of the state's legal system. Bar counsel's offices do not usually pay
enough to attract and keep lawyers with securities expertise, and lawyers
are unwilling to support the increases in bar dues that would finance
higher pay and larger staffs. 275 Moreover, unlike the SEC, which also
needs more funds to attract and retain top-notch securities lawyers, bar
counsel employment does not offer as promising a route to a prestigious
career in private practice following government service. Lawyers with considerable expertise in securities law would be required to prosecute disci274. See Speech by SEC Chairman: Remarks Before the Annual Meeting of
the American Bar Association's Business Law Section, Securities and Exchange
Commission (Aug. 12, 2002), at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch579.htm.
Harvey L. Pitt, then SEC Chairman, in a speech to the ABA Section of Business
Law, stated that ethics referrals that the SEC had made to state disciplinary bodies
had not resulted in lawyer discipline; see also supra note 263 (comments by Senator
Enzi) (stating that state regulation is insufficient and often goes unenforced).
275. See HAzARD, KONIAK & CRAMTON, supra note 216, at 934-37 (discussing
limited funding of state disciplinary bodies and factors that limit its effectiveness).
Discipline is primarily applied to serious intentional violations of ethics rules that
cause harm to clients (e.g., stealing client's money), and disciplinary proceedings
"are rarely directed at practitioners from mainstream firms and organizations."
Deborah L. Rhode, InstitutionalizingEthics, 44 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 665, 696 (1994)
(finding that state agencies have grossly inadequate resources, and that the public
is not protected, nor lawyers punished).
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plinary violations involving lawyer conduct in connection with complex
corporate fraud situations, and such lawyers are lacking in bar counsel
offices. The attorneys they would be prosecuting would almost always be
from large law firms that have such expertise, not to mention the money
and the incentive to fight such charges tooth and nail. Hiring outside
counsel to bring disciplinary charges is not a viable option. Contingency
fee arrangements are not and should not be available to tempt such lawyers to take those assignments. Ethical and legal prohibitions constrain
public prosecutors, even in disciplinary as opposed to criminal proceed276
ings, from working for personal profit.

It is unrealistic to suggest that bar counsels' offices will suddenly be
transformed-infused with enough cash and prestige-to do the regulatory job that the ABA and some state judges would have the Commission
leave entirely to the states. Nor does Section 307 permit that approach:
the statutory mandate says that "rules" must be promulgated, "including,"
not "limited to," the up-the-ladder rule embodied in the legislation itself.
The choice is regulation by the Commission or no effective regulation.
The Commission's duty under Section 307 is to adopt appropriate "rules"
to protect investors and in the public interest. The Commission's mandate neither assumes nor allows the Commission to yield to state regulatory regimes that have not and cannot do the job.
4.

Does Section 205.3(d)(2) in Fact Preempt State Law?

Even if the SEC had general authority to promulgate rules preempting state law, it is a separate question whether the SEC in fact promulgated
rules with preemptive effect. In particular, does the permissive disclosure
rule in Section 205.3(d)(2) have such preemptive effect? We think the
SEC did promulgate rules with preemptive effect, and that Section
205.3(d) (2) has as much preemptive effect as the other rules.
The SEC rules include two specific provisions directed at preemption.
The very first rule, Section 205.1, states: "Where the standards of a state or
other United States jurisdiction where an attorney is admitted or practices
conflict with this part, this part shall govern." 27 7 Similarly, one of the last
rules, Section 205.6(c), states: "An attorney who complies in good faith
with the provisions of this part shall not be subject to discipline or otherwise liable under inconsistent standards imposed by any state or other
278
United States jurisdiction where the attorney is admitted or practices."
The question, then, is whether an SEC rule that permits, but does not
require, disclosure, "conflicts" or is "inconsistent" with state standards that
prohibit or restrict disclosure. If "conflicts" or "inconsistent" means that it
276. See, e.g., Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787

(1987) (holding that appointment of lawyers who represented plaintiffs in private
action from which this contempt prosecution emerged was improper because of
their self-interest in matter).
277. 17 C.F.R. § 205.1 (2004) (emphasis added).
278. Id. § 205.6(c) (emphasis added).
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is not possible for the lawyer to comply with both the SEC and state standard, then Section 205.3(d) (2) does not conflict with state law, because a
lawyer can comply with both the SEC and state standards by not disclosing.
On the other hand, if "conflicts" or "inconsistent" means that the SEC
rules displace any state standards whose enforcement would frustrate the
SEC's goals in its rules, then the SEC's permissive disclosure rule preempts
state rules prohibiting disclosure in the sense that no state could discipline
a lawyer for disclosing what the SEC rules permit. The first meaning of
"conflict" corresponds to what the courts have called the "physical impossibility" version of conflict preemption. The second meaning corresponds
to what courts have called "obstacle preemption." Most courts recognize
obstacle preemption as sufficient, though the concept has its critics. 279 So
as long as the SEC intended, in using the words "conflicts" and "inconsistent" to incorporate the preemption case law understanding of these
terms, Section 205.3(d) (2) should have preemptive effect.
The strongest argument in favor of the "obstacle" interpretation of
Sections 205.1 and 205.6(c) is to look at the purpose of Section
205.3(d) (2), the permissive disclosure rule. The key point is that the SEC
rules contain no general rule of confidentiality or prohibited disclosure,
comparable to Model Rule 1.6, to which Section 205.3(d) (2) is an exception. For example, if a lawyer makes a disclosure under Section
205.3(d) (2) that he does not "reasonably believe necessary," the lawyer
does not, in our view, violate the SEC rules (though he would lose any
preemptive protection against state discipline or liability). The question
then is what possible purpose a permissive disclosure rule could have? It is
not possible for a lawyer to violate such a rule by failing to disclose any
more than it is possible to violate the rule (for purposes of SEC discipline)
by disclosing. Therefore, the only possible purpose of the SEC in adopting a permissive disclosure rule is to preempt state law that prohibits disclosure in situations in which Section 205.3(d) (2) permits disclosure, thus
enabling lawyers to avoid aiding and abetting material violations of issuers
and encouraging compliance, consistent with the goals of Section 307.280

279. See generally, e.g., Nelson, supra note 252.
280. In several recent cases, courts have concluded that California's recently
enacted ethics standards for arbitrators are preempted by NASD's arbitration procedures authorized by the SEC under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, in part
on "obstacle preemption" grounds. See Mayo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 258 F.
Supp. 2d 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2003); Jevne v. Superior Court, 113 Cal. App. 4th 486
(2003). The cases provide an example of SEC rules preempting state ethics provisions, with both courts deferring to the SEC's views on whether such obstacles
exist. On the other hand, the cases are distinguishable on two grounds from the
preemption issue here. First, the cases rely on "physical impossibility" conflicts as
well as "obstacle preemption." Second, the state ethics rules were relative newcomers; it was the federal regulation of arbitration that was the established practice.
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5.

The SEC and the State Bars Square Off

a.

Round One: The Washington State Bar Interim Opinion

Despite these strong arguments that Section 205.3(d) (2) preempts
state ethics rules prohibiting or restricting disclosure, two state bars expressed contrary opinions in 2003. The Washington State Bar fired the
first shot on July 26, 2003 by publishing an "Interim" Formal Ethics Opinion entitled "The Effect of the SEC's Sarbanes-Oxley Regulations on Washington Attorneys' Obligations under the RPCs." 28 1 The reason for the
unusual "interim" designation of the opinion, as explained in a footnote,
was "the lack of case law about the extent to which the SEC Regulations
addressed in this opinion pre-empt state ethics rules and [the fact that] ...
a WSBA committee is considering changes to RPC 1.6."282
The real question, however, is why, given the reasons cited by the
Washington State Bar, it felt compelled to issue an interim opinion at
all. 283 The question is all the more puzzling because Washington's version

of Rule 1.6 does not absolutely prohibit disclosure in the case of corporate
fraud, but rather allows a lawyer to "reveal such confidences or secrets to
the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent the client
from committing a crime." 28 4 Of course, as the opinion pointed out, the
disclosure permitted by Section 205.3(d) (2) is broader because it includes
civil wrongs not also criminal (though violations of the securities laws are
often subject to criminal and civil sanctions) as well as rectification of past
wrongs.
The opinion begins by boldly stating its conclusion: "It is the opinion
of the Board that, to the extent that this SEC regulation [Section
205.3(d) (2)] authorizes but does not require revelation of client's confidences and secrets, the Washington lawyer cannot reveal such confidences
28 5
and secrets unless authorized to do so under the Washington RPCs."
How does it reach this conclusion? Not by considering the law of preemption, because that would require the Board to opine on a question of law
rather than ethics, which it is not authorized to do. But if the Board did
not think it appropriate to consider the law of preemption, it would seem
that the whole ethics opinion is a waste of time.
Not wanting to concede its irrelevance to the question it poses, the
opinion goes on to discuss the two preemption sections of the SEC rules,
Sections 205.1 and 205.6(c). The opinion states that there is no need to
consider Section 205.1 because there is no conflict between Section
281. SeeWash. State Bar Ass'n Board of Governors, Interim Formal Ethics Op.
(July 26, 2003) [hereinafter Interim Formal Ethics Opinion] (discussing effect of
SEC's Sarbanes-Oxley regulations on Washington attorneys' obligations under
rules of professional conduct).
282. Id. at 1 n.1.
283. See id.
284. Id.; see also WASH. RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (1990).
285. Interim Formal Ethics Opinion, supra note 281, at 5.
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205.3(d) (2) and Washington's Rule 1.6: a lawyer can comply with both by
not disclosing. How the opinion concludes that there is no conflict without "considering" and interpreting the term "conflict" in Section 205.1,
thus opining on a question of law (no such concept appearing anywhere
in the ethics rules), is nowhere explained in the opinion. 28 6 Not content
with this illegitimate assertion of authority to decide legal questions, the
opinion goes on to state, in an ironic show of restraint, that "the Board
does not at this time reach the question of whether, if there were such a
conflict, the SEC laws or regulations would be deemed to have pre-empted
the field, such that Section 205 would govern over a Washington RPC to
28 7
the contrary."
In the bar's view, a "conflict" already exists between its vision of the
primacy of the ethics rules, in particular the rule of confidentiality, and
the illegitimate encroachment by the SEC. The bar's resolution of this
conflict is to assert its own authority until forced to bow to state power.
Thus, the opinion states: "Though the Board recognizes the possibility
that Section 205 may ultimately be interpreted as preempting Washington
law, a cautious attorney should refrain from making any disclosures in violation of the Washington RPCs until this issue is resolved by the courts."288
The opinion thus fires a clear warning shot to lawyers appearing and practicing before the SEC, saying in effect, "Don't even think about disclosing;
we won't hesitate to come after you."
One might think that lawyers would ignore such blustery warnings by
the bar. After all, Section 205.6(c) protects a lawyer from discipline if the
lawyer "complies in good faith" with Section 205.3(d) (2).289 Yet the Washington State Bar opinion asserts otherwise. It opines on another question
of law-the meaning of "good faith" and "complies" under Section
205.3(d) (2).290 While the opinion's interpretation of "conflict" at least

had some basis in case law, albeit uncited and not controlling, these interpretations have no basis in anything other than the opinion authors' vivid
imaginations. With respect to "good faith," the opinion states:
As a general matter and with the current lack of case law on the
pre-emption issue, a Washington attorney cannot.., fairly claim
to be complying in "good faith" with the SEC Regulations, as that
286. For an explanation of this phenomenon, see Susan P. Koniak, The Law
Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. Rv. 1389 (1992) (analyzing connection
between law as upheld by state and ethics codes and "law" maintained by legal
profession, and concluding that legal profession's "law" has large influence on lawyers despite ultimate authority of state's law).
287. Simon, supra note 251 (referring, somewhat generously, to this statement as "cryptic").
288. Interim Formal Ethics Opinion, supra note 281, at 6.
289. See 17 C.F.R § 205.6 (c) (2004) (protecting lawyer acting in "good
faith"); id. § 205.3(d)(2) (authorizing disclosure of confidential information).
290. See Interim Formal Ethics Opinion, supra note 281, at 6-7.
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term is used in Section 205.6(c) of the Regulations, if (s)he took
29
an action that was contrary to this Formal Opinion. '
This is a Humpty-Dumpty interpretation of "good faith." A provision that
is clearly intended to preempt state law is instead interpreted as deferring
to it. To suggest the SEC intended this rule to preserve the ability of state
rules to punish conduct the SEC permits is absurd because it nullifies the
very purpose of the permissive rule.
Even more bizarrely, the opinion concludes that the use of the term
"complies" in Section 205.6(c) "means that the good faith defense applies
only to those provisions which are mandatory in nature and not to discretionary disclosures." 29 2 This interpretation of "complies" is nonsensical
and appears nowhere else in law to the best of our knowledge. In normal
usage, people "comply" with non-mandatory laws all the time. For example, getting a driver's license is not mandatory, but if one wants to get one,
one must "comply" with the requirements. Section 205.3(d) (2) sets forth
requirements for permissive disclosure. 293 A lawyer who seeks the safe
harbor of Section 205.6(c) against state discipline and liability will want to
conform his behavior to those requirements. This activity is "complying"
in the normal sense of the word. Put another way, one "complies" by seeking the benefits conferred by a permissive rule just as much as by avoiding
the costs imposed by a mandatory, prohibitionist rule. Moreover, the
phrase in Section 205.6(c) is "complies in good faith with the provisions of
this part."294 This language suggests no limitation to mandatory
provisions.
b.

Round Two: The Response from the SEC

Before the Washington State Bar Interim Opinion was published, the
SEC, through its general counsel, wrote a letter in an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to persuade the Washington State Bar not to go forward with
its opinion. 295 The brief letter essentially made three points. First, the
SEC letter argued that Section 205.3(d) (2) preempts Washington RPC 1.6
to the extent it permits disclosures that 1.6 forbids, and that the Washington State Bar's argument to the contrary contravened prevailing Supreme
Court opinions.2 96 Second, the letter argued that the meaning of good
291. Id. at 1.
292. Id. at 7.
293. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d) (2).
294. Id. § 205.6(c) (looking at plain language section).
295. See Letter from Giovanni P. Prezioso, General Counsel, U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission, to J. Richard Manning, President, Washington State
Bar Association (July 23, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch
072303gpp.htm [hereinafter Prezioso Letter] (addressing Interim Formal Ethics
Opinion).
296. See id. (stating "the Proposed Interim Formal Opinion is inconsistent
with prevailing Supreme Court precedent"). The letter explains that the Court
"has consistently upheld the authority of federal agencies to implement rules of
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faith compliance under Section 205.6(c) is a question of federal law in
which the SEC's views must be given deference and preempt inconsistent
state interpretations.2 9 7 Finally, in a thinly veiled and unclear threat, the
letter concluded that even the initiation of disciplinary proceedings
against a lawyer who in good faith complied with the SEC rules even
though the lawyer's conduct violates state ethics rules would "frustrate" the
29 8
SEC rules and "thwart" their purposes.
c.

Round Three: The California Bar Committee's Retort

Several weeks later on August 13, 2003, the California State Bar Business Law Section jumped into the fray via its Corporations Committee.
The California Bar Committee wrote a response letter to the SEC taking
issue with the SEC's views on preemption. 299 Unlike Washington, California is one of the few jurisdictions with an ethics rule that prohibits all
disclosure in cases of corporate fraud. 300 The California Bar Committee
conduct that diverge from and supersede state laws that address the same conduct." See id. (citing Sperry v. State Bar of Fla., 373 U.S. 379 (1963)). More relevant to the Washington State Bar's argument, the letter cites Fidelity FederalSavings
&Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 155 (1982), for the proposition that if "a
conflict arises because a state rule prohibits an attorney from exercising the discretion provided by a federal regulation, the federal regulation will take priority,"
even if the regulation simply permits what state law prohibits. See id. (supporting
argument with case law). Although the SEC letter does not specifically refer to
obstacle preemption, Fidelity Federal relies on this doctrine in finding a conflict.
458 U.S. at 156.
297. See Prezioso Letter, supra note 295 (citing Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S.
212 (2002); United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 108, 110 (2000); and City of NewYork
v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 64 (1989)).
298. See id. (questioning remedy). Perhaps the SEC could bring an injunction action to prevent a state from pursuing discipline against a lawyer. Section
205.7(b) gives the SEC " [ a ]luthority to enforce compliance with this part," but the
only sanctions referred to in Section 205.6 are sanctions against lawyers appearing
and practicing before the SEC. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.7(b), 205.6 (2004).
299. See Letter from Keith Paul Bishop & Bruce Dravis, Co-Chairs of the Corporations Committee, Business Law Section, The State Bar of California, to Giovanni P. Prezioso, General Counsel, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(Aug. 13, 2003) [hereinafter State Bar of California Letter] (on file with Villanova
Law Review).
300. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (2004) (stating that attorneys have
duty to "maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself
to preserve the secrets, of his or her client"); see also RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT OF
THE STATE BAR OF CAL. R. 3-600(B) (providing rule for "Organization as Client").
Rule 3-600(B) states:
If a member acting on behalf of an organization knows that an actual or
apparent agent of the organization acts or intends or refuses to act in a
manner that is or may be a violation of law reasonably imputable to the
organization, or in a manner which is likely to result in substantial injury
to the organization, the member shall not violate his or her duty of pro-

tecting all confidential information as provided in Business and Professions Code Section 6068, subdivision (e).
Id. The former version of Model Rule 1.13(b), unlike California's Rule 3-600(B),
did not deal with disclosure outside the organization, but left that issue to other
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letter warned that a California lawyer who relied on the SEC's assertions of
preemption risked harm to their clients and themselves because the courts
could disagree with the SEC's position. 30 1 The alleged harm to the client
would come from the risk of waiver of the attorney-client privilege
through "selective disclosure" to the SEC. 30 2 The potential harm to lawyers would be discipline or liability for disclosing client confidences because, unlike the SEC rules, California law contains no "good faith"
exception. 303 In fact, the California Bar Committee stated that "[a] n attorney faced with choosing between potentially irreparable harm to a client's interests arising from disclosure of a confidence or the cost of a good
faith, well founded objection to the SEC's rules is virtually duty-bound to
select the latter."30 4 The whole basis for this position rests on the assertion that there is a real risk that courts will not find preemption.
The California Bar Committee letter grounds this assertion in the potential claim that the SEC lacked authority to adopt Section 205.3(d) (2)
or Section 205.6(c).305 But the arguments the letter marshals in support
of this claim are remarkably weak. The letter boldly asserts that "there is
no evidence of Congressional intent to preempt state ethics rules," without
attempting to examine any of the evidence we discuss above, based on the
language of the statute and the legislative history.30 6 The letter does
knock down a few straw man arguments, such as the fact that the "referrules (e.g., Rules 1.6, 3.3 and 4.1). Compare MODEL

1.13(b), with RULES

RULES 1983, supra note 11, R.
OF PROF'L CONDUCT OF THE STATE BAR OF CAL. R. 3-600(B).

301. See State Bar of California Letter, supra note 299.
302. See id. at 5 n.5. Although the letter noted the SEC's own concern with
'selective waiver," the "selective waiver" problem that the SEC is concerned with
involves the situation in which a company wants to waive the privilege for information that is clearly protected by the attorney-client privilege as part of cooperating
with the government.
303. See id. at 5.
304. See id. at 6.
305. See id. The letter accurately stated that the SEC only has the authority to
adopt regulations to carry out the will of Congress as expressed by the statute. It is
also true, as the letter states, that courts have on occasion struck down SEC
rulemaking for lack of authority. See id. Interestingly, the case cited is Business
Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990), in which the SEC had adopted a
rule (Rule 19c-4) purporting to regulate shareholder voting requirements (a corporate governance rule requiring one share/one vote). The court vacated the rule
because it found that the rule did not further the main purpose of the securities
laws, namely disclosure. See Bus. Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 417 (vacating rule). Thus,
this case is an odd one to cite in support of a position that an SEC rule lacks
authority because it permits disclosure. An equally odd citation, made in the letter
for the proposition that the SEC lacks "the power to preempt validly adopted regulations of a sovereign state," is LouisianaPublic Service Commission v. FCC, 476 U.S.
355, 374 (1986). See State Bar of California Letter, supra note 299, at 6 (questioning SEC authority to preempt adopted regulation). The statute in LouisianaPublic
Service Commission specifically carved out a role for state regulation with respect to
intrastate matters, unlike Section 307, which is designed to redress dissatisfaction
with state regulation.
306. See State Bar of California Letter, supra note 299, at 6.
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ences in Section 307 to 'public interest' and 'protection of investors' are
simply too general to evidence any actual intent by Congress to empower
the SEC to adopt rules allowing attorneys to divulge client confidences
and establish immunity for those who do."3 0 7 But of course these are not

the only possible phrases in Section 307 that could be relevant. As argued
above, the very specific reference in Section 307 to reporting up rules that
are designedly more stringent than the extant version of Model Rule 1.13
is strong evidence of preemptive intent, and permissive disclosure fits comfortably within "minimum standards of conduct" that already exist in numerous states, besides being consistent with the disclosure thrust of the
securities laws. In addition, the letter argues that the statutes other than
Section 307 cited by the SEC in support of its rules "do not appear to
address Congressional intent to invest the SEC with broad authority to
permit lawyers to disclose client secrets and then immunize or otherwise
protect those lawyers who do."30 8 True enough, but again not responsive
to the affirmative case we have made.
The letter also draws distinctions between Section 307 and two other
statutory provisions. First, the letter distinguishes Section 301 of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, which "specifically requires a registered public accounting firm to report to the SEC in specific
circumstances." 30 9 Section 205.3(d) (2), however, does not require a lawyer to report to the SEC, or even permit the lawyer to report to the SEC as
a general matter. 3 10 It permits lawyers to disclose information reasonably
believed necessary to prevent or rectify a material violation of law. Continuing the same vein, the letter argues that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act itself
"established a comprehensive regulatory scheme for that segment of the
accounting profession that deals with issuers, [whereas] the grant of authority to the SEC under Section 307 was limited to 'setting forth minimum standards' for attorneys practicing before it." 3 11 But in what sense is

Section 307 "limited"? Perhaps the California Bar Committee is attempting to read "minimum standards" to mean "minimal standards," a reading
which in our view has no support in ordinary usage or common sense.
The most natural reading of "minimum standards" is "standards that an
attorney who wishes to appear and practice before the SEC must meet,"
not "the SEC should adopt as few rules as possible" or "the SEC should
adopt rules that infringe as little as possible on a lawyer's obligations
3 12
under state law."
307. Id. at n.9.
308. Id. at 6.
309. Id. at n.9.
310. See 17 C.F.R. 205.3(d) (2) (2004).
311. State Bar of California Letter, supra note 299, at n.9.
312. A better argument for the California Bar Committee is that Section
205.3(d) (2) is not a "minimum standard" because it does not require a lawyer to
do, or refrain from doing, anything. This may also be what the Washington State
Bar was really trying to get at in its discussion of "good faith compliance." Although we believe this argument is stronger, we still do not find it persuasive. One
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Next, the California Bar Committee letter seeks to distinguish Sperry v.
State of Florida,3 13 which the SEC letter relied on for the proposition that
the "Court has consistently upheld the authority of federal agencies to implement rules of conduct that diverge from and supersede state laws that
address the same conduct. ' 314 In Sperry, the Supreme Court vacated, on
preemption grounds, an injunction obtained by the State of Florida
against a nonlawyer for the unauthorized practice of law before the U.S.
Patent Office.

3 15

The California Bar Committee letter says Sperry is distinguishable in
three ways. First, "the power of Congress to establish a patent office is
expressly set forth in the United States Constitution," whereas the SEC's
rules "do not emanate from authority expressly vested in Congress by the
U.S. Constitution."3 1 6 This distinction is astonishing. Does the California
Bar Committee mean to suggest that the SEC is unconstitutional because
it is not specifically mentioned in the Constitution? Or is the California
Bar Committee "merely" suggesting that patent office rules have more preemptive effect simply because the Constitution contains a patent clause?
No Supreme Court case even remotely suggested such a standard.
The second distinction is that "Congress expressly granted the Commissioner of Patents the authority to prescribe regulations, among other
things, recognizing agents or other persons before the Patent Office,"
whereas the "statutory authority cited by the SEC ...evidences no clear
intent by Congress to supercede state laws and ethical rules."3 1 7 Something seems to have been lost in the parallelism here. Does not Section
307 expressly grant, indeed require, the SEC to prescribe regulations concerning attorneys who appear and practice before the SEC? If so, how
exactly is Section 307 distinguishable from the patent statute?
of the benefits of Section 205.3(d) (2) is that it allows lawyers a means of avoiding
aiding-and-abetting liability under the securities laws. Compliance with the general requirements of the securities laws would, in our view, count as a "minimum
standard," though it is not one specifically mentioned in the SEC rules. As we
argued in our comments to the SEC, the rules should have made clear that they do
not displace the general obligation under the securities laws not to engage in aiding-and-abetting violations. For a further discussion of the "safe harbor" provision,
see supra note 147 and accompanying text.
313. 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
314. See Prezioso Letter, supra note 295 (using Sperry v. State Bar of Florida,373
U.S. 379 (1963), to support SEC proposition).
315. See Sperry, 373 U.S. at 404 (vacating state court order enjoining petitioner, who was registered to practice before U.S. Patent Office, but not admitted
to practice law before Florida's or any other bar, because it prohibited him from
"performing tasks ... incident to the preparation and prosecution of patent applications before the Patent Office").
316. See State Bar of California Letter, supra note 299, at 7 n.12 (quoting U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8: "Congress shall have the power... [t]o promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries").
317. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 31, which was subsequently repealed).
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The third distinction from Speny is that "the practice by lay patent
agents was long-standing at the time that Congress considered the statute,"
whereas "the SEC's rules represent a radical change from historical patterns of state regulation of attorneys." 31 8 As previously discussed, however, given Rule 102(e) as well as other federal statutes already authorizing
the regulation of lawyers practicing before federal agencies, the change
effected by Section 307 was not so radical. Moreover, the whole point of
Section 307 was to redress inadequate state regulation. 3 19
Finally, the California Bar Committee letter neatly overlooks the fact
that the long-standing practice that supported the preemption in Sperry
was actually inconsistent with the state bar's having monopoly control over
the regulation of the practice of law.
The California Bar Committee letter then responds to the SEC letter's
argument that the states owe deference to the SEC's interpretation of
"good faith" in Section 205.6(c). Recall that the SEC letter made this
point to rebut the Washington State Bar's novel construction of "good
faith compliance" with the SEC rules to mean in fact compliance with the
state's ethics rules. But, says the California Bar Committee:
[T] he Committee expects that in specific cases, the question of
whether an attorney acted in good faith will involve determinations of questions of fact as well as law. It is unclear to the Committee whether the SEC contemplates that it will make these
factual findings in each case of voluntary disclosure by an attorney. In the absence of any SEC determination that the attorney
acted in good faith, no conflict exists with a state
320
determination.
318. Id.
319. The California State Bar letter also cites several cases relevant to this
point, one of which deserves special mention. Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 U.S.
462 (1977), is cited for the proposition that the SEC has no authority to preempt
state law in traditional areas. See Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 462. The letter quotes
Santa Fe Industries "[a] bsent a clear indication of congressional intent, we are reluctant to federalize the substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals
with transactions in securities, particularly where established state policies of corporate regulation would be overridden." See id. at 479. In Santa Fe Industries, the
Court held that Section 10(b) of the Securities Act and Rule 1Ob-5 could not be
interpreted to cover claims of breach of fiduciary duty involving only internal corporate mismanagement. See id. at 479 (reversing lower court). The Court indeed
had reason to worry that a contrary ruling would "federalize [a] substantial portion
of the law of corporations" traditionally regulated by states. Section 307, by contrast, specifically directs the SEC to create federal rules in part because state regulation has proved inadequate. Moreover, Section 307 modifies the underlying
premise of Santa Fe, by specifically including breaches of fiduciary duty (i.e., state
law violations) within its ambit.
320. State Bar of California Letter, supra note 299, at 7. The California State
Bar then went on to assert that "[t]he Administrative Procedure Act requires a
reviewing court to hold unlawful and set aside any agency action that is in excess of
its authority." Id.
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We agree that questions of fact may be involved in determining
whether a lawyer acted in good faith, and that the SEC will not make these
factual findings in state proceedings. We fail to see, however, how that
point is at all responsive to the SEC's argument that its construction of
good faith is entitled to deference. The Washington State Bar Interim
Opinion was not making a factual determination in offering its construction of good faith. Thus, the last sentence in the quotation above is a
complete non sequitur.
The California Bar Committee letter's final substantive point is that
the State Bar of California has no power, under California law, to refuse to
enforce California statutes on the basis of federal preemption unless an
appellate court has so ruled. The California Constitution, Article III, Section 3.5 states: "An administrative agency ...

has no power ...

(c) To...

refuse to enforce a statuteon the basis that federal law or federal regulations
prohibit the enforcement of such statute unless an appellate court has
made a determination that the enforcement of such statute is prohibited
by federal law or federal regulation." 32 1 This point has merit, though of
course it is separate from the merits of the preemption claim. California
has a State Bar Court, created by a 1988 statute and funded exclusively by
members of the state bar. The State Bar Court acts as an arm of the California Supreme Court in deciding all disciplinary cases. It enforces not
only California's ethics rules but also its Business and Professional Code,
which contains Section 6068(e), the confidentiality rule. The State Bar
Court has the power to suspend or permanently ban lawyers from practicing law, but the attorney may appeal to the California Supreme Court.
Thus, if a California lawyer disclosed confidential client information and
the California Bar sought to discipline him, the lawyer would not be able
to argue successfully a preemption defense in the State Bar Court unless
an appellate court had ruled on the question. Nevertheless, the lawyer
would be able to raise the defense on appeal.
California lawyers are therefore at some risk if they seek to take advantage of Section 205.6(c). The question then is whether there are any ways
of reducing that risk. For example, it is not clear how the California constitutional provision handles the issue of prosecutorial discretion. If the
California Bar chooses not to discipline a lawyer for disclosing, does it
violate the constitutional provision? What if the discretion not to discipline is based partly on preemption concerns and partly on other reasons?
In addition, it is possible that procedural devices, such as a declaratory
judgment action in advance or an injunction action in the event of
threatened disciplinary action, could be used to protect a lawyer from discipline and establish the requisite appellate ruling on preemption. 32 2 Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, the California Bar Committee letter does
321. CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3.5 (emphasis added).
322. See Simon, supra note 251 (arguing that Washington State Bar, rather
than threatening lawyers in its interim opinion, should bring declaratoryjudgment
action to resolve preemption question).
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not address these questions. Its interest is not in protecting its members
who choose to disclose in good faith compliance with the SEC rules, but in
deterring such disclosure.
d.

Let's Get Real

This is where things stand at the moment of this writing: an unresolved and unsatisfactory state. We believe the SEC's position on preemption is strong and likely to prevail in the courts. We cannot help but
note, however, that this debate has an air of unreality to it. In reality, few
if any lawyers will exercise discretion to disclose material violations outside
the corporation, despite Section 205.3(d), regardless of what state ethics
rules say and regardless of the likelihood of preemption. We believe it is
equally true, however, that in the event some lawyer did decide to disclose,
it would be very unlikely that the lawyer would be disciplined for doing so.
So what is really going on? What we are seeing is a vivid example of
the bar demonstrating its commitment to its vision of lawyering, in which
the duty of confidentiality takes center stage, and any law of the state that
seeks to diminish or interfere with that duty is trumped, deemed invalid,
marginalized and disparaged. In adopting Section 205.3(d), the SEC put
itself in something of a bind, because it cannot enforce the provision directly except in its own proceedings. Rather, enforcement of the provision depends crucially on the "good faith" of the bar disciplinary
authorities. As we have seen, the bar is not likely to capitulate without a
fight. Unwittingly, perhaps, the actions and arguments of the state bars
have provided the strongest demonstration of why Section 307 was necessary in the first place, and why the concerns we have expressed with the
SEC's implementation rules are well grounded.
6.

State Rules That Go Further Than Those of the SEC

A number of states already have ethics rules that require more of lawyers who practice before the SEC than do the SEC's rules, particularly in
the areas of withdrawal and disclosure. In our initial comments to the
SEC, we argued that those rules should not be preempted.3 23 The SEC
responded by revising Section 205.1 to include the following statement:
"These standards supplement applicable standards of any jurisdiction
where an attorney is admitted or practices and are not intended to limit
the ability of any jurisdiction to impose additional obligations on an attor324
ney not inconsistent with the application of this part."
The Commission has acted prudently in making it clear that states
that require or permit more disclosure than that prescribed by the Commission's rules are not preempted by the Commission's more limited requirements. Preemption in this situation is not justified under Section
307 and is inconsistent with the broader regulatory regime set forth in
323. See Koniak, Cramton & Cohen Comments, supra note 128, at 6-10, 15-16.
324. 17 C.F.R. § 205.1 (2004).
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Sarbanes-Oxley and federal securities legislation. Section 307 requires the
Commission to adopt "minimum" standards to govern the conduct of securities lawyers, not "maximum" standards.
IV.

"Noisy

WITHDRAWAL": REQUIRED
TO THE

A.

DISCLOSURE

OF WITHDRAWAL

SEC

Required Withdrawal and Disaffirmance of Tainted Opinions Under
State Law

This topic has been discussed in Part III.A. above. It is sufficient here
to repeat a few fundamental matters.
First, all U.S. jurisdictions, we believe, require a lawyer to withdraw
when the client demands that the lawyer knowingly assist conduct that is
illegal or violates the rules of professional conduct or other law. 325 The
lawyer's honest opinion that proposed conduct is illegal will almost always
lead to conduct that is within the bounds of the law. Channeling client
conduct along lawful paths is one of the principal purposes and benefits of
legal representation and of the professional secrecy with which it is carried
on. In the rare situation in which a client insists upon an illegal course of
conduct, the lawyer must withdraw. Not doing so would aid and abet the
illegality.
Second, in all jurisdictions the lawyer is free to give public notice of
the fact of withdrawal; such notice is not a disclosure of information pro3 26
tected by the duty of confidentiality.
Third, the ABA takes the position that, after withdrawal, a lawyer may
withdraw opinions or representations that the lawyer made to third persons during the course of the representation when the lawyer reasonably
believes that they are being relied upon by third persons and the lawyer
comes to know that the opinions or representations contain materially inaccurate information or are being used to further a crime or fraud. An
ABA formal opinion states that withdrawal of an opinion or representation, without more, does not reveal confidential information.3 2 7 The formal opinion also states that, under some circumstances, disaffirmance of
325. See MODEL RULES 2003, supra note 32, R. 1.2(d), 1.16(a); see also ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-366 (1992).
326. See MODEL RULES 2003, supra note 32, R. 1.6 cmt. 14; see also id. R. 1.16
cmt. 2.
327. See ABA Formal Op. No. 92-366 (1992). The majority in ABA Formal
Op. No. 92-366 (1992) concluded that, even though Rule 1.6 prohibited a lawyer
from disclosing a client's prior fraud to anyone, the lawyer must withdraw and
must "put [the defrauded party] on notice that something is wrong" by withdrawing the lawyer's prior opinion, and that this duty applied after discharge or withdrawal. See MODEL RULES 2003, supra note 32, R. 1.6 cmt. 15 (including comment
from 1983-2003, stating, "Neither this Rule nor Rule 1.8(b) nor Rule 1.16(d) prevent the lawyer from giving notice of the fact of withdrawal, and the lawyer may
also withdraw or disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation, or the like"). This
sentence creates an exception to Rule 1.6 that is not reflected in the text of the
rule.
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opinions or representations is required to avoid assisting the client's un-

lawful conduct. Such disclosure may be made in every jurisdiction when
an investigation or proceeding involves an allegation that the lawyer engaged in misconduct during the representation, bringing the self-defense
exception to confidentiality into play.
Fourth, all states, either by professional rule or judicial decision, permit disclosure of confidential information for certain purposes: to maintain the integrity and impartiality of adjudicative proceedings; to protect
important interests of third persons and the public against illegal invasion;
and to protect the lawyer's own interests in self-defense and fee collection.
The vast majority of states require disclosure in some cases in the first
situation, involving the integrity of the adjudicative process. Where a future financial fraud on third persons or the government is involved, the
vast majority of states permit disclosure and a few states require it, but
when only an unrectified past fraud is involved a substantial minority of

states permit disclosure and a few require it.
Ongoing fraud, in which new crimes or frauds are being committed
as investors, consumers or other third persons continue to be deceived by
fraudulent past statements, is a situation that should be treated by a uniform national rule, especially when the securities markets are involved.
Although state ethics rules have some commonality, the variations make

no overall sense and a uniform national pattern is desirable when the application to public companies threatens the integrity of the national market in traded securities. A uniform federal position is desirable and
necessary for the protection of investors.
B.
1.

The SEC's Noisy Withdrawal Proposal

The OriginalProposal: Reporting Out by the Issuer'sAttorney

Proposed Section 205.3(d) (1) requires an issuer's attorney, in the
rare situation in which the attorney reasonably believes that: (1) an issuer
has not made an appropriate response to the attorney's prior report of
evidence of a material violation; and (2) "the material violation is ongoing
or is about to occur and is likely to result in substantial injury to the finan3 28
cial interest or property of the issuer or of the investors:"
Commentators have criticized the ABA position that noisy withdrawal does
not disclose information protected by the professional duty of confidentiality. New
York, apparently concerned that the information inferentially disclosed by a notice
of withdrawal of an opinion or representation may reveal protected information,
includes a provision in its confidentiality rule permitting disclosure of the information implicit in withdrawing a tainted opinion or misrepresentation. See N.Y. CODE
OF PROF'L. RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 § 1200.19(c)(5) (2003).
328. When the material violation is not ongoing or about to occur, Section
205.3(d) (2) permits, but does not require, the attorney to withdraw, notify the
Commission and disaffirm any tainted opinions or representations. This provision
is substantially the same as ABA Model Rules 1.6(b)(3), 1.13(c) and 1.16(b), as
amended in August 2003.
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[T]o withdraw forthwith from representing the issuer, indicating
that the withdrawal is based on professional considerations; ...
promptly disaffirm to the Commission any opinion, document,
affirmation, representation, characterization, or the like in a document filed with the Commission, or incorporated into such a
document, that the attorney has prepared or assisted in preparing and that the attorney reasonably believes is or may be materi329
ally false or misleading.
As indicated earlier,33 0 the ethics rules adopted by most American
states reach much the same result when viewed together. In the situation
contemplated by the SEC's noisy withdrawal rule, Rule 1.16(a) requires
the lawyer to withdraw and comments to Rules 1.2 and 4.1 state that public
notice of that withdrawal may be required in some situations. In addition,
the combined effect of ABA Model Rules 1.2(d), 1.16(a) and 4.1 (b), when
Rule 1.6(b)(3) permits disclosure to prevent or rectify a client crime or
fraud in which the lawyer's services have been used, is to require the lawyer to correct the false misrepresentations on which third persons are continuing to rely (Rule 4.1 (b)). Failure to do so would assist the prospective
331
or ongoing client crime or fraud (1.2(d)).
Moreover, the fact that most U.S. jurisdictions conform to such a standard indicates that this requirement is a "minimum standard[ ] of professional conduct for attorneys" of the kind the SEC is required to
promulgate "for attorneys appearing and practicing before the Commission in any way." In a situation involving "a [c]lient's ongoing criminal or
fraudulent act," an attorney is required to reveal confidential information
in forty-four jurisdictions, permitted to do so in three jurisdictions, must
resign in one state and is prohibited from revealing confidential informa332
tion relating to the representation in only three jurisdictions.
The wording of the noisy withdrawal provision suggests that an
outside attorney is required to withdraw from all representation of the
issuer. Section 205.3(d) (1) (A) provides that "[a]n attorney retained by
the issuer [an outside lawyer] shall withdraw from representing the issuer," whereas "[a]n attorney employed by the issuer [an inside lawyer]
shall cease forthwith any participation or assistance in any matter concerning the violation." 333 This may have harsh consequences on the issuerclient when a lawyer in a firm that handles the issuer's securities work is
engaged in a transaction or litigation that is unrelated to the matter that
has been reported. Consideration should be given to whether withdrawal
329.
to resign
330.
331.

An attorney employed by the issuer (an "inside lawyer") is not required
from employment, but must stop working on the matter involved.
See supra Part II.A.2.
See supra Parts II.A.2 and IV.A.

332. See ALAS Memorandum, supra note 222.
333. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d) (1) (A) (2004).
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should be limited to matters that have a substantial relationship to the
material violation.
2.

The Alternative Proposal: Reporting Out by the Issuer

On January 29, 2003, when the Commission adopted its "reporting
up" rule and permissive "reporting out," which are considered in Parts II
and III of this Article, it also proposed an alternative to required noisy
withdrawal which would require the issuer, rather than the reporting attorney, to notify the Commission of the reporting attorney's withdrawal and
33 4
also report "the circumstances related thereto."
Does a permission or requirement that the circumstances of withdrawal be reported infringe the attorney-client privilege? The attorneyclient privilege applies only to communications between lawyers and clients. It does not privilege the underlying facts. Thus, the privilege allows
a client (or its lawyer) to refuse to answer a question in this form: What
did your lawyer tell you? Or, what did you tell your lawyer? The privilege
does not, however, allow a client to refuse to answer questions about a
matter simply because the matter was discussed between lawyer and client.
That is what courts mean when they say that the privilege "does not protect disclosure of the underlying facts by those who communicated with
3 35
the attorney."
A request that the circumstances of withdrawal be revealed is similar
to a discovery request for certain underlying facts. The SEC is not asking
issuers to hand over its lawyer's written reports or summarize the oral advice the lawyer gave. The SEC is not asking issuers to describe the backand-forth between lawyer and client on the matter that was the subject of
the report. What the Commission wants from issuers is two things: one, a
statement that the lawyer has resigned, whenever a resignation is required
by Part 205; and two, a statement that the lawyer's resignation was in connection with the following matter, including a brief description of the matter, with no requirement that the issuer repeat or disclose any of what the
lawyer actually said about the matter.
Does this disclosure threaten the attorney-client privilege because it
amounts to requiring the issuer to make this implicit statement: "My lawyer said that there is evidence that a material violation of law occurred (is
occurring or will occur) in connection with this matter"? We think not.
Courts do not treat the privilege so lightly as to find waiver based on "implicit" references to lawyer-client communications.3 36 The Restatement
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, Section 79, Comment e, states:

334. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys,
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 33-8186, 68 Fed. Reg. 6824, 6824 n.40 (proposed Jan. 29, 2003) (discussing proposed Section 205.3(e)).
335. See, e.g., Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981).

336. In general, client identity, the fact of consultation and fee payment are
not protected by the attorney-client privilege or the professional duty of confidentiality. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 52, § 69 cmt. e. The disclosure by a lawyer of
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Knowledge by the nonprivileged person that the client consulted
a lawyer does not result in waiver, nor does disclosure of nonprivileged portions of a communication or its general subject matter.
Public disclosure of facts that were discussed in confidence with a
lawyer does not waive the privilege if the disclosure does not also
33 7
reveal that they were communicated to the lawyer.
The more general concern that a noisy withdrawal rule will undermine the attorney-client relationship because "our clients will not confide
in us anymore" is a makeweight-rhetoric without substance. Why? The
people who might be engaged in wrongdoing (e.g., corporate managers
who are violating fiduciary duties to the issuer or engaging in law violations that will harm the issuer as well as investors) have no privilege now
and no legitimate claim of confidentiality. The privilege and the duty to
keep confidences belong to the entity, not the managers or the directors.
338
Either can be waived by future managers or trustees in bankruptcy.
Lawyers can disclose confidences in every state to defend themselves when
necessary, even before the filing of actual charges or a complaint. 339 Lawyers can disclose confidences to collect a fee, when necessary. The crimefraud exception to the privilege leaves unprivileged all communications of
the client or its agents made in furtherance of illegality. And in most
states, lawyers are already permitted, and in some cases required, to disclose client fraud. With all these exceptions to confidentiality and the
privilege extant, the idea that noisy withdrawal or the alternative's "circumstances" provision would suddenly result in clients not talking to their
lawyers is untenable.
Corporate clients (through their agents) confide in corporate lawyers
(to the extent they do, which is now imperfect and always will be) because
corporations need legal advice to carry on their businesses. Period. There
is no evidence whatsoever that corporate clients have avoided lawyers in
those few states that now require disclosure of a client illegality (e.g., New
Jersey) or those jurisdictions that permit such disclosure (e.g., Pennthe fact of representation or the general nature of the representation does not
constitute a waiver of the privileged communications themselves. See supra Part
II.A.3 (discussing general rule that lawyer's disclosure of confidential information,
adverse to client and without client's consent, pursuant to ethics rule permitting or
requiring disclosure, does not constitute waiver of privileged communication).

337.

RESTATEMENT,

supra note 52, § 79 cmt. e (emphasis added).

338. See Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343,
349 (1985) (noting that when control of corporation passes to new management,
so too does authority to raise or waive attorney-client privilege). The privilege belongs to the entity, not to individual officers and may be waived by the board of
directors or a person authorized by the board to act for it. See id. The successor in
interest of the entity, including the trustee of a bankrupt entity, may waive the
privilege over the objections of its former or current officers. See id. at 354.
339. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 52, § 64 cmt. a (providing exception to general duty of confidentiality that "gives a lawyer limited permission to employ confidential client information to defend against a threatened accusation that the
lawyer ... acted wrongfully in the course of representing a client").
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sylvania), as distinct from the few that prohibit disclosure (e.g., District of
Columbia). There is no evidence that lawyers in such states are told less
than lawyers in other states. Corporate clients that function across state
lines, as so many do, have a fairly wide choice of states from which they
may secure outside lawyers. No evidence exists that lawyers in disclosure
states have suffered at all or that the quality of representation or compliance with law in those states has been reduced.
Moreover, securities laws now require issuers to disclose a contingent
liability when that liability is likely to be significant enough to be of concern to investors. Any such disclosure involves as much of an implicit
statement about what a lawyer told the issuer as the "circumstances" provision of the alternative proposal of a report by the issuer to the SEC would
require. In sum, eliminating the "circumstances" provision would render
the alternative less protective than the original proposal. It should not be
eliminated. If it is, the original proposal requiring the reporting lawyer to
notify the Commission should be adopted. Whatever version of the rule is
adopted should include the requirement that the lawyer disaffirm any
opinions or representations that the lawyer reasonably believes are or may
be materially false or misleading. This additional step is required to ensure that these "minimum" standards are not lower than the fraud provisions of the securities laws or the ethics rules of most states.
C. Does Noisy Withdrawal Undermine Confidentiality and Adversely Affect the
Lawyer-Client Relationship?
The major argument against broadening exceptions to confidentiality
is that clients will be deterred from confiding information to their lawyers.
The lack of candor on the part of clients, it is said, will make it difficult for
a lawyer to give informed advice. The "sound advice" and "sound administration of justice" thought to result from this highly confidential relationship will not be achieved.3 4 0 Moreover, the ability of the lawyer to disclose
client information may diminish client trust and adversely affect the quality of the relationship and the single-mindedness with which the lawyer
pursues the client's interests. If and when the lawyer informs the client
that disclosure is desirable or contemplated, a serious conflict of interest
arises between the lawyer and the client. The relationship ends in bitterness and a sense of betrayal.
There are several responses to these arguments. First, significant exceptions to both the professional duty and to the attorney-client privilege
are long-standing and have not had the consequences that are feared.
The self-defense and crime-fraud exceptions involve situations that arise
340. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (stating utilitarian justifications for corporate

attorney-client privilege). Communications made to corporation's lawyer by lowerlevel corporate employees who were not in "control group" were protected by attorney-client privilege when made to counsel at direction of corporate superiors to
secure legal advice from counsel.
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quite frequently and have limited lawyer secrecy from the very beginning.
There is no evidence that those broad exceptions have had undesirable
effects on the candor with which clients communicate to lawyers. There is
no reason to believe that a slight broadening of the exceptions in situations that arise less frequently will have any discernible effect.
A great deal of romanticism often surrounds discussion of "trust" and
"candor" in the lawyer-client relationship. Studies indicate that mistrust
and suspicion are frequently encountered in the relationship; lawyers frequently state that clients are unwilling to reveal embarrassing or sensitive
facts, which need to be dynamited out of them; and factors that restrict
candor operate in various practice contexts in powerful ways. 34 1 In the
criminal defense field, for example, both lawyer and client have powerful
incentives not to candidly discuss facts relating directly to guilt.
Second, the available empirical evidence, albeit limited, suggests that
most lawyers and clients expect that confidentiality will be breached when
extremely important interests of third persons or courts would be impaired.3 42 Nor is there any indication that clients are more candid with
their lawyers in jurisdictions that have fewer exceptions to confidentiality
than they are in jurisdictions with broader exceptions. Any objective observer must concede that there is insufficient solid empirical evidence to
support firm conclusions in either direction. Do New Jersey lawyers, who
are required to disclose to rectify a client's prior fraud on a third person,
have an inferior relationship with their corporate clients than those in the
District of Columbia, where such disclosure is prohibited? When severe
harm, which could be prevented by disclosure, is threatened, the reality of
that more certain interest should be preferred to dubious assumptions
about effects on client candor.
Third, the confidentiality interests of public companies regulated by
the SEC have less a moral claim for protection than those of private individuals who are suddenly confronted with a legal problem that requires a
lawyer. 343 Inexperienced individual clients, unfamiliar with legal matters
and fearful of their predicament, have confidentiality interests that derive
in part from constitutional provisions involving individual rights, especially

GEO.

341. See, e.g.,
Robert A. Burt, Conflict and Trust Between Attorney and Client, 69
L.J. 1015, 1015 (1981) ("Many attorneys and clients mistrust one another

notwithstanding their initial hopes and the insistence of the profession's formal
norms that a proper relationship requires mutual trust.").
342. See Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IowA L. REv. 351, 377-

78 (1989) (discussing attitudes of general public and of lawyers regarding lawyers'
obligations to disclose confidential information when questioned by court).
343. See, e.g.,
MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 197
(1990). Freedman's well-known argument for nearly absolute confidentiality relies

heavily on the special constitutional protections afforded individual criminal defendants, a principle that never applies to public companies. See id. at 103-07 (criticizing leniency of Model Rules in permitting disclosure of confidential client
information in situations other than those in which it is necessary to avoid death or
serious bodily harm).
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the special protections given to criminal defendants. On the other hand,
a public corporation has neither a "soul to be damned [nor] body to be
kicked."

3 44

The public companies regulated by the SEC have many public obligations, operate in a goldfish bowl of scrutiny and have large experience and
sophistication concerning the hiring, supervision and firing of lawyers.
They are sophisticated repeat-players who use law regularly in carrying on
their business, entering into transactions, dealing with regulatory authorities and participating in litigation. They are the major group of clients
who are well informed about the details of the attorney-client privilege
and the exceptions to it, the work-product immunity and the professional
duty of confidentiality. They are also clients whose managers may have a
large economic incentive to use lawyer secrecy to delay compliance with
regulations or to conceal ongoing violations of them. This group of clients has many advantages in litigation over those with less resources, experience and staying power.3 4 5 The social value of secrecy versus disclosure
is less when one is dealing not with individual citizens encountering law
for the first time, but with large and informed repeat-players, profit-making organizations that have strong incentives to delay or conceal compliance with regulatory requirements that impose substantial costs.
Fourth, one useful aspect of disciplinary requirements is to allow a
lawyer to deflect responsibility for thwarting a client's will from the lawyer
to the rule. The ability to say, "I have no choice" stiffens the spine of a
lawyer by blaming the command of law. It also threatens the lawyer with
liability or discipline if the lawyer disobeys. Equally important, it warns the
client that help cannot be obtained from other lawyers, who would be subject to the same constraint. Even if lawyers would prefer not to have to
exercise judgment about the legality of the actions of a client's agent, a
strong reporting rule is likely to be better than a discretionary rule because it eliminates the lawyer's worry that the client will take the problem
and attendant legal matters to a more malleable lawyer.
Fifth, as indicated at the end of Part IV.B.2. above, a lawyer's public
disclosure of his or her withdrawal and the general nature of the matter
3 46
involved, does not violate or waive the client's attorney-client privilege.
Finally, there is no evidence that exceptions to confidentiality have
led or will lead to frequent whistle-blowing on the part of lawyers. Indeed,
it is clear that the incidence of whistle-blowing by lawyers is astonishingly
344. John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick ": An Unscandalized
Inquiry into the Problem of CorporatePunishment, 79 MICH. L. Rv.386, 386 (1981)
(quoting Edward, First Baron Thurlow (1731-1806)).
345. See, e.g.,
Marc Galanter, Why the Haves Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 95, 97-104 (1974) (discussing advantages

of "repeat players," such as corporations, over those with less litigation experience
or familiarity with court system).
346. For a further discussion of the withdrawing lawyer's obligations and du-

ties of confidentiality owed to its former clients, see supra notes 338-45 and accompanying text.
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low given the fact that most or all states require disclosure when a crime or
fraud has been perpetrated on a tribunal. Thirty-seven states permit disclosure to prevent a client criminal fraud and four with many lawyers require disclosure in that situation. Disciplinary proceedings for failing to
disclose information when required to do so are virtually non-existent and
the same is true for failure to withdraw when withdrawal is required. On
the other hand, law firms that learn that a client has used their services to
defraud others and who have taken no action to prevent or stop the fraud
have frequently settled malpractice and third-party liability claims for large
amounts. Further, available evidence indicates that lawyers who have discretion to disclose almost always decide not to do so, even when that
course of action risks civil liability. The objection to rules permitting or
requiring disclosure is not that they will lead to professional discipline, but
the effect of the existence of such rules on the likelihood and success of
the malpractice and third-party liability claims. Such claims are the real
risk and, prior to the SEC's implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley, the principal deterrent force.
V.
A.
1.

THE

SPIEGEL CASE

"Reporting Up" in the Spiegel Case

The Relevant Facts

The report of Stephen J. Crimmins, the examiner appointed by the
347
atdistrict court in the SEC's enforcement proceeding against Spiegel,
tributes Spiegel's financial decline in 1999-2001 to an attempt to improve
poor sales performance in its retail subsidiaries by providing easy credit to
customers who often could not get credit elsewhere. 348 This strategy resulted in deterioration of Spiegel's financial condition when the 1990s
boom ended and increased credit card losses triggered Spiegel's securitization obligations on its receivables. 349 In 2001, Spiegel's financial condition worsened and it breached all four loan covenants in its bank loan
agreements. 3 50 On February 7, 2002, after efforts at renegotiating financing failed, Spiegel's auditor, KMPG, advised the company that a "going
concern" opinion would have to be included in its 2001 Form 10-K to the
SEC, due at the end of March 2002.351 A going concern opinion is a pub-

lic warning of the auditor's substantial doubt about a company's ability to
remain in business. A few weeks later Spiegel announced in a press re347. See Crimmins Report, supra note 41.
348. See id. at 2 (discussing tactics employed by Spiegel to boost short-term
profit margins).
349. See id. at 2-3 (noting that when economy "soured," many high-risk Spiegel customers stopped paying their credit card bills).
350. See id. at 3 (stating that impending bankruptcy and worsening financial
condition resulted in Spiegel's breach of its loan agreements).
351. See id. (providing opinion of Spiegel's auditor, KMPG, as to Spiegel's
declining financial health).
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lease that it would record a $398 million 2001 loss, but other facts in the
'352
release "seriously understated Spiegel's desperate circumstances.
When more bad news concerning sale of Spiegel's credit card business and possible refinancing came from Spiegel's investment bankers in
March, a crisis meeting of Spiegel's executive committee, which was empowered to act for the full board, was held on May 31, 2002, in Hamburg,
Germany. 353 The board participants were Michael Otto, the sole voting
stockholder, who owned ninety percent of Spiegel stock and two of his
business associates, Cruesemann and Zapfel. 354 The meeting was preceded by earlier meetings discussing all of the financial problems faced by
Spiegel, as well as its disclosure obligations under federal securities
laws. 35 5 The Form 10-K for 2001, which included KPMG's going concern
warning, had been prepared by Spiegel's securities lawyers (Kirkland) and
35
was virtually ready for filing.

6

At the meeting on May 31, the committee, rejecting the advice of all
of the Chicago-based managers of Spiegel, Kirkland and its auditor
(KPMG), decided to file a notification of delayed filing. 357 On April 1,

2002, Spiegel filed the Form 12b-25 notice of delayed filing that also had
been previously drafted by Kirkland. 35 The Form 12b-25 filing stated that
the 2001 annual report could not be filed because Spiegel was not currently in compliance with its 2001 loan covenants and had reached a strategic decision to sell its credit card subsidiary that, "as disclosed in the
Company's press release of February 21, 2002, [will result] in a significant
loss."3 5 9 The same statements were included in subsequent quarterly fil-

ings for 2002.
Examiner Crimmins concludes in his report that this notification of
delayed filing was false and misleading because it failed to reveal the real
reason for not filing the required annual report: KMPG's opinion that the
annual filing had to include the going concern warning and Spiegel's
fears that the warning would cause suppliers to refuse to sell goods to Spiegel on credit, depress its stock price and adversely affect sales and em352. Id. at 44 ("Spiegel's February 2002 release said that Spiegel's 2001 net
loss was $398 million, but its actual 2001 net loss was $587 million.").
353. See id. at 45-50 (enumerating topics discussed among Spiegel executives
during May 31 crisis meeting).
354. See id. at 45-46 (noting individuals in attendance at meeting).
355. See id. at 44-45 (characterizing discussions as involving "life threatening"
issues then facing Spiegel).
356. See id. at 50 (stating that at time of meeting in Hamburg, Germany, Form
10-K already was prepared and ready to file).
357. See id. (noting that decision to delay filing was made after consultation
with Spiegel Chairman Michael Otto).
358. See id. (discussing Spiegel's rationale in filing "notification of late filing"
rather than standard Form 10-K).
359. Id. at 50-51 (quoting Spiegel's response to questions asked on Form 12b25 filing).
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ployee morale and turnover. 360 Kirkland, on the other hand, which
drafted the Form 12b-25 language and continued to use the same language in Spiegel's later Forms 12b-25 for its missing quarterly Form 10-Q
reports during the remainder of 2002, contends that a Form 12b-25 is just
notice to the SEC of a missed return and not itself a disclosure document. 36 1 The examiner disagreed, stating that Rule 12b-25 requires both
disclosure of the inability to make a filing "and the reasons therefore in
reasonable detail." 362 The examiner concluded that the real and unstated
reason for the delayed filing and for several subsequent quarterly reports
in 2002, in which the same language was used, was KPMG's going concern
warning and the business consequences it would have for Spiegel. 3 63
Therefore, the failure to provide this material information to investors was
364
fraudulent and misleading.
The net effect was that investors did not learn of KPMG's going concern warning and other materially adverse information until March 2003,
almost a year later. That occurred only when the SEC brought an enforcement proceeding against Spiegel for fraudulently withholding public disclosure of the company's 2001 annual report and subsequent quarterly
reports, each of which failed to disclose KPMG's going concern opinion.
Kirkland had advised Spiegel, both before and during the May 31, 2002
board meeting, that Spiegel was required to file a 2001 annual Form 10-K
including KPMG's going concern warning. 365 On May 15, 2002, Kirkland
gave Sorensen, Spiegel's general counsel, its opinion that failure to file its
Form 10-K could result in an SEC enforcement action against Spiegel, its
officers and directors and its controlling shareholder.3 66 Kirkland also
noted that the SEC could take the position that, in addition to failing to
file, Spiegel had engaged in fraudulent or deceptive conduct, and that the
sanctions could include civil penalties, officer and director bars and crimi36 7
nal prosecution.
360. See id. at 51-52 (concluding that Spiegel's "real reason" for not filing was
its desire to avoid negative publicity that would be created from KPMG's "going
concern" opinion).
361. See id. at 51 n.14 (stating Kirkland's position that purpose of 12b-25 form
is to provide notice only).
362. Id. (quoting applicable provision of governing SEC Rule 12b-25) (emphasis added).
363. See id. at 51.
364. See id. at 5 (noting that Spiegel matter involved "failure to make disclosure of material information about Spiegel's financial condition" and that Spiegel
was charged with fraud for "failing to disclose its auditors' going concern
position").
365. See id. at 80-81 ("By mid-May 2002, Kirkland... had plainly advised Spiegel that it was violating the law by not filing its Form 10-K, and that this illegal act
could have serious consequences, including action by the SEC.").
366. See id.
367. See id. at 64 (describing extent of Kirkland's legal advice concerning SEC
action for Spiegel's failure to file its Form 10-K).
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Did Kirkland Perform Its "Up the CorporateLadder" Report Obligations?

Most of the events considered above, concluding with Spiegel's final
decision at the executive committee meeting on May 31, 2002 to file a
notice of delayed filing of its 2001 annual report, occurred before public
concern about corporate integrity had led to the enactment of SarbanesOxley and the SEC regulation implementing Section 307. Nevertheless, as
indicated in the earlier discussion, state and federal law concerning the
obligation of a securities lawyer in advising a public company concerning
its disclosure obligations recognized then and now the following proposition: A lawyer, in representing an organization, must, when agents of the
organization or the organization itself are considering conduct that would
constitute a violation of law, act in the best interest of the organization,
which may require a lawyer in some circumstances to report the prospec368
tive law violation to the organization's highest authority.
Kirkland's conduct prior to the end of May 2002 conformed to this
requirement.3 69 Kirkland advised Spiegel managers of Spiegel's disclosure obligations under federal securities law and persuaded them that the
2001 annual report should include KPMG's going concern warning. Kirkland provided the same advice to the Spiegel executive committee, acting
for the full board, at and before the May 31, 2002 meeting in Hamburg,
where the decision was made to file a notice of delayed filing. The board
participants in the final decision, including the sole voting stockholder,
Michael Otto, were advised of the risks involved in filing a notice of
delayed filing that did not fully and fairly state the reasons for doing so.
B.
1.

Lawyer Conduct in the Spiegel Case: Withdrawal and Disclosure

Facts Reported by the Examiner in the Spiegel Case

When Robert Sorensen joined Spiegel as its general counsel in June
2001, Kirkland was retained as Spiegel's principal outside counsel "to provide additional depth in corporate and securities matters." 370 Kirkland
replaced Rooks & Pitts, which continued to represent Spiegel in securitization and other matters. "[B]y mid-May 2002, Kirkland . . . had plainly
368. See MODEL RULES 2003, supra note 32, R. 1.13(b) (stating that organization's lawyer may be required to refer matter to "higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted by the seriousness of the matter, referral to the
highest authority than can act on behalf of the organization"). Comment 4 to
Model Rule 1.13 provides: "The organization's highest authority to whom a matter
may be referred ordinarily will be the board of directors or similar governing body.
However, applicable law may prescribe that under certain conditions the highest
authority reposes elsewhere, for example, in the independent directors of a corporation." Id. R. 1.13 cmt. 4. See also Comment 8, which states, "Whether such warning should be given by the lawyer for the organization to any constituent individual
may turn on the facts of each case." Id. R. 1.13 cmt. 8.
369. The implications of Kirkland's role in drafting and approving the misleading language in Spiegel's March 29, 2002 notice of delayed filing and in subsequent quarterly filings are considered in Part III.C. of this Article.
370. Crimmins Report, supra note 41, at 80.
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advised Spiegel that it was violating the law by not filing its [2001] Form
-a71
10-K, and that this illegal act could have serious consequences ....
Sorensen concurred with this advice, and it was communicated to Zapfel,
Spiegel's president and a member of the board committee empowered to
act for the full board. By the end of May 2002, Kirkland's advice had been
reported to Otto and Cruesemann, the other two members of the board
committee. As discussed earlier, Kirkland reported its opinion of a material violation to Spiegel's CLO, Sorensen, and to the appropriate board
committee.3 72 If SEC Part 205 had been in effect at the time, Kirkland
would have been in full compliance with it through the end of May 2002,
when the final decision not to file the 2001 Form 10-K was made by the
board committee.
White & Case became involved in Spiegel's affairs as counsel for Spiegel's sole voting shareholder, Michael Otto, and his corporate interests.
"Through its Hamburg partner, Urs Aschenbrenner, White & Case 'interpreted' for the Otto interests the advice received from Spiegel's U.S. legal
advisers, and it clearly played a substantial role in helping Otto and the
Spiegel board committee evaluate that advice . . . during much of
2002." 3 7 3 At the critical May 31, 2002 meeting, Aschenbrenner was pre-

sent and "was heard to challenge Kirkland & Ellis' advice on the need to
file Spiegel's Form 10-K and the consequences of non-filing."3 74 Subsequently, "neither Aschenbrenner nor his New York partners did anything
to express their agreement with Kirkland & Ellis' advice. '3 75 Through the
balance of 2002, none of the lawyers did anything "to press Spiegel to
make its required filings.., or otherwise to update, supplement or correct
3 76
disclosures made in Spiegel's Forms 12b-25 and/or its press releases."
After May 2002, Spiegel's German directors considered replacing Kirkland and Sorensen, viewing them as pessimists who were exaggerating
the seriousness of the situation. 377 The effort failed when U.S. management pointed out the cost of bringing in a new firm to draft documentation for Spiegel's refinancing and other pending matters.
Meanwhile, White & Case, "ostensibly still only counsel for Spiegel's
sole voting shareholder," assumed a prominent role in Spiegel's search for
refinancing. 378 White & Case never reported any concerns about Spie371. Id.
372. See id. at 80-81 (noting Kirkland's admonition to Spiegel's general coun-

sel and board meeting members). For a further discussion of Kirkland's actions in
this regard, see supra notes 358-59 and accompanying text.
373. Crimmins Report, supra note 41, at 81.
374. Id. at 82.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. See id. (noting that term "black painters" was used by German directors
to describe Spiegel's U.S. management team).
378. Id. at 83 (discussing role of White & Case in Spiegel's refinancing
efforts).
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gel's disclosure obligations "up the ladder" to the company's audit and
3 79
board committees.
Kirkland, until the SEC fraud proceeding against Spiegel was filed in
March 2003, continued to prepare and file Spiegel's Forms 12b-25, providing public notice of Spiegel's failure to file its required quarterly reports
for the balance of 2002. These filings repeated that Spiegel was not filing
its reports because it was "not currently in compliance with 2001 loan covenants and is currently working with its bank group to amend and replace
its existing credit facilities," and, thus, "not in a position to issue financial
s
"Of course, as Kirkstatements ... pending resolution of this issue."380
land & Ellis knew, the real reason why Spiegel was not filing its periodic
reports was that it did not want to disclose KPMG's going concern qualification and other material bad facts and circumstances threatening Spie38 1
gel's survival."
The examiner makes a pointed reference to the SEC's proposed noisy
withdrawal rule:
None of Spiegel's legal advisers withdrew-"noisily" or otherwise-from representing Spiegel. If the SEC's proposed withdrawal rule had then been in effect, the SEC would have been
alerted to take action sooner, and investors would have received
information they could have acted on to make informed investment decisions about Spiegel. In this case, the absence of a
"noisy withdrawal" requirement allowed Spiegel to keep investors
382
and the SEC in the dark.
2.

Kirkland's Failure to Withdraw, Disaffirm Filings and Notify the SEC

Spiegel's principal place of business is in Illinois, and Kirkland is a
Chicago law firm. We assume that the client-lawyer relationship was
formed in Illinois and the representation largely took place in Illinois. If
so, Kirkland's conduct in representing Spiegel must be examined under
Illinois law and professional rules.
According to the ALAS chart summarizing the position of all states
and the District of Columbia on disclosure of client confidences, the applicable Illinois ethics rules are as follows: the Illinois rules pennit a lawyer to
disclose a client's intention to commit a criminal fraud likely to result to
injury to the financial interest or property of another party; prohibit a lawyer from disclosing a client's intention to commit a non-criminal fraud
likely to result in injury to the financial interest or property of another
379. See id. (concluding that if White & Case had reported its views concerning Kirkland & Ellis "up the ladder," Spiegel may well have avoided SEC fraud
charge).
380. Id. (quoting Spiegel's response in completing Forms 12b-25 during
course of 2002).
381. Id.
382. Id. at 84.
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party; and require a lawyer to reveal confidential information relating to a
38 3
client's ongoing criminal and fraudulent act.

The result in the latter situation, which was involved in Kirkland's representation of Spiegel, comes about because of the relationship of Rule
4.1(b) to Rules 1.2(d), 1.16(a) and 1.6. Here is the ALAS explanation for
the required disclosure:
Although the lawyer [in this situation of an ongoing client crime

or fraud] is prohibited by the final clause of [Rule 4.1(b)] from
explicitly disclosing that the client is concealing or misrepresenting material facts, the lawyer in this situation is required by Rules
1.2(d) and 1.16(a) (1) to resign forthwith as counsel if the client
cannot be persuaded to correct the record. Further, under Official Comment [14] to Rule 1.6 ....

the lawyer after resigning

may also noisily "withdraw or disaffirm" any fraudulent statement
of the client with which the lawyer might be deemed to be associated by reason of the lawyer's prior presence in the transaction as
the client's counsel. In other words, . . . Rule 4.1(b) does not

permit "whistle-blowing" in the normal sense, but (when interpreted in harmony with Rules 1.2(d) and 1.16(a)(1)), it clearly
requires a certain amount of flag-waving that will alert even the

most naive citizen to the fact that the lawyer's client has probably
concealed or misrepresented material facts. .

.

. Additionally,

where the client's behavior constitutes continuing misconduct,
the permissive disclosure provision of [the Illinois version of Rule
1.6(b)] comes into play.... If disclosure of a client's intent to
commit a crime or fraud is permitted under Rule 1.6, then such
disclosure becomes mandatory under [the "shall not knowingly
fail to disclose" language of] Rule 4.1(b) if the situation also
3 84
meets the requirements of that Rule.
The law in its various forms (tort law, criminal law and the law governing lawyers) "prohibits a lawyer from knowingly counseling or assisting
a client to commit a crime or fraud." 385 Although Kirkland, as it should
have, gave its honest opinion about the actual consequences that ap383. See ALAS Memorandum, supra note 222, at 132-38 (reprinting ALAS
chart indicating provisions adopted by Illinois).
384. Id. at 139 n.3. In Spiegel's case, the "record" referred to in the ALAS
explanation included material false statements previously made to the SEC by Kirkland in drafting and approving Spiegel's required filings as a public company. See
Crimmins Report, supra note 41, at 4-6 (summarizing extent of Spiegel's fraudulent disclosures). Here, Kirkland failed in fulfilling its obligation under Rule 4.1
when it did not disclose Spiegel's prior fraudulent statements to the SEC and its
investors. See ALAS Memorandum, supra note 222, at 139 (noting that attorney
violates Rule 4.1 when it fails to disclose material fact to third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting criminal or fraudulent act by client, such as by
continuing representation when attorney knows that prior false statement was
made in course of representation).

385.

MODEL RULES

2003, supra note 32, R. 1.2 cmt. 9.
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peared to be likely to result from Spiegel's conduct, its responsibility became "especially delicate" after Spiegel had committed itself to a
fraudulent course of conduct. 38 6 At that point, according to the current
Comment 10 to ABA Model Rule 1.2:
[A] lawyer is required to avoid assisting the client, for example,
by drafting or delivering documents that the lawyer knows are
fraudulent ....
A lawyer may not continue assisting a client in
conduct that the lawyer originally supposed was legally proper
but then discovers is criminal or fraudulent. The lawyer must,
therefore, withdraw from the representation of the client in the
387
matter. See Rule 1.16(a).
But Comment 10 does not stop at this point. It states further that,
n some cases, withdrawal alone might be insufficient. It may be necessary for the lawyer to give notice of the fact of withdrawal and to disaffirm
any opinion, document, affirmation or the like. See Rule 4.1"388 Turning
to Rule 4.1, Comment 3 provides, "In extreme cases, substantive law may
require a lawyer to disclose information relating to the representation to
389
avoid being deemed to have assisted the client's crime or fraud."
We think the statements in Comment 10 to Rule 1.2(d) correctly summarize Kirkland's obligations in the situation it faced after May 31,
2002.390 Kirkland knew and had repeatedly advised that Spiegel would be
violating the securities laws by failing to file an annual report that, if filed,
would have to contain bad news for Spiegel's investors, suppliers and employees. Any further act, such as filing quarterly notices covering the bal386. See id. at cmt. 10 ("When a client's course of action has already begun

and is continuing, the lawyer's responsibility is especially delicate.").
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id. R. 4.1 cmt. 3.
390. The text presents its argument in terms of the general ethics law prevailing in the United States today. Although Illinois has not adopted the language
from the ABA comments quoted in the text, the result would be the same under
the applicable Illinois rules. Rule 1.6(c) (2) of those rules permits a lawyer to "use
or reveal ... the intention of a client to commit a crime .... " ILL. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.6(c) (2) (2003). Rule 4.1(b) provides that "[i]n the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not . . . fail to disclose a material fact to a third
person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act
by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6." Id. R. 4.1(b). Because
disclosure is not prohibited by Illinois Rule 1.6, a lawyer, who, in the course of the
representation, knows that the client has communicated a material fact to a third
person that the lawyer now knows is false, will assist the client's wrongdoing unless
the material fact is corrected. Hence, disclosure is required. See, e.g., Ill. State Bar
Assoc., Formal Op. 93-6 (1994), reprinted in UNWERSITY PUBLICATIONS OF AMERICA,
NATIONAL

REPORTER

ON

LEGAL

ETHICS

AND

PROFESSIONAL

RESPONSIBILITY

IL:

RULES: 4-5 (transfer vol. 1997) (explaining that lawyer who knows that client has
committed tax violations must avoid making false representations about such matters and must ensure in future representation that information is not used by client to perpetrate fraud on third persons).
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ance of 2002 that stated reasons other than the real ones, would be
misleading and fraudulent and, therefore, would and did assist Spiegel's
ongoing fraud.
A Kirkland partner and spokesman, Jack Levin, has been quoted in
the Wall Street Journalas stating, "Spiegel 'decided not to follow our advice"' and that "It]here are no rules that say you must resign if the client
doesn't take your advice." 391 That is a true statement, of course, if the
advice involves a choice that is permitted by law. But if the choice is between a lawful course of conduct and an unlawful one and the client uses
the lawyer's services to choose the unlawful one, the lawyer must resign
because the lawyer cannot continue to represent a client on the matter
when the client refuses to act "within the bounds of the law."
In addition to withdrawal, Kirkland's continued participation in the
drafting and filing of false notices of delayed filing put it in a position in
which it was subject to civil or criminal charges by the SEC for aiding and
abetting a securities fraud. Although third-party civil liability for assisting
a client's securities fraud has been eliminated by the CentralBank decision,
Kirkland's role in drafting and approving the filings may subject it to civil
liability under federal securities law as a participant in the fraud or for
3 92
negligent misrepresentation under Illinois law.

Finally, Part 205 became effective on August 5, 2003. Section
205.3(d) (2)(iii) permits disclosure of confidential information "[t]o rectify the consequences of a material violation by the issuer that caused...
substantial injury to the financial interest or property of the issuer or investors in the furtherance of which the attorney's services were used."3 93 The
language has a literal application to Kirkland, which was appearing and
practicing before the Commission in preparing and filing Spiegel's securities filings. There is nothing in the language that makes it applicable only
to representation or client acts that occurred after the effective date of the
regulation. Of course, reporting in the Spiegel situation would serve no
purpose now that the SEC proceeding and the bankruptcy examination
has revealed the relevant information. However, other law firms, facing a
situation in which they now know of an ongoing client fraud that has not
become publicly known, can use the leverage provided by the SEC's rectification provision to force a client or former client to face the consequences
of the client's past fraud, whether or not state ethics rules permit disclosure under the same circumstances.
391. See Weil & Bryan-Low, supra note 36.
392. See Greycas v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560, 1565 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that
lawyer's false representations in opinion letter constituted negligent misrepresentation under Illinois law); In re Enron Corp. Sec., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 704-05 (S.D.
Tex. 2002) (dismissing law firm's summary judgment motion on grounds that
plaintiff had sufficiently pled firm's participation in client's fraudulent conduct to
such extent that firm could be subject to primary liability if allegations proved

true).
393. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2)(iii) (2004).
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Was White & Case Required to Withdraw, Disaffirm Documents or Disclose
to the SEC?

White & Case, according to the Wall Street Journal article, takes the
position that it represented only the Otto interests, not Spiegel, implying
that it had no duties to Spiegel.3 94 That premise is questionable.3 95 First,
White & Case played an important role in Spiegel's decision not to file the
required 2001 Form 10-K. The minutes of a critical May 31, 2002 meeting
of the audit committee, prior to the executive committee decision later in
the day when the decision not to file a 2001 Form 10-K was made, state
that the audit committee engaged in "intensive discussion, careful deliberation and consultation with [Spiegel's] outside law firm (White & Case)"
concerning the Form 10-K filing issue. 39 6 Prior to the meeting, Aschenbrenner, White & Case's Hamburg partner, e-mailed his New York partners for "urgent" advice as to "whether we file the 10-K later today with the
'going concern' opinion."3 9 7 The examiner's report indicates that it is not
clear whether such advice was received. 3 98 During the audit committee
meeting, the Kirkland partner responsible for Spiegel's securities filings
was consulted by telephone. He later stated that he gave "unequivocal"
and "heated" advice that Spiegel's failure to file was "illegal" and might
result in liability of Spiegel and its individual officers.3 99 Nevertheless, the
audit committee was persuaded by Aschenbrenner's contrary advice that
"it was unacceptable to file the Form 10-K as long as it contained a going
concern opinion." 40 0 The audit committee recommended that Spiegel
delay filing its Form 10-K "until financing is in place with [Spiegel's] lenders and an unqualified opinion is received from KPMG." 40 1 Later that
same day, the board committee accepted that recommendation.
Second, from that date on, White & Case took the leading role in
representing Spiegel in its efforts to obtain refinancing. 40 2 The nature
and extent of White & Case's participation in Spiegel's decision not to file
its 2001 Form 10-K suggest that a lawyer-client relationship with Spiegel
may have been established. If so, White & Case owed Spiegel all the duties
a lawyer owes to an organizational client.
394. See Weil & Bryan-Low, supra note 36, at C1 (reporting that White & Case

regarded Otto Versand as its sole client).
395. See Crimmins Report, supra note 41, at 70-72 (discussing participation of
White & Case counsel in meetings with Spiegel's audit committee in which decision was reached to delay filing of SEC Form 10-K).
396. Id. at 71-72 (quoting minutes taken at Spiegel audit committee meeting
in Hamburg on May 31, 2002).
397. Id. at 70.
398. See id. (making no mention of response from Aschenbrenner's partners).
399. See id. at 71 (providing lawyer's advice that it would be "illegal and would

be breaking the law for Spiegel not to file [the Form 10-K]").
400. Id.
401. Id. at 72 (quoting minutes from audit committee meeting).
402. See id. at 78-79 (indicating that White & Case assumed lead role in negotiating new financing arrangement for Spiegel).
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An alternative argument is worth considering. Even if Michael Otto
and his German financial interests were the sole client of White & Case,
Otto, as sole voting shareholder of Spiegel and as a director and member
of the board committee that acted for the full board, had fiduciary duties
to protect Spiegel from harm flowing from illegal conduct. 40 3 Present or
developing corporation law may include a duty of care on directors and
those in control to prevent the company from suffering serious legal
harm. 40 4 If so, the lawyers representing Spiegel's sole controlling shareholder had a derivative duty to Spiegel to prevent it from such harm.
In making these statements, we are asking questions and proposing
possibilities, not reporting clearly established fact or law. But there are
signs that corporate law is moving in this direction. If so, the analysis of
the conduct of White & Case would be similar to that provided with respect to Kirkland.
The White & Case situation also poses an interesting question under
Sarbanes-Oxley. Was White & Case, even if its sole client was Otto and his
German financial interests, "appearing and practicing before the Commission" when it refused to endorse Kirkland's advice that failure to file the
Form 10-K constituted a violation of the law? This question is especially
significant when considering that White & Case knew that Otto's control
of Spiegel made his view and vote decisive in the decision by the German
directors to override the view of Spiegel's U.S. management and its principal outside counsel, Kirkland.
Section 205.2(h), defining "issuer," makes it clear that a lawyer for a
wholly owned subsidiary of an issuer "appears and practices" before the
Commission where the services are provided for the benefit of or on behalf of the issuer. 4 0 5 Here, we have a situation in which the sole control403. As sole controlling shareholder and director who could control Spiegel
decisions, Otto had fiduciary duties to Spiegel. The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers states: "[I] f the lawyer represents as a client either the entity or the
constituent owing fiduciary duties, the lawyer may not counsel or assist a breach of
any fiduciary obligation owed by the constituent to the organization." RESTATEMENT, supra note 52, § 96 cmt. g. Aschenbrenner, by urging Otto not to file Spiegel's annual report, may have breached this obligation.
404. Two recent decisions have emphasized the duties of directors to protect
the company from harm. See Geraldine Fabrikant, Private Concern, Public Consequences, N.Y. TIMES,June 15, 2003, at El (reporting decision of U.S. district court in
which officers and directors of Trace International Holdings Corp. were held liable for breach of their fiduciary duty when they "rubber-stamped" actions of chief
executive Marshall Cogan, who looted company of millions of dollars while directors stood by and did nothing); Patrick McGeehan, Case Could Redefine Board Members' Liability, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2003, at CI (discussing Delaware decision
permitting shareholders' suit to proceed against current and former members of
board of Walt Disney Company alleging that board's failure to participate meaningfully in compensation arrangements made by Disney's CEO, Michael Eisner,
with President, Michael Ovitz, led to compensation of about $138 million for
Ovitz's fourteen-months service with company).
405. For a further discussion of how the term "issuer" is defined for purposes
of enforcing SEC regulations, see supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
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ling stockholder, represented by a law firm, is taking positions and
exercising authority concerning the required filings of the controlled
company. If the situation arose today, with Part 205 in effect, a law firm in
White & Case's situation might reasonably be viewed as being covered by
the Rule and subject to its report obligation.
C.

The Spiegel Case Indicates Why the SEC Should Require Noisy Withdrawal

The vigorous objections of many bar associations, law firms and lawyers to the Commission's proposed rule requiring noisy withdrawal are
usually predicated on the assertion that the permissive disclosure required
by most states' ethics rules and by Section 205.3(d) is sufficient to protect
issuers and investors from prospective or ongoing violations of law by public companies. The American experience with corporate fraud in recent
decades, reinforced by the events of recent years, supports a contrary
conclusion.
Lawyers for public companies have not exercised the authority given
under state ethics rules to disclose prospective or ongoing illegality by the
corporate managers who hire and can fire them. Many lawyers confronted
with client fraud situations have not reported the material violations of law
up the corporate ladder. Moreover, many have not withdrawn even when
ethics rules required them to do so; if they did withdraw, they did so silently, often without notifying the highest authority of the company of the
reasons for withdrawal. And many corporate lawyers, such as the Kirkland
partner quoted in the Wall Street Journal article to the effect that no rule
even required Kirkland to withdraw, 40 6 appear to be oblivious to the arguments made by the ABA, ALAS and by this Article that the combined effect of Rules 1.2(d), 1.16(a) and 4.1(b), when permissive disclosure is
provided by the state's equivalent of Rule 1.6, requires a lawyer to withdraw, to disaffirm false documents or representations and, in many jurisdictions, to disclose information to persons who are being or will be
harmed by an ongoing client crime or fraud.
Experience also tells us that professional discipline is never invoked
to punish and deter these violations of existing state rules in complex client fraud situations involving difficult issues of what the lawyer knew when
the lawyer acted or failed to act. Many client fraud situations, witness Enron, involve complex and multiple transactions and raise difficult legal
and factual issues. There also is the difficulty, in a disciplinary context, of
pinning responsibility on particular lawyers within the law firm. The principal deterrent force has been the fear of law firms that silent withdrawal
will be insufficient to protect the law firm from civil liability to those
harmed by the client's fraud: liability to the corporate client in a malpractice action when bankruptcy has occurred or new management is put in
406. See Weil & Bryan-Low, supra note 36, at C1 (stating Kirkland's position
that withdrawal was not mandated, even though Kirkland knew of Spiegel's fraudulent practices).
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place, or to third persons in actions for negligent misrepresentation or for
state or federal securities law violations.
However, the most effective civil remedy-third-party liability for aiding and abetting a federal securities fraud-was eliminated by Central
Bank40 7 and Congress's refusal to undo that decision when it passed the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. 40 8

These changes left private

plaintiffs with only the more difficult cause of action against the law firm
40 9
as a principal participant in the fraud rather than a secondary actor.
The normal role of a lawyer, of course, is to be a secondary actor: to provide advice and assistance within the bounds of the law. The absence of
such third-party civil liability requires the SEC to be vigilant in exercising
its authority to proceed against law firms that have assisted an issuer in
violating the securities laws.
If the facts recited by Examiner Crimmins in the Spiegel case turn out
to be true, along with his legal conclusions that Spiegel's notices of
delayed filing were false and misleading in violation of federal securities
laws, and known to be such by the Kirkland firm, the case provides an
object lesson of the failure of existing law and the need for adoption by
the Commission of its proposed noisy withdrawal provision in one of the
forms proposed.
Spiegel, thus viewed, is a situation in which a major law firm (perhaps
two such law firms), knowing that an ongoing criminal fraud was taking
407. 511 U.S. 164, 190-91 (1994) (overruling long-standing federal decisional
law and holding that secondary actor in securities transaction (e.g., lawyer or accountant) is not liable for damages in private cause of action for aiding and abetting securities violation). The decision did not affect the SEC's authority under
statute to bring an enforcement action for aiding and abetting a securities violation. But it requires private plaintiffs to cast the defendant as a primary violator of
Section 10(b), i.e., that the defendant engaged in manipulative or deceptive acts
or made fraudulent representations rather than merely assisted in the acts. See,
e.g., Jill Fisch, The Scope of Private Securities Litigation: In Search of Liability Standards
for Secondary Defendants, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1293, 1298 (1999) ("Nonetheless, the

Court explicitly stated that outside professionals could still be liable under Section
10(b) as long as the requirements for primary liability were met.").
408. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No.
105-353 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq.). Although Central Bank did not consider and thus did not change the SEC's ability to bring suits for aiding and abetting, Congress did not consider and change that authority. Under the PSLRA, the
SEC's authority to bring suits for aiding and abetting is explicitly recognized, but
to establish aiding-and-abetting liability, the PSLRA requires the SEC to show that
the defendant acted knowingly and willfully. See 15 U.S.C. § 77t(2) (f) (1995). For
over forty years, the courts had held that a showing of recklessness was sufficient to

establish aiding and abetting in a suit brought by a private party or the SEC. The

PSLRA thus not only refused to reinstate a private cause of action for aiding and
abetting, it also made it more difficult for the SEC to succeed in an aiding-and-

abetting case.
409. For an additional discussion of the various theories under which a law
firm's involvement in a client's ongoing fraud might be considered so substantial
that the firm would be primarily liable under Section 10(b), see In re Enron Corp.
Securities, Derivative & ERISA Litigation, 235 F. Supp. 2d 549 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
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place, did little to prevent or rectify the ongoing fraud. Although Kirkland reported to Spiegel's highest authority, it did not press managers or
directors to file the long overdue 2001 Form-10K annual report. Instead,
the firm continued to file on a quarterly basis a false and misleading notice of delayed filing. This conduct resulted in losses to the issuer and to
investors, suppliers, employees and others and could have been prevented
by doing what state ethics rules clearly required. First, the firm should
have remonstrated with the client, and especially its highest authority,
warning the client of the risks incurred by its criminal course of conduct.
Second, as a last resort, the firm should have advised the client of the law
firm's obligation to withdraw and threatened to disclose to the SEC the
reasons for withdrawal. And finally, the firm should have carried out that
threat if the board continued to refuse to comply with the law.
As Examiner Crimmins stated, "[T] his was a case where reporting 'up
the ladder' was not enough. The advice from the lawyers here was rejected by Spiegel's audit and board committees, and the material information that should have reached investors was kept under wraps." 4 10 If the
SEC's proposed noisy withdrawal rule had been in effect, the fraud perpetrated upon Spiegel investors might well have been avoided. 41 1
VI.

CONCLUSION

Three major propositions are advanced in this Article. First, the obligations and permissions conferred on securities lawyers by the SEC's
adopted and proposed rules implementing Section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley
are consistent with and reflect the duties of lawyers under the ethics rules
of the vast majority of American jurisdictions. The characterization of
these rules as novel requirements that would result in a fundamental
change in the relationship of a lawyer to a corporate client is hot air: a
hullabaloo stirred up primarily to defeat or limit a new vehicle of regulation that might, unlike the disciplinary process of the states, provide a substantial deterrent to lawyer assistance of corporate fraud and criminality.
Second, the reporting up obligation of the Commission's Part 205
already has served a valuable function: reminding corporate lawyers that,
under corporate law and state ethics rules, their fundamental obligation is
to the corporate entity, not to the officers who temporarily direct its affairs. 4 12 Informing the ultimate authority-the board of directors-of a
410. Crimmins Report, supra note 41, at 81.
411. See id. at 84 (noting efficacy of noisy withdrawal requirement in this
situation).
412. The first published application of the SEC's reporting up rules occurred
in December 2003. A partner in the New York office of a major firm, Akin Gump
Strauss Hauer & Feld, wrote a letter to directors of TV Azteca, a large Mexican
broadcasting company, informing the board that Akin Gump was withdrawing as
general outside counsel because company officials had refused to disclose in a
securities filing sufficient information concerning a corporate transaction that
could have yielded a profit of $100 million to the company's chairman and con-

trolling shareholder. See Patrick McGeehan, Lauyers Take Suspicions on TVAzteca to
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prospective or ongoing illegality that will cause substantial harm to the
corporation is not a radical new idea but a restatement of the require4 13
ments of both corporate law and state ethics rules.
However, a number of major loopholes in the SEC's rules implementing Section 307 threaten to nullify the effectiveness of the reporting up
requirement. The loopholes discussed in this Article are likely to result in
noncompliance by lawyers and issuers and ineffective enforcement by the
SEC. The SEC should move promptly to close those loopholes through
amendments that narrow or eliminate them.
Third, the reporting out obligation that remains pending before the
SEC (usually referred to as "noisy withdrawal"), although of much less importance than correcting the deficiencies in the reporting up rules, is a
good idea. And it, like the reporting up requirement, is consistent with
the ethics rules of the vast majority of states. We have given this point
special attention because it is contradicted by the statements and understanding of many, perhaps most, lawyers.
The Spiegel case provides a vivid example of a situation in which reporting up was not enough to prevent a securities fraud. When the authoritative committee of the issuer refused to follow the law firm's advice
that the filing the company proposed to make would violate the federal
securities laws, the issuer embarked on a fraudulent course of conduct.
When this happened, the law firm not only failed to withdraw but also
assisted the issuer in making additional fraudulent filings. The issuer and
its investors were harmed. No one knows how frequently situations of this
kind have occurred and will occur, but the lessons of the many corporate
frauds in recent years, supplemented by the unprecedented number of
financial restatements by public companies, strongly suggest that the problem is frequent enough to justify adoption of one of the two pending noisy
withdrawal proposals.

Its Board, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2003, at C1 (reporting actions taken by Akin Gump
pursuant to provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley Act). The lawyer's letter also stated that
Akin Gump "reserve[d] the right to inform the S.E.C. of our withdrawal and the
reasons therefore." Id.
413. In re Gutfreund, Exchange Act Release No. 31554 (1992), provides another vivid example of why reporting up is not enough. Feurstein, Salomon's
CLO, was informed that a trader had engaged in illegal trading, investigated the
matter and reported it to the CEO. When the CEO failed to take action, Feurstein
did nothing. The Commission held that Feurstein, knowing about the wrongdoing, "was obliged to take affirmative steps to ensure that the misconduct was adequately addressed," including "resignation from the . . . [representation], or
disclosure to regulatory authorities." In the absence of required noisy withdrawal,
currently required by only a small minority of jurisdictions, disclosure outside the
organization is extraordinarily unlikely.
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